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THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL

Demonstrated by the

LIGHT of NATURE.

In Two DIALOGUES.

By *WILLIAM CHARLETON*, M.D.

LONDON,
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In Effigiem & librum Dns Charlton
Imago pulcra Est. picta sculporis manu.
At pulcrioem dat libris Autor suis.
Hic Corpus. Illis ipsa Mens depingitur
Imo Vniuersi Mens & Ipsius simul
C B.
P. ombart. Sculpsit A. Londre.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

TO THE

RIGHT HONOVRABLE,

The Lord Marquels of

DORCHESTER,

EARL of KINGSTON, VICOUNT NEWARK, LORD PIERPOINT, and Manvers, &c.

My moſt Honour'd Lord,

AS *in the Firmament, or Æthereal region of the Great World, the Creator hath placed two great Lights, the one to rule the Day, the other to rule the Night: So, (to conſtitute*

ſtitute a perfect Analogy or correſpondence) in the Firmament or Celeſtial part of the Leſſer World, Man, hath He placed two great Truths (the proper Lights of the Soul) the one to rule the Day, or Life of Man; the other to diſpel the horrid darknes of his Night, Death. And theſe are thoſe twin-like proleptical Notions of the Being of the Deity, *and of the* Immortality of the Human Soul. *I call them* Twin-like Proleptical Notions, *becauſe, as the Sun and Moon were made together, ſo were theſe implanted at once in the Mind of the Firſt Man, and have as conſtantly ſhined in the region of every mans Soul ſince, as thoſe have done in the Heavens; however the opacity of terrene Objects and Corporeal Affections may ſeem ſomtimes to eclipſe them: and becauſe, as the Sun doth communicate its light to the Moon, ſo doth the Former of theſe ſuper-excellent Notions, illuminate the* Latter; *the knowledg of the Immortality of the Soul, receiving illuſtration, if not abſolute dependence, from the knowledge of the Exiſtence of God.*

The

The Consideration hereof (may it please your Lordship *) as it engaged me, some years since, to endeavour the Demonstration of the Existence of God; so hath it now of late importuned and prevailed upon me, to attempt the Demonstration of the Immortality of Mens Souls, by pure and sincere* Reason: *To the end, that such as doubt of either, may be convinced of the extream folly and absurdity of their unbelief; and such as firmly believe both, may be corroborated in their true perswasions, observing the Testimony of the* Light of Nature *to make a perfect Symphonie and concordance with that of* Authority Divine. *A Design, certainly, neither inconsistent with the genuine zeal of a* Christian, *nor unworthy the most serious speculation of a* Philosopher: *And were I as well assured, that I have not fallen much short of what might be expected from me, in the capacity of the Latter, as I am, that I have not in the least transgressed the sacred bounds of the Former; I should with more reason hope your Lordships Approbation of my performance*

mance therein, than the sense of my own insufficiency will permit me now to entertain. And, therefore, though perhaps my Reasonings have not attained to that perfection and exquisite Rigour, as to satisfie those immoderately Curious Wits of our Age, who think it much beneath them, to acquiesce in any other Evidence but that of Demonstrations Geometrical (of which notwithstanding, the Argument of these my Discourses is absolutely uncapable; as I have therein manifested, by clear and undeniable reason); Yet I may comfort my self with this, that my present Undertaking will be Acceptable to as many, as reflect upon the Piety *and* Good Intention *of it; and my Proofs sufficiently Perswasive for all such, who come not to examine the force of them with invincible Prejudice, and resolution not to be convinced.*

But, lest I should seem to anticipate your Lordships Judgement, which being most profound, cannot but be also most Equitable; it becometh me rather to excuse this my exceeding Presumption, *in daring*

to

to invoke the Patronage of ſo Illuſtrious a Perſon as your Lordſhip, to ſo ill-compoſed a work as this is; which (with all conceivable Humility and Devotion of Spirit) I here lay at your feet. Truly, My Lord, I have ſo many Reaſons to alleage, in defence of this my Ambition, that, ſhould I inſiſt upon but the one half of them, this ſheet would ſwell into a Volume greater than the Book it ſelf, which it now uſhers to your View. Let it ſuffice, therefore, I moſt humbly beſeech you, that, had I had no inclinations in my ſelf to this way of teſtifying my Reverence and Admiration of your Lordſhips Eminency, both in the Quality of your Perſon, and Perfections of your Mind; yet the very rules of common Prudence, and Law of Decency would not have permitted me to make this Addreſſe to any other, but your ſelf. For,

When I reflect upon Greatneſſe of Condition; *inſtantly my thoughts fix upon your Lordſhip as one, whom your high Birth, and higher Merits (aſſiſted by the favour of Heaven) have elevated to a ſublime ſphear*

of Honour, wherein, among the Nobility of the First Magnitude, you shine with dazling lustre, such as strikes the eyes of all below with solemn Veneration, and excites a noble Emulation in those Few that move in the same orb of Dignity with you.

If I consider greatnesse of Virtue; *I need look no further then upon your Lordship, in whom all Heroical Virtues are so transcendently conspicuous, that they seem to be Essentially concentred in your very Nature, and as if they were therein met together, on purpose to shew the world, How glorious a thing may result from such a Conflux of Great and Good.*

If I respect Greatness of Judgment; *whither, even in this Age of Light, should I go but to your Lordship? Who, having with continued industry cultivated that fertil and capacious field of your Mind, and planted it with all the most usefull Notions in Theology, Metaphysicks, Physicks, Medicine, Law Civil and Common, the Mathematicks, and other Arts and Sciences; have at length reaped so rich a Harvest of General Knowledge,*

as

as might alone plentifully maintain the whole Commonwealth of Letters. *Insomuch as all men are ready to confess, that if there be an Universal Oracle in the World, for the solving all Difficulties in Learning,* You *are it: Nor doth any thing restrain them from accusing you of Engrossing all Science to your self, but your rare Affability, and promptness to impart it to others.*

Should I look forth for the Chiefest Patron of Learned Men; *the Common People themselves, daily observing so great a Confluence of men of the Long Roab, to the place of your residence, and those too the most eminent in their several Faculties, would soon direct me to your Lordship: And your Favour of Schollars is become so notorious, that I have heard it urged as a chief Cause, why Learning hath of late found such admirable Advancement in our Nation, notwithstanding the check of our unhappy Civill Warres.*

In fine, should I consult my own particular Obligations; *Gratitude it self would rise up and injoyn me to make this Oblation*

only

only to your Lordſhip; ſince from you alone I have received more both of Encouragement and Aſſiſtance in my ſtudies, than from the whole World beſide; ſo that, indeed, your Right to this Homage I now make to your Lordſhip, doth wholly take away the Freedom of it.

What I have ſaid, My Lord, *though (I fear me) ſcarce agreeable to your ſevere Modeſty; is yet fully agreeable with Truth, and as wel known as your Name; and therefore, without offending the Law of Decency (as I ſaid afore) I ought not to have permitted this Treatiſe to venture abroad into the common Aer, without that Advantage and Protection, which your, and only your Patronage can give it. Nor would* Policie *have adviſed me otherwiſe: for, albeit among my Readers, many may chance to diſlike the Book it ſelf; yet, ſure I am, moſt will like it much the better, for carrying ſo illuſtrious a Name in the Epiſtle; and the ſevereſt Criticks cannot but commend my judgement in the Dedication.*

Notwithſtanding all theſe Inducements alleage-

alleageable in favour of my Boldneſs, I think it ſafer to caſt my ſelf intirely upon your Lordſhips Charity, *for a Forgiveneſs of it, than to truſt in their importance, how great ſoever it may ſeem. And therefore, without being further rude, in diſturbing your thoughts from things of more weight and concernment; I moſt humbly beg your* Lordſhips *gracious Acceptance of this publick acknowledgment, I here make, of that infinite Obſervance and Thankfulneſs, which is due to you from,*

My moſt Honourd LORD

your Lordſhips moſt humble, moſt obedient, and moſt faithful Servant

W: CHARLETON:

The *Errors* of the Preſs, that have eſcaped the Eye of the Corrector, though but few and veniall, are yet not ſo ſoon excuſed, as mended, by reading

Affectation for affection, in the 10. line of the 10. page.
And, for ane, in 22. l. of the 25. page.
Coppices, for Coppies, in the 2. l. of the 30. page.
Silence, for ſilende, in the 1. l. of the 62. page.
Contraſt, for Contract, in the 9. l. of the 71. page.
Demonſtrateth it ſelf, for demonſtrate thits ſelf in the 19. l. of the 72. page.
Immaterial, for immortal, in the 1. l. of the 85. page.
Nightly, for mightly, in the 14. l. of the 127. page.
No other encouragment, for no other other, & in the 1. l. of the 138. page.
Obeliſckes, for obeliks, in the 1. l. of the 139. page.
Contraſt, for Contract, in the 18 l. of the 153. page.
Make, for moke, in the 22. l. of the 165 page.

An Advertiſement to the READER.

AMong the Ancient Philoſophers (as you may remember) nothing was more frequent, than to deliver their opinions and documents, as wel Phyſical as Moral, in the plain and familiar way of Dialogue; *and the Reaſons, that induced them thereunto, are not unworthy conſideration. For, beſides the opportunity both of commemorating their worthy Friends, and of introducing ſeveral occaſional and digreſſive ſpeculations, that might be, perhaps, nor leſſe grateful, nor leſſe uſeful, than the principal Argument propoſed; they thereby gave themſelves the advantage of freely alleaging the various and different Conceptions and Perſwaſions of Men, concerning the ſubject, which they had deſigned to diſcuſs: Which in the ſtricter method of Poſitive and Apodictical Teaching, they could not with equal conveniency do; And how much better we may judge of the truth of any Theorem, when we have heard as wel the principal Reaſons that impugne, as thoſe that aſſert it, its obvious to common obſervation. Hereunto may be added, that a Diſcourſe digeſted into the form of a familiar Conference, doth by its variety delight, and by its natural freedom and familiarity more gently inſinuate it ſelf into the Mind; as is aſſured by Experience. Now, when you have reflected upon theſe Conſiderations, you clearly underſtand whot were the main Motives, which induced the Author of this Treatiſe, to diſpoſe his Collections and ſolitary Meditations, on this excellent ſubject, the* Immortality of Mens Souls, *into a* Dialogue *conſiſting of Three Perſons, the one Propugning, another Impugning that moſt comfortable Tenent, and the third impartially Determining their Differences. But yet (as I have heard) He had one inducement more to this manner of writing; and that was, thos being not long ſince in* France, *and invited to diſcourſe of the ſame Argument, He delivered the ſubſtance of all that is here ſpoken by one of the Interlocutors (viz.* Athanaſius) *in a free Colloquy, betwixt Himſelf and two of his honour'd Friends, as they were recreating and repoſing themſelves in* Luxenburg *Garden in* Paris. *So that in the Circumſtances of this* Confabulation, *there is nothing of fiction, beſides that of Names proper to each of the Speakers. And, as for thoſe, the Parts they bear in the Diſcourſe, ſufficiently diſcover their Derivations.*

Henry Herringman.

The Contents in Scheme.



Hæc ipsa Philosophorum Meditatio est, Animum à corpore solvere atque segregare. Plato in Phædo.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE *HUMAN SOUL*, Demonstrated by the Light of Nature.

DIALOGVE THE FIRST.

The Interlocutors.

LUCRETIVS, *ATHANASIVS*, *ISODICASTES*.

Lucretius.

WEll met, my deare and honored *Athanasius*; Thus to encounter you, I am sure, is more then a good *omen*: It is a happinesse in present.

Athanasius.

I wish it may be so, *Lucretius*; but, when I reflect upon my owne unworthinesse, and want

of power to be ſerviceable to my Friends, in any proportion to my reſpects, or the honour I receive in their commands; I cannot eaſily be ſo vaine, as to conceive, I can be an occaſion of Happineſſe to you, in any kind. However, let me aſſure you, both of my joy to ſee you, and my readineſſe to ſerve you.

Lucretius.

Ah! *Athanaſius*, I am already convinc'd of both. I am not ſo unacquainted with the exteriour Characters of the Paſsions, as not plainely to perceive the evidences of joy in your countenance. The ſerenity of your aſpect, the pleaſant ſmoothneſſe of your forhead, the vivacity and luſtre of your eyes, and the unuſuall ſanguine tincture of your cheeks, are perfect demonſtrations of that Paſsion within you, which with a ſudden yet gratefull violence cauſeth an effuſion of blood and ſpirits towards the habit of the body; as if the Soul, impatient of delay and diſtance, diſpatch'd thoſe her Emiſſaries to meet and bring in her beloved object. And, as for your ſingular Humanity, and generous inclination to oblige, by doing good offices; the happy experience I have had of that, hath long ſince confirmed me, that, if there be any ſuch thing as a perfect Friend left in the World, certainely you are that thing, where once you are pleaſ'd to profeſſe a Deareneſſe. But, why do I injure my ſelfe, in deferring that content, this faire opportunity offers me, in your converſation; while I endeavour to prevent your further profeſſion of that ſincerity and truth, I long ago knew to be inherent

inherent and eſſentiall to your very Soul? Pray therefore, let me borrow you, for an hour or two, from your meditations or other ſerious imployments, that we may not onely ſolace our ſelves, with recalling to mind our ancient Careſſes, in the dayes of youth, innocence and peace, and mutually congratulate each others health and ſafety, after ſo many troubles, dangers, and changes of Fortune, as the late Civill Warres in *England* hath driven us upon: but alſo revive that *quondam* cuſtome of ours, when we were Fellow-Collegiates in *Oxford*, of diſcourſing freely and calmely of ſome Argument or other in Philoſophy. For, though I have not beene ſo good a husband of my time, as I might have been, nor improved the ſeverall opportunities of augmenting my ſmall ſtock of learning, that ſome yeares travell towards the South, and frequent hearing the moſt eminent profeſſors of all Arts & Sciences, in forraigne Univerſities offered me; yet, let me tell you, I have not beene altogether a ſtranger to ſtudy, nor utterly loſt my familiarity with the Muſes. Nay more, ſince the day I firſt ventured abroad into the World, I have had no Miſtreſſe that held any conſiderable room in my thoughts, but One, and that the very ſame I have many times obſerved you to court, with the ſtrongeſt deſires and ſtricteſt devotion imaginable.

Athanaſius.

Who I? pray Sir, who was that? I doe not remember I ever tooke Cupid for any other

than an imaginary Deity, or that I reſign'd up the rains of my will and Affections into the unſteady hands of a Woman. Sometimes perhaps, I have ſo far comply'd with the incitements of my youth and blood, as to ſeeke to pleaſe my ſelfe in the company and favour of a handſome Woman, for divertiſement: But I was alwaies too well aware of their Tyranny, ever to put my ſelfe ſeriouſly and durably under their government.

Lucretius.

Alas Sir, you miſtake me. I doe not meane a Woman; but Her, upon whom women uſually transfer the blame of all their imperfections, *Nature.*

Athanaſius.

Her, indeed, I have courted long and zealouſly, and intend to dy her Admirer. For, though it be a great while ſince I became conſcious of the vaſt diſtance betwixt us, and of my incapacity to ſatisfie my deſires in the knowledge of ſo much as the leaſt part of Her; yet my deſires are ſtill the ſame, and I diſcover ſuch an infinite variety of freſh beauties & excellencies in her every day, that but to gaze upon them at diſtance; & view Her in the weake and pale reflections made in the glaſſe of my own Reaſon, I finde the moſt pleaſant & raviſhing employment, my minde is capable of, and which me thinks ſufficiently compenſates all the Labours and Difficulties I meet with in my purſuit of her. And if this bee

that

that Miſtreſſe, you have ſo long affected, I eſteem you ſingularly happie in your Choice, and my ſelfe happie in having ſuch a Rivall, as may promote my Addreſſes, and yet at the ſame time further his owne.

Lucretius.

And I beleeve I ſhall likewiſe dy, as I have lived, Her humble Admirer too. For, I have more reaſon then you, conſidering the vaſt advantage you have over me, in Wit, perſpicacity, and judgement; and that your profeſſion daily furniſheth you with variety of freſh obſervations and uſefull experiments (for, the Art of Medicine is the beſt, if not the onely Practical Philoſophy we have, and who ſo enquires into the operations of Nature, by no other light than that of Books and ſolitary ſpeculations, ſhall in the end find his head full of ſpecious Termes, but empty of true and ſolid Science.) I ſay, conſidering this, I have more reaſon than you to deſpaire of ever attaining to the leaſt degree of Familiarity and privacy with ſo divine a Model, as ſhe is. And I confeſſe ingenuouſly to you, that after all my ſtudious applications to Her, for ſo many yeares together, and all my beſt endeavours to inſinuate my ſelfe into her neerer acquaintance, I can get no further then to diſcover, that ſhe is like the Sun, the more we fixe our eyes upon her, ſtill the leſſe we diſcern of her; that ſhe is an immenſe Ocean, too deepe for the ſounding line of Man's reaſon ever to reach Her bottom: and (in a word) that betwixt Us, who call our ſelves Philoſophers, Secretaries of Na-

ture, &c. and the Illiterate, who calmely acquieſce in the ſimple information of their ſenſes, thereis no other difference, but what conſiſteth wholly in Opinion: We flatter our ſelves with a beleef, that we know more than really we do; and they remaine free from the diſquiet of that curioſity, which occaſions our deluſion; they neither know nor beleeve they know; we only beleeve we know. And yet, for all this diſcouragement, I am ſtill conſtant in my affections to Her, and my Soul as eager and hot in the purſuit, as if it expected to carry Her clearely in the end. So that I cannot but ſtay heer a litle, and wonder at the ſtrange temper of my Mind, which is ſtill poſſeſs'd with a ſtrong deſire of what I ſee no poſſibility ever to enjoy; eſpecially when I reflect upon what I have been taught, by ſuch as were well skil'd in the nature of Paſſions, that *Love is alwaies accompanied with Probability of Fruition*, which is the reaſon we much oftner obſerve perſons of high rank to become enamour'd on their inferiors, than the contrary. This I am ſure of, that this unceſſant deſire of knowledge muſt be Natural, and coeſſential to the Soul of Man; or elſe it muſt be a Production of Opinion, as ſundry other Appetites are. And, if it be ingrafted into our minds, by Natures owne hand, methinks it ſhould be more capable of ſatisfaction; for, Nature doth never inſtitute any thing in vaine, but commonly provides meanes for the expletion of each Appetite ſhe createth. But, if it be not Natural, and the effect only of Preſumption; how comes it to be ſo Univerſall? there

there being no man, though nere ſo rude and ſavage, who doth not perceive his Mind to be under the ſovereignty of this Affection, more or leſſe: nay, as I remember, I have read a diſcourſe of yours, wherein you have proved that all the Actions of our lives are in ſome ſort or other the effects of this Tendency to Science. And thus you ſee, *Athanaſius* into what a labyrinth I have unexpectedly brought my thoughts; nor can I hope to extricate my ſelfe, unleſſe you ſhall pleaſe to lend me the Clue of your ſtonger and more deciſive reaſon.

Athanaſius.

Lend you the clue of my Reaſon, ſay you? Alack, alack, *Lucretius*, I well perceive, your long converſation which the French, hath infected you with the humour of ſaying a great deale more then you thinke, and tempting your Friends modeſty with attributes of more value than you know belongs to them, as if I could be ſo arrogant as to undertake the ſolution of a Ridle, which *Lucretius* really finds too hard for him. No, *Lucretius*, no, I am too conſcious of my owne dulneſſe and ignorance, ever to entertaine a conceipt ſo extreamely vaine. But, come, I perceive your drift. I know you to be one of *Epicurus*'s Diſciples, and indeed the moſt eminent amongſt them; and having long ſince digeſted and heightned all your Maſters Arguments, for the Mortality of the Human Soul; knowing me to be irreconcileable to that uncomfortable and dangerous Opinion, you would now

now take the opportunity of experimenting the force of them upon ſo weake an Adverſary as my ſelfe. Not that I think a perſon of your wit and acuteneſſe can be ſo inſenſible of the admirable and almoſt divine operations of that noble Eſſence, even while ſhe is lodged in Walls of clay, as to be ſeriouſly of his perſwaſion, That ſhe is onely a certaine Contexture or diſpoſition of thinneſt and ſubtileſt Atoms, and ſo upon the change of that diſpoſition by death, is immediately diſſolved, and thoſe Atoms againe diſperſed in the infinite Inanity or Space; but, that you would willingly heare what I am able to alleage to the contrary.

Lucretius.

Will you beleeve me, *Athanaſius*? I had no ſuch deſigne upon you: Nor can I eaſily conceive, how you could from that doubt I propoſed to you, draw any ſuch ſuſpition.

Athanaſius.

No? Whither then could that diſcourſe of yours tend? Is it not plaine that the Soul's inſatiate and unlimited deſire of knowledge, is a good Argument of her being Immaterial, and conſequently indiſſoluble?

Lucretius.

O, now I apprehend you. I remember indeed I have heard that urged, and as a mighty Argument in the Schooles, but at preſent I had no reflection thereupon. However, I thanke you for giving

giving me the hint, and humbly beg your purſuite of it. 'Tis a Theam worthy ſo ſtrong a brain as yours, and (pardon my freedom) I think you are oblig'd to ſatisfie the expectation of the World, by divulging your Conceptions concerning that Subject. For, as I remember, in the Concluſion of your *Phyſiology* (which I had the good fortune not long ſince to ſee and peruſe, in the *Jeſuits* Library here in *Paris*, and with more content and benefit to my mind, than your modeſty will permit me to expreſſe to you) you promiſe a ſecond part thereof, in way of diſcovery of the Nature and Immortality of the Reaſonable Soul of man.

Athanaſius.

Truth is, I there ſaid ſomwhat of my Hopes and willingneſſe to finiſh that ſtructure (how ſlight and confuſed ſoever it were) by addition of what ſeem'd requiſite to make it entire, which is the Conſideration of the nature of Souls; as well thoſe of Unreaſonable, as thoſe of Reaſonable Creatures: And this ſome, and you among the reſt, have been pleas'd to interpret for a promiſe. But, grant it be ſo; Yet, ſure I am, it was only Conditionall, and in caſe I ſhould receive the friendly Approbation of ſuch judicious perſons as had ſurvey'd the firſt Story of that building, for my encouragement; and obtain Leiſure and Quiet, for my better effecting the reſt. And how far I have been from receiving that, or obtaining theſe, I ſuppoſe you cannot be ignorant.

Lucretius.

Yes really I am.

Athanasius.

That's somwhat strange. Why then give me leave to tell you, that, instead of that Candor in the forgiveness of my lapses, and that approbation of my toyl and industry, which I look'd for from my Readers; I have reaped no other fruit of all my labours in that long and difficult Work, but most severe, inhumane, uncharitable, unjust Censures. Some condemning me of too much youthfull Heighth and Affection in the style; others accusing me of usurping other men's Notions, Maxims, and Experiments for my own, without so much as naming the Authors, to whose bounteous Wit and Industry I was beholding for their discovery and communication; a third sort reproaching me with inconsideration, in assuming a taske of weight so vastly disproportionate to the slender nerves of my judgment; and a fourth scandaling me with negligence in the duties of my Profession, and invading the certainty of all its Rules and Maxims, while I wholly addicted my selfe to the Innovation of its Fundamentalls. Now if you can allow this for encouragement, I shall the lesse wonder at your expectation of my proceeding to the accomplishment of that worke, which (I call Heaven to witnesse out of pure devotion to knowledge; and commendable ambition to be serviceable to the Commonwealth of Learning in proportion

portion to my talent) I had propoſed to my ſelf to enterpriſe: Otherwiſe, I hope, you will not envy me, the Peace I aim at, in being henceforth ſilent, and employing all my Collections, Obſervations, and Speculations Philoſophicall, only to the furniſhing the little Cabinet of my own brain. I have now at length learned, that *Sapere domi*, to endeavour the acquiſition of Science in private, ought to be the principall ſcope of a Wiſe man: Nor ſhall I eaſily ſuffer my ſelf to be diverted from the reſolution I have taken, conſtantly to put that excellent Leſſon in practice.

And as for Leiſure and Quiet (without both which, you well know, no man can compile a work of any ſolidity and accurateneſſe, in any part of Learning whatſoever) I have been ſo farre from enjoying either of them, that on the contrary, from the time I firſt publiſhed that Phyſiology you mentioned, even to this very day, I have been embroil'd in as many troubles and diſtractions, as malice, perſecution, and ſharp adverſity could accumulate upon me. I have been driven from my Country, Houſe, Family, Books, Friends, and Acquaintance; and wholly depriv'd of all the chief endearments of life; inſomuch that I am a perfect ſtranger to any ſuch thing as comfort, but what I ſometimes form to my ſelf out of the aſſurance of my Innocence, and the hope of that compenſation that is ordained for Patience in unjuſt ſufferings. In a word, *Lucretius*, (for as it ſharpneth the ſenſe of my afflictions in my ſelf, for me to recount them; ſo I know it cannot be, but very unpleaſant to

you, to hear the miſerable adventures of your Friend) for almoſt theſe two laſt years, I have been continually toſs'd up and down by a Tempeſt of Calamity, which is yet ſo violent, that the dangers, which threaten me, ſeem to deſpiſe the prevention of that ſmall skill I have in the uſe of my Compaſs: My Anchors are loſt, my Veſſell leaks, the VVinds hurry it from land, and I hourly exſpect to ſink down-right. Nor can I ſee how it is poſſible for me to avoid it, unleſſe relief ſuddenly come from that Divine Power; by whoſe permiſſion (for my chaſtiſement) it is, that the cruelty and rage of my Enemies have raiſed this ſtorm againſt me. Conſider, then, whether this be a Condition fit to ſtudy in, or whether you could forbear to have an indignation againſt this folly; who, being in ſuch a caſe, ſhould hope to write any thing worthy ſo judicious and curious an eye, as yours is? If not, pray ceaſe to reproach me, with having been wanting as well to my ſelf as to the VVorld, in not making good the Promiſe you urge; And rather give me your advice how to deport my ſelf as becomes a Philoſopher, with Conſtancy and tranquillity of mind, than ſtrive to aggravate my diſquiet, by engaging me to write on ſo abſtruſe and difficult a Subject.

Lucretius.

You have told me enough to change my Curioſity into Sadneſſe and Commiſeration. I ſhall not be ſo rude to exaſperate the ſmart of your wounds, by preſſing you further to diſcloſe them to

to me, nor am I ſo good a Phyſician for the Mind, as to preſcribe you any more ſoveraign remedies againſt Diſcontent, than what I am ſure you well know already. But ſince you require my advice, I ſhall bid you look into that Magazine of choice Morall Precepts, which you have been long collecting, and treaſuring up in your own breaſt: For, there, I am ſure, you will find ſuch Cordialls, and vertuous Antidotes, as will ſecure your Soul from being diſcompos'd at the worſt that evill Fortune can do againſt you, and heighten your thoughts and Reſolutions to a generous defiance of temporall croſſes, and a perfect Contempt of the VVorld. And among the reſt, as you meet with it, be ſure to dwell longeſt upon this rule, *Never ſuffer your Spirit to ſink*; ſtill remembring, that Vertue is like precious Odours, moſt fragrant, when incens'd or cruſh'd; and that the extremities of worthy Perſons are uſually annihilated in the conſideration of their own deſervings, but alwaies overcome in the end, by their bravery and magnanimity ſhew'd in the entertainment of them. VVhich I the rather point at, becauſe I know you to be of a Melancholy diſpoſition, and ſuch commonly ſuffer adverſe accidents to make too deep impreſſions upon their mind, which is thereupon apt to dejection, which ſome have defined to be the firſt ſtep to finall Deſpair; And how difficult a thing it is to raiſe him up, who helps to depreſs himſelf; I need not tell you. It will not be amiſſe alſo for you, often to have recourſe to gentle and Philoſophicall Divertiſements, and

to

to admit conferences with your Friends, touching ſome Argument or other, that you are able to diſcourſe of familiarly, and without torturing the brain, and putting your Imagination upon the rack: For, by this means, you ſhall inſenſibly wear out the Characters your misfortunes and diſtreſſes have ſtampt in your Soul, and find a pleaſure in taking occaſionall reviews of the ſeverall uſefull Notions filed up in the rolls of your Memory, and at the ſame time, both benefit and endear your company.

Athanaſius,

Sir, your Counſel is excellent, and I ſhall make it my chief care to let you ſee how much I prize it, by my endeavours to follow it preciſely. But, know withall, *Lucretius*, that the foreſight, I tell you, I have of my approaching ruine, as to all that Fortune laies claim to as hers, doth not imply either my Fear of it, or want of reſolution to ſuſtein that, and even Death it ſelf, in what ſhape ſoever it ſhall preſent it ſelf, without ſtooping one hair's breadth below that pitch of ſpirit, that belongs to an honeſt Mind to conſerve in all encounters. 'Tis one thing to previſe a danger, and another to be ſtartled and grow pale at the ſtroak of it: I well underſtand the value of the goods of the Mind above thoſe of Fortune: And if I can be ſo much in favour with Heaven, as to be endowed but with the leaſt portion of the Former, I ſhall eaſily part with the Latter, and account my ſelf rich enough in the exchange. Be confident therefore, that ſo long

long as I can conſerve my integrity, and the peace of my Conſcience entire, I ſhall alſo keep my Spirit from dejection, nor will it be in the power of my Adverſaries ever to depreſſe it, with all the weights of adverſity they can heap upon me.

As for that way of Divertiſement, by free and unbiaſsed Philoſophicall Conferences you ſpeak of; I approve it as very available both to the gentle weaning of the Mind from ſad apprehenſions, and the exerciſe of its more agreeable Habits. But, I fear me, you do as that Phyſician, who preſcribed his Patient a doſe of the grand Elixir, in the yolk of a Phœnix egge; You refer me to a Medicine I cannot poſſibly obtain. For, though among the French there be many excellent Wits, and men eminent for their abilities in all kinds of Learning; Yet I obſerve them generally to be of a temper more fit for hot and teſty Diſputes, then calm and peaceable Debates, in way of Diſquiſition: and commonly, they are ſo fierce and ardent in defence of their own preconceived opinions, that they account it a piece of diſreſpect and incivility in any man that ſeems to doubt, or call the verity of them in queſtion. So that a Noble perſon of our Nation, who hath lived long in this City, and is able to give a true Character of the French Genius, as to this particular, was pleas'd to tell me within theſe few daies, that their humour of prejudice to all that is not their own, though really much better then their own, extends alſo to their Tenents in Arts and Sciences; And that

it

it would be hard for me to find a Scholar among them, who would not rather loſe the opportunity of inveſtigating a truth, by an equitable and patient comparing of the ſtrength of other mens reaſons with his own, then not appear to have clearly underſtood the full nature of the thing, before it was propoſed. Now, how highly diſagreable this would be to my Genius, which is ſo averſe to all conteſts and paſſionate Altercations, and which alwaies brings me to Philoſophicall Diſcourſes only as to Enquiries, not final Determinations, and with perfect indifferency to either ſide, not caring at all whether my Allegations, or my Opponent's, give the greater light to certainty, ſo I attain to any degree of certainty in the end: I ſay, how diſagreeable this Overweening of the French, would be to me in Converſation, you may eaſily conjecture. Beſides I am yet but beginning to ſpeak their Language, and ſo am uncapable of the benefit and pleaſure of their Colloquies. And though many of them are very great Maſters of the Latine, and write very elegantly therein; Yet when they come to ſpeak it, you may perceive ſuch a tedious redundancy of words flowing from their tongues, as will ſufficiently convince you, that they cannot ſuddenly tranſlate the conceptions of their minds into another Language, without retaining the verboſity of their own. Which I find exceedingly troubleſome to me, in reſpect of the narrowneſſe of my capacity, that cauſeth me many times to loſe the notion and ſenſe, in the long and ſtrict attention to the expreſſions; Juſt as

as when we meet ſome perſon in brave and gawdy clothes, the waving of his Feather and Ribons, and the Luſtre of his Lace, ſo diſtract and take off our ſight, that we ſee the leſſe of his Face; and when he is paſt by us, we remember more of his dreſſe, than his ſtature, complexion and aſpect. And thus you ſee how unlikely it is for me to meet with the Phyſick you preſcribe me, here among the French.

And as for the Engliſh that now reſide here; I am not acquainted with any one (except your ſelf) who makes it his buſineſſe to purſue the favour of thoſe ſevere and reſerved Muſes, that you and I ſo much adore. Some doubtleſſe there are of the ſame contemplative inclination; But (as I tell you) I have not encountred ſo much felicity as to know any one of them; and if I did, without good experience of his candor, and ſome degree of intimacy, I ſhould think it an unpardonable Solœciſme in good manners, to moleſt him with the importunity of my Converſation, which ſavours of nothing ſo much as of ſowrneſſe and melancholy. So that unleſſe you pleaſe to be the remedy you adviſe, I ſee no probability of my obtaining it, till I return into *England.*

Lucretius.

What you have now remarked of the French's being generally great Opinionators, my obſervation alſo confeſſeth to be altogether true. Nor are there among our Country-men, in this place, many of thoſe we call Votaries of Na-

ture; Yet I can introduce you to the knowledge of a Perſon, noble by Birth, and of high condition, but infinitely more noble by the Heroick endowments of his better part, and the large meaſure of Knowledge he hath acquired in all things of moſt uſe, to the well government of our ſelves, in all the various occurrences of life. He is a prudent Eſtimator of mens actions and opinions, but no rigid Cenſor of either. A valiant Aſſertor of truth, yet far from Tyranny; where he finds an errour, as alwaies reflecting on human frailty, and the obſcurity of things in themſelves. He well knows how to overcome, but not at all to triumph; And when he hath overcome, you can hardly perceive he ever contended. For, he doth not ſeem ſo much to refute, as to teach, rather gently inſinuating verity, then ſtrugling in the detection of falſhood. Curious in the collection of Books, diligent in reading them, accurate in examining what they deliver, & alwaies more favourable to Reaſon, then to Authority, unleſſe in matters of Faith. A great Lover of Experiments in Phyſick and Chymiſtry; Yet no waies infected with the vanities of the one, or frauds of the other. A friend to all learned & judicious men of your Profeſſion, he meets with; and a Patron to the Art it ſelf. Witneſſe the vaſt paines and coſt he hath lately beſtow'd upon his Garden, wherein are now growing more then two thouſand ſix hundred Plants, of different ſorts; Each of them being, according to admirable method, diſpoſ'd into a particular Claſſis, conteining all the ſpecies referrible to their

their proper Genus or Tribe: So that considering the great variety, and orderly ranging of the Plants, I cannot think it much inferior to the famous Seminary of Vegetables at *Bloys*, belonging to the Duke of *Orleans*. Witness likewise the spacious Elaboratory, he hath caused to be erected in his house, and furnished with Furnaces, Vessells, and Instruments of all sorts; Which he imployes rather for his recreation, and the extraction of the most virtual and purest parts of Herbes, and other medicinal Simples, and the distillation of choise Cordial Waters and Spirits, for the conservation of health, than in practising the impostures of *Pseudo*-chymists, that pretend to the mysterious Art of Transmutation of Metalls, and making the Philosophers stone, as they call it. And yet I have known when he hath permitted one of those Bastards of *Hermes*, therein to run through a whole Progresse, or course of Spagirical operations, in order to the production of the Seminal tincture of Gold: But, it was only, that the man himself might be the better convinc'd, and the World satisfi'd of the folly and knavery of such attempts, by the constant unsuccessefullness of them. In a word, *Athanasius*; he is a perfect *Virtuoso*, one infinitely above the best Character I can give him: Nor do I herein aim at praising him, but assuring you, that in him you may meet with the most pleasing and satisfactory Conversation in the World.

Athanaſius.

Even now you mention'd the Philoſophers ſtone, *Lucretius*, and ſure this excellent Perſon you deſcribe, is it: For if the Elixir be only Virtue in a Parable, as I know ſome wiſe men have affirmed, why may not I think him ſo? But who is it, I pray?

Lucretius.

I am ſure you have often heard his name, and perhaps ſeen him too: 'Tis *ISODICASTES*.

Athanaſius.

I know him both by ſight and fame. He was with us in *Oxford*, in time of the late Warres, and in great favour and truſt with the King his Maſter. And now I am confirmed of the truth of all you have ſaid of him, having heard as much from ſundry others of worth and Credit. But will you adventure the reputation of your Judgment ſo far as to commend me to his notice? I fear, you dare not.

Lucretius.

Yes I do, and doubt not to receive his thanks for my Labour, for I know you to be ſingularly able in your Profeſſion, and as free in the communication of any thing you have found conducible to the advancement of it, or any other part of Learning: And either of thoſe two qualities

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(if you had no other that were commendable) is ſufficient to endear you to him in a ſhort time.

Athanaſius.

When will you permit me to wait upon you to him?

Lucretius.

Even when you pleaſe: What ſay you of going thither this preſent evening? For his houſe is not far off this place, and about this hour of the day he is uſually at leaſure, and diſpoſed to admit viſits. We ſhall find him, I ſuppoſe, viewing his Nurſery of Plants, and keeping a Diary of their ſhort lives; recording in the margine of his Catalogue, which of them are now in their youth or immaturity, which in their full vigour and growth, and which beginning to decline; And noting alſo which is in the bloſſome, which in the Flower, which in the Seed, which fit to be cropt, that ſo he may be exact in knowing the true ſeaſon when each kind attains to its pride and perfection of Virtue. For, at this time of the year, and till the latter end of *Auguſt*, this commonly is his recreation every evening, in caſe the weather be favourable. So that if you think fit, I will conduct you thither inſtantly.

Athanaſius.

With all my heart; I am not for deferring happineſſe one moment.

Lucretius

Lucretius.

Content; But let me advertiſe you of one thing before we go: Though you are a ſtranger to him in perſon; yet he is acquainted with your Genius, by your Writings. You know the ſaying, *Oratio indicat virum.* And it is not many daies ſince I heard him commend your Phyſiology, and wiſh you would proceed to publiſh the remainder of it, concerning the Immortality of the Reaſonable Soul. So that aſſure your ſelf, he will ſoon find occaſion to draw you on to diſcourſe of that ſubject: Nor can you with civility decline it. Therefore, provide your ſelf for the ambuſh, by turning over the records of your memory, and rallying your ſcattered notions, in as good order as you can, upon ſo ſhort warning.

Athanaſius.

Hear you, *Lucretius*; doth this conſiſt with the counſell you gave me, even now, to divert my ſelf from the ſenſe of my misfortunes, by entertaining frank and familiar conferences with ingenious company, without torturing my brain, and racking my imagination? You are like a Phyſician, who forbids his patient Wine, and yet can be content to ſee him drunk, ſo it be in his company. Do you think I can diſcourſe any whit tolerably of ſo difficult an Argument, and in ſuch a preſence, without great labour of the Mind?

Lucretius.

Lucretius.

Why not? having profoundly conſidered, and frequently revolved the matter in your Mind, before hand, as I am confident you have, or otherwiſe you would not have given us hopes of your writing a particular Treatiſe thereupon. Pray, deal ingenuouſly with me, have you no *Adverſaria*, no Firſt-Draught of that piece you intended, among your Papers?

Athanaſius.

Some few ſheets I have, in which I haſtily ſcribled over my Collections, and Firſt Thoughts, as they chanced to occurr: But diſjoynted, without Form, and wanting the decency of connexion and language. But what of that? Would you have an Architect acquaint you with his deſign, only by ſhewing you his Materialls lying confuſedly congeſted together in a heap?

Lucretius.

From a view of the Materials, I can gueſs at the ſtrength and firmneſſe of the building intended, though not at the Model or Platform. Therefore, without any further excuſes or evaſions, be pleaſed to comply with the deſires and expectation of your Friends, either by affording us the liberty of peruſing thoſe memorials of your thoughts; or by abſtracting the ſubſtance or marrow of them your ſelf, and infuſing it into our ears in a brief diſcourſe.

Athanaſius.

Athanasius.

I perceive, *Lucretius*, you well understand the unlimited power you have over me; otherwise you would not thus have put me upon such a Demonstration of it, as requires me, at the same time, to lay aside my Reason, and resign up my discretion wholly to the conduct of your importune Curiosity. But, that you may see I am all obedience and complacency, where I have once enter'd into a league of amity; I will no longer consider the hazard of my reputation, in exposing to your Examination (which I am sure, will be strict enough) a Summary of those Reasons, which I conceive sufficiently strong and evident to evince the Immortality of the Human Soul, while they yet want due Connexion, and such illustration of Art and Language, as they deserve, and as perhaps I could have bestowed upon them, at my better leisure, and vacancy from sollicitude of mind: I say, I will no longer keep my reputation in the ballance against your Commands, but freely deliver you an Abbreviate of my Notes, touching the subject mentioned. Nor will I defer your satisfaction longer than untill to morrow, about this time; When, if you please to meet me here in this cool Cypress Walk, in *Luxemburgh* Garden, you shall hear what I am able to say, concerning that particular. In the mean time, I will go home and look over my papers, and digest the contents of them into the most naturall method I can, upon so short premeditation. If they answer not your expecta-

expectation, be juſt in imputing it to your own unreaſonable haſte; Which would not allow me convenient time, to caſt them in a more uniform mould: If they do, be not ſo much a Courtier, as to aſcribe it to any thing, beſides the Goodneſſe of the Cauſe, in defence whereof they are alleaged.

Lucretius.

My dear *Athanaſius*, my heart is too narrow to contein the joy you have infuſed into me; Nor can I expreſſe the ſmalleſt part of that content, which redounds to me from this your moſt affectionate condeſcention. And yet I would urge your kindneſs to a further grant.

Athanaſius.

Of what?

Lucretius.

Of ſomthing, that will conduce to your own advantage, in the end.

Athanaſius.

I ſhall have but little regard to that, if what you require may but be really gratefull to your ſelf. Pray, therefore, ceaſe henceforth to eſtimate my readineſſe to ſerve my Friend, by the proportion his requeſts hold to my own utility ane m olument: And freely ſpeak your deſire.

Lucretius.

It is no more, but that you would permit me

to interrupt you, now and then, in your discourses, to morrow, when we meet, in case I see occasion of Doubting, or Objecting any thing that seems materiall. For (as you know) I am somwhat strict in examining the force of all Arguments proposed to me, especially of such as pretend Evidence and Certitude requisite to full Conviction. I would not willingly admit any Position into my beleif, but what hath past the severest triall of my Reason, I can put it to.

Athanasius.

Nor shall you, *Lucretius*, be circumvented or ensnared into an error, by any sophistry of mine. If what I shall urge, in favour of the Soul's Eternall subsistence after death, shall appeare to you to be lesse cleare or solid, than I apprehend; pray, detect the invalidity thereof and spare not. Where I am once assur'd of Candor, I love to be opposed. But since you intend to raise Scruples and Objections out of what I shall deliver, and that it is easily possible for you and me to dissent about the preheminence of each others reasonings: me thinks, it were but just, we had some Third person present, whose judgement and equity may qualifie him to play the *Arbiter* betwixt us, and unto whose decisive Verdict we ought equally to submit our Differences.

Lucretius.

You have prevented me: *Isodicastes*, I am confident, will do us the honour to be the Man. I know none so fit, in respect either of the admirable

rable perſpicacity of his underſtanding, or the ſincerity and uprightneſſe of his judgement: As no Fallacy can eſcape his remark, ſo the whole world cannot bribe him to a partial ſuffrage. And if you approve the choice, I will undertake to prevaile upon him to be preſent at our conference, and do us that noble office.

Athanaſius.

Pray, let him know withall how far I was from ſeeking this occaſion of his trouble, and that I am not ſo vainly conceipted of the worth of my notions, as to promiſe to my ſelf they ſhall compenſate his patience, by adding one mite to that large magazine of knowledge, He is already maſter of. All I hope for at his hands, is a charitable forgiveneſſe of my Audacity, in daring to enter the liſt againſt ſo potent an Opponent, concerning ſo difficult and ſublime an Argument, and before ſo diſcerning a Judge; and that with ſuch blunt weapons, as your unexpected and ſuddaine compulſion of me to the encounter, enforceth me to make uſe of.

Lucretius.

Feare not my juſtice, either in owning the violence I have uſed, to draw you to comply with my deſires, or ſaving your modeſty the labour of prepoſſeſſing him with the extreme diffidence you have of your own Abilities. And now we are agreed upon the manner and circumſtances of our Duell, pray, let us a little ſolace our ſelves with a turne or two in this coole and fragrant walk, into which the neighbouring Orange

trees so plentifully transmit the gratefull odour of their flowers. How like you this so much admired Garden? Doth it not clearely demonstrate to you, how great the additions are, that the beauties of Nature are capable of receiving, from the hand of Art?

Athanasius.

I think it worthy as great a share in the spectators wonder, as the vast and magnificent Fabrick to which it is adjoyned. And if it be lawful for us to guesse at the Greatnesse of Princes Minds, as well as at that of their wealth, by the amplitude and sumptuousnesse of the structures they have reared; I may conjecture, that the Foundresse of this prodigious Pallace, had a Soul in all things equal to the height of her Dignity, and the largeness of Empire, she once enjoy'd; For, otherwise her subtile Favorite whom she had raised to that immoderate sublimity of power, as made him fit to be her Competitor for Soveraignty in dominion; would not have conceived himselfe unstable in his unlimited sway, till he had clipt the wings of her aspiring Soul, and left her embroyld in the jealousie of the King, her Sonne: who being perswaded, that the lustre of his Diadem was eclipsed by her shining in the same Sphere; readily embraced their counsell, who suggested that the greatnesse of her policy and aimes, was never to be obscured, but by removing her into another climate, by a kind of gentle Banishment. Had she been of as soft and flexible a spirit as the King was, whose power he

he employ'd to her ſuppreſſion; doubtleſſe, *Monſier the Cardinall* had never thought her worthy the honour of his Fears. *Great envie is alwaies a certaine ſigne of great Merit.* But to leave my unſeaſonable reflection on the Queen, who raiſed this ſtupendious Building, and anſwer your demand of my opinion of the Garden; I tell you, in a word, it is the moſt Princely I ever ſaw, for the largeneſſe of the ground or Contents, for the uniformity it holds to the deſigne of the Houſe, for the freedome of Proſpect from all the principall roomes thereof, and for the variety of entertainments it affords, according to the ſeverall ſeaſons of the yeare. Here are Grotta's, Groves, and places of ſhade, for Eſtivation; and artificiall Fountaines perpetually ſpouting up ſtreames of water, to attemper the fervour of the air, in heat of Summer: Spatious and open walks to take in the more temperate and refreſhing breath of the Spring: and arched Piazza's that afford equall ſhelter from Sun, cold or raine. Here is a peculiar Garden for each moneth in the yeare, in which things of beauty and ſweetneſſe are then in ſeaſon. Here is variety well ſorted, Magnificence and Curioſity gracefully united; and yet a Natural wildeneſſe ſo wel imitated in all, that the lovelineſs & perfection of the whole, ſeemes to conſiſt in the neat diſguiſe of the ſymmetry of the parts: ſo that Art is almoſt loſt in the excellency of it ſelf, & viſible only in diſſembling a confuſion. Here Palats & Noſes of all ſorts are exactly accommodated and ſtrangers uſually diſpute, whether the ſight or Taſt, or Smell be the better provided for: nor

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is it easie to decide the controversie, where each sense is feasted even to satiety. Here are litle Copf pies of Orenge trees, environed with hedges o Jasmine; as if the Planter had respect to the mixture of odours in the aer, and intended——

Lucretius.

Hold, *Athanasius*, if the distance doth not deceive me, yonder comes *ISODICASTES*, the wise and good——— Yes it is He, I am sure. I can distinguish him thus far off, by the gravity of his Habit, and the sober evenness of his pace, with a naturall decorum and comlinesse, expressing the majesty and serenity of that noble Principle, which gives motion to his body from within.

Athanasius.

Pray put me not out of countenance, by telling him before my face, how inconsiderate I have been, in accepting your challenge against to morrow. Doe not insult over the facility and good nature of your friend, by boasting the force of your influence upon him.

Lucretius.

I doe consider your excesse of modesty, and, therefore, will not touch upon our appointment, while you are present. But, now he drawes neer, let us not be rude in seeming insensible of the singular respect due to his quality and worth: but mend our pace, and, by our speed to meet him civilly, confesse our transport of joy

to

to have the happy opportunity —— Nobleſt and worthieſt *Iſodicaſtes*, your moſt humble ſervant.

Iſodicaſtes.

Witty *Lucretius*, I am yours, and glad to encounter you thus unexpectedly.

Lucretius.

I ask your leave Sir to preſent to your knowledge, this friend of mine here, a Perſon of more than common merit, which is more than I need tell you, when you have heard me name him.

Iſodicaſtes.

I remember, I have ſeen this Gentlemans face often, or one extreamly like him, at leaſt: But cannot, on the ſuddain recall to mind, or where, or when.

Lucretius.

In *Oxford*, Sir, in time of the Warrs, doubtleſſe, if at all. For, He was ſcarcely arrived at the twentieth year of his age, when the flames of our inteſtine commotions firſt brake forth into open hoſtility: And ſince they were extinguiſh't in the ruines of the Royall party, you have been conſtantly reſident here in *France*, whither he is but lately come. But, not to hold you longer in ſuſpence, This is *Athanaſius*, of whom I have heard you ſpeak, upon occaſion of ſome new opinions and experiments, in the Phyſiology he not long ſince publiſhed.

Iſodicaſtes.

Isodicastes.

Worthy *Athanasius*, fortune could not have brought me to the knowledge of any Person, who had aforehand a greater share in my esteem then your self. I am an honourer of your Art, and so cannot but have a singular value and respect for any, that endeavours by his studies and writings to contribute towards the advancement of it, as I am satisfied you have done.

Athanasius.

Most honour'd Sir, I am not conscious to my self of any thing in me, worthy the honour of your slightest notice, but barely my Good-will to Learning, and the sincere Devotion and reverence I bear toward your noble self, who are both so great an Ornament, and Patron of it. And if you shall vouchsafe to admit me to the lowest degree in your good Grace and favourable regard, upon so small an account as that: You will demonstrate the vast extent of your Charity, in obliging a poor and inconsiderable thing, and one that hath nothing but the simplicity of his Zeal, to qualifie him for your service.

Isodicastes.

You are unreasonably modest, thus to diminish your self, *Athanasius*: And as immoderate in your overvaluation of my Capacity to expresse my affection to Learning and Learned Men, otherwise than only by the content I take in their con-

converſation. But, let us leave this formality of Complements to young Courtiers, as ſavouring of leſſe plainneſſe and freedom, than ought to be amongſt the Votaries of Truth and Science, when they meet together: And give me leave to enquire of you (for, it ſeems you came but lately thence) ſomwhat concerning the ſtate of Learning now in *England*. I have been told of great Diſcoveries made, by men of your Faculty there, in Anatomy, Diſeaſes, and their waies of Cure; Far different from the Principles and Doctrine of the Antients. I have heard alſo, that the Mathematicks are in high reputation among you, and have received much, if not of improvement, yet of illuſtration, from the happy induſtry of ſome, in our Univerſities. Pray, therefore, let it not be troubleſome to you, to give us ſome hints of the particulars, wherein the Wits of our Nation have of late been ſo highly beneficiall to the Commonweal of Philoſophy.

Athanaſius.

Sir, you have laid a command upon me, which is impoſſible for me to obey, without ſhamefully betraying my own ignorance, and (by a diſadvantageous repreſentation of them) much diſparaging the noble ſucceſſes of thoſe Heroicall Wits among our Country-men, who have addicted themſelves to the Reformation and Augmentation of Arts and Sciences, and made a greater Progreſſe in that glorious deſign, than many ages before them could aſpire to, not-

withſtanding all their large hopes, ſpecious promiſes, and manifold attempts. Nevertheleſſe, being your command, I ſhall ſtrive to yeeld obedience to it, ſo far forth at leaſt, as to recount to you in brief, what upon the ſuddain I can call to mind, of the moſt conſiderable Novelties in Naturall Philoſophy, Medicine, the Optiques, Aſtronomy and Geometry, found out by the ingeny and labours of men now living in *England*, & as yet in the prime of their ſtrength and years.

In the Colledge of Phyſicians in *London*, (which without offence to any thing, but their own Modeſty, I may pronounce to be the moſt eminent Society of men, for Learning, Judgement and Induſtry, that is now, or at any time hath been, in the whole World) you may behold *Solomons Houſe* in reality. Some there are, who conſtantly imploy themſelves in diſſecting Animals of all kinds, as well living as dead; and faithfully recording all ſingularities that occur to their obſervation, both in the ſeverall ſpecies, and individualls: That ſo they may come to know, what is perfectly naturall, what preternatural, what rare and monſtrous among the parts of them; And alſo what reſemblance there is betwixt the Conformation of the parts in the body of Man, and thoſe in the bodies of other Animals, ordained by Nature to the ſame, or like and equivalent uſes. So that it will be hard for any man to bring thither any Fiſh, Bird, or Inſect, whoſe Entrails theſe genuine Sons of *Democritus* are not already intimately acquainted with; or, at leaſt, which they will not with admirable

mirable dexterity and skill anatomize without confuſion of the ſmalleſt Organ, and inſtantly explore the proper office of each Organical part, by remarking the Figure, Subſtance, Veſſells, and ſituation of it. And, I have ſome reaſon to put you in hope, that ere long you may ſee a Collection of moſt of the Anatomical Experiments that theſe Men have made, in the bodies of Beaſts, Birds, Fiſhes, and Inſects of various ſorts; together with the Figure of each, and all its principle Organs, expreſſed to the life in Copper-Cuts; and an exact account as well of the Analogy, as Diſſimilitude that is betwixt them and others of conſimilar uſes in Man, the grand Rule or Prototype to all inferior Creatures. Which is a Method, certainly, of ineſtimable uſe towards the complement of *Natural Hiſtory*, and the only way to perfect that *Comparative Anatomy*, whoſe defect the *Lord St. Alban* ſo much complained of, in our Art.

Others there are, who daily inveſtigate arguments to confirm and advance that incomparable invention of Doctor *Harvey*, the *Circulation of the Blood*; And have already brought the Doctrine thereof to ſo high a degree of perfection, that it is not only admitted and admired by all the Schools in *Europe*, but the advancers of it alſo are able to ſolve moſt of the difficult phænomena in Pathology, only by that Hypotheſis; And frequently effect ſuch Cures, by having reſpect thereunto in their intentions and preſcripts, as well in Cronique, as Acute Diſeaſes, as could not be hoped from any other ground-work, or

ſuppoſition formerly laid; At leaſt not with equall correſpondence to the true method of Healing, which ought to be deduced from Principles of the greateſt evidence and certainty in Nature, among which certainly this of the Circulation is the chiefeſt. And though I deny not, but the like Cures may have been performed by Phyſicians, who never dream't of any ſuch thing, as the continual motion of the blood from the heart, by the Arteries to the outward parts of the body, and thence back again, by the veins, into the heart; but reſted in the Antique opinion of a difference betwixt Arterial and Venal blood, both as to ſubſtance and uſes: Yet I may ſafely affirm, that the Remedies uſed by them, wrought the effects aimed at, by waies altogether accidental, and beſide the direct ſcope of thoſe, who gave them; And to do a cure only by Accident, you well know, is much below the ambition of a Rational Phyſician, who ought to have a firm and well-grounded Theory of the Faculties and Virtues proper to each particular Inſtrument he is to make uſe of, in rectifying the diſordered Oeconomy of nature in mans body. For my own part (I ſpeak ingenuouſly) I am ſo well ſatisfied of the Verity of this *Harvean Circulation*, and have ſo ſeriouſly conſidered the great advantages that may be made of it, in order to the ennobling the Art of Medicine, by reducing the maxims of it from obſcure and conjectural, to evident and demonſtrative; And by accommodating the ſame to the explanation of moſt of the Apparences in Pathology: That I have

have had ſome thoughts of undertaking to juſtify all the *Aphoriſms of Hippocrates*, which concern the Nature and Sanation of Diſeaſes, by reaſons and conſiderations deduced meerly from this one Fountain, the Hypotheſis of the Circulation of the blood; And if my troubles had not deprived me of leiſure, I had ere this made ſome progreſs in that enterpriſe. But, I have digreſſed, and ask your pardon for it.

There are, moreover, among the members of this venerable Society, who purſuing the hint, ſome few years ſince, given them by *Jacobus Mullerus*, a German, in an Academical exerciſe, of the nature of Animal and Voluntary Motion; have gone far toward the explication of the reaſons and manner of the Motions of the Muſcles, by the principles of Mechanicks: An enterpriſe of great difficulty, and long deſiderated, as leading us to underſtand the Geometry obſerved by the Creator in the fabrick of the Microcoſme, and the verification of Anatomical aſſertions by demonſtrations Mathematical. The ſame perſons likewiſe have demonſtrated, that we goe, becauſe we fall, *i.e.* that each ſtep we advance, is but a ſhifting the body to a freſh Centre of Gravity; And our Reſt but a remaining or fixing of it upon the ſame: As alſo that in progreſſion, the Head of a man is moved through more of ſpace, than his feet, by almoſt one part of four, in reſpect of its greater diſtance from the Centre of the Earth; which indeed was toucht, and only toucht upon, by that prodigie of Mathematical ſubtleties, *Galileo*, in his *Second Dialogue de Mundo*.

There

There are also of these *Miners* of Nature, who have found out more probable and commodious Uses for the *Glandules*, or fatty Kernells scituate in divers parts of mans body, than were assigned unto them by all antecedent Anatomists. For, whereas Those generally conceived them to have been intended by Nature to no nobler an end, than either for the Imbibition or dreining of superfluous humours inundating the parts adjacent to them; Or for the susteining of Veins, Arteries, and Nerves in their progresse from part to part; These have discovered, that some *Glandules* serve for the preparation of the *Succus Nutritius*, or juice that nourisheth the whole body; That others are official to the sequestration of some lesse profitable and disagreeable parts of the same nutritive juice, or Vital Nectar; And that a third sort of them are ordained for reduction of those same lesse profitable parts, after their separation or streining, back again into the masse of blood, by the small veins that are contiguous to them. And among these likewise there is one (A person of singular note, for his Universal Learning, and indefatigable industry in Disquisition) who aiming to promote the certainty of these New Tenents: (1.) That, according to the Anatomical observations of *Joh. Pecquet*, a young Physician of *Diepp* in *Normandy*, the Chylus is convey'd from the stomach, by the *Venæ Lacteæ*, or Milky Veins, into a certain Receptacle, or common-promptuary scituate at the bottom of the Mesentery; and thence transmitted upwards, by a conduit running all along on

on the inſide of the Spine of the back, to the ſubclavian veins, and ſo delivered into the right Ventricle of the heart, there to be turned into blood: (2.) That the Liver is not the immediate inſtrument of Sanguification, but inſervient only to the ſequeſtration of the Cholerick parts of the blood, and the conveying the ſame into the Gall, to be thence excluded into the Guts: (3.) That there is no Anaſtomoſis, or mutual Inoſculation betwixt the ſmall branches of the *Vena Portæ*, and thoſe of the *Vena Cava*, in the ſubſtance of the Liver; as was generally believed from the infancy of Phyſick, till of late years, when this Gentleman was ſo happy as to evince the contrary, by ocular demonſtration: (4.) That there are certain thin, ſlender and tranſparent Veſſells, for the moſt part accompaning the veins, & eſpecially in the liver, (named *Vaſa Lymphatica*, by *Thomas Bartholinus*, who ſeems firſt to have diſcovered them, and *Lymphe-ducts*, by others ſince) containing a clear liquor, like water, which they exonerate into the common Receptacle of the Chyle, newly mentioned; to the end, that being again infuſed together with ſo much of the Chyle as enters the veins, into the blood, it may both prevent the Coagulation of it, and alſo (in reſpect of its prediſpoſition to Volatility) aſſociating it ſelf to the Vital ſpirits in the Heart and Arteries, promote the Mication, or boyling motion of the blood: And (5.) That the ſolid parts of the body are not, in the general, nouriſhed by the blood (which He conceives to be only the fewel of the

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Vital Flame, or Heat; and in regard of its great Volatility, and harſh and grating nature, more likely to prey upon and conſume, than feed and repair the ſubſtance of the ſolid parts) but by the ſweeter and more unctuous part of the Chylus, drawn up by the mediation of the Nerves (eſpecially thoſe of the ſixth Conjugation, called the Recurrent Nerves) into the brain, and there elaborated, and afterward tranſmitted by the Nerves, to all parts of the body: This worthy Perſon, I ſay, aiming to promote the certainty of theſe recent Opinions, hath collected, illuſtrated and diſpoſed them into one Syſteme; Hoping thereby to declare their mutual Conſiſtence, as well each with other, as with the demonſtrative doctrine of the Circulation of the bloods And at the ſame time put an end to all diſputes, concerning the *Milky veins*, the uſe of the Spleen, of the *Capſulæ Atrabilariæ*, or *Renes ſuccenturiati*, Deputy Kidnies (as *Caſſerius Placentinus* called them) and ſundry other Difficulties in Anatomy. But, whether or no he hath attained to the full pitch of his hopes, in that deſign; you will be beſt able to judge, when you have read and examined the weight of his experiments and diſcourſes, delivered in his excellent Book, *de Anatomia Hepatis:* In the mean time, give me leave to advertiſe you, that his modeſty is ſo great, as that he expreſly profeſſes his own want of full ſatisfaction concerning the truth of ſundry particulars therein contained; And therefore preſents them to the World, as poſitions, not of apodictical evidence, but great probabi-

bability, and worthy to be embraced, only till time ſhall have brought more credible ones to light.

Furthermore, among theſe *Merchants for light*, we have ſome ſo excellently well skilled in all ſorts of Medical Simples; that they know, not only the names, but the faces alſo and virtues of moſt of the Plants in *Europe*; And can, beſides that, give you a better account of the American druggs, than *Piſo Margravius*, and others, notwithſtanding the large volumes they have compiled concerning that ſubject. They likewiſe ſo well underſtand all *Foſſilia*, and the ſeveral kinds of Minerals, pretious Stones, Salts, concreted juices, and other ſubterranean productions; That even Lapidaries and Miners come to learn of them. We have others, who enquire into the myſteries of Refiners, Belfounders, and all others that deal in Metals. Others, who ſearch out the frauds and ſophiſtications of Wine-Coopers and Vintners, in the brewing, feeding, ſtumming, and adulterating of Wines. Others, who can inform you exactly of the ſeverall hurtfull Arts of Brewers, Bakers, Butchers, Poulterers, and Cooks: All which are of very great detriment to the health of men, though the danger be commonly undiſcerned; And, were the civil Magiſtrate but half ſo careful to reform, as theſe Doctors have been in detecting thoſe publick abuſes, the Citty of *London* would ſoon find, by happy experience, that Phyſicians are both as willing and able to preſerve health, as to reſtore it. In a word, there is nothing eſcapes their

examination, which may any way concern the ſafety of mans life; or the knowlege whereof can conduce to make themſelves every way accompliſht in their Profeſſion.

And as for *Chymiſtry* (which I had almoſt forgotten) in the whole world there are none who know better how to diſtinguiſh betwixt the impoſtures and truths of it, than theſe Men doe: or how to make uſe of all the ſecrets thereof, towards the preparation of noble and generous Medicaments. Witneſſe that plenty of choiſe Chymicall remedies, daily confected in the Elaboratory belonging to the Colledge, by the directions and preſcripts of the Fellowes; and the care they conſtantly take, to diffuſe thoſe ſafe and excellent preparations among all their Apothecaries, that ſo the lives of their Patients be not endangered by the falſe and poyſonous wares of Pſeudo-chymiſts. A courſe, certainly, that occaſions great readineſſe and ſecurity in their Practice; and ſatisfies the World both of their ſingular Judgement, and conſtant Integrity in diſcharge of their truſt. And thus, moſt honourd Sir, I have haſtily, and ſlightly run over a few of thoſe particulars, wherein Natural Philoſophy, and the Art of Medicine have, of late, received ſuch notable advancement, by the Inventions and Diſquiſitions of this Venerable Society; which for the Knowledge of Nature, well deſerves to be eſteemed the *Great Luminary of the World*, from whence there conſtantly ſtream rayes of light, for the diſpelling the thick and long congeſted clouds of ignorance. But, before

I paſſe to the remainder of your demand, permit me to obſerve to you; that though the Fellows of this Colledge apply themſelves ſeverally to this or that particular Province, each one accord ng to the inclination & delight of his own private Genius; Yet, when they meet together in Conſultations, they are ſo candid and liberal in the communication of their ſingle obſervations and diſcoveries, that no one of them can long be ignorant of the notions of all the reſt: And the noble Emulation that hath equally enflamed their ingenious breaſts, makes them unanimous in cooperating toward the Common deſign, the erecting an intire and durable Fabrick of ſolid Science; ſuch as poſterity may not only admire, but ſet up their reſt in.

And now Sir, if you pleaſe to goe along with me to *Oxford*, you ſhall there alſo find as great *Benefactors to Learning*, as thoſe were, who founded and endowed their Colledges; and ſome, who for the excellency of their Inventions, will have their Memories freſh and verdant, when Time hath made thoſe ſtately buildings confeſſe their brittleneſs, and reduced them into Quarries again. I could bring you to *One* there, who hath excogitated a Method, whereby the Aſtronomy of the primary Planets may be Geometrically explain'd: & that as wel according to the Elliptical, as to the Circular way. A thing of ſtupendious difficulty, requiring univerſal knowledge in the Mathematiques; & of ineſtimable benefit toward the Certification of Cœleſtiall Science: and which, being judiciouſly perpended, ſeemes to

be of equall weight with the merits of even the Great *Hipparchus*, who (you know) made the firſt Catalogue of the Fixt Stars, obſerved their ſeverall Magnitudes, and marked out their particular Stations, both according to longitude and latitude; without which there could be no certaine obſervation of the motions of the Erratick ones. So that if *Hipparchus* may be deſervedly named *Atlas the Second*, for relieving the wearied ſhoulders of that Great Grandfather of Aſtronomy; and if the glorious *Tycho Brahe* may be called *Hercules the Second*, for relieving *Hipparchus*, long languiſhing and ready to ſink under ſo prodigious a burden, as the whole myſterie of the Heavens: I ſee no reaſon, why the *Author* of this admirable Invention, which ſeemes to aſſure the truth of all the reſt, may not be called *Tycho the Second*. For my part really, were I worthy to have this Gentlemans Picture in my ſtudy, I ſhould deſire to have it drawne in this manner. I would have *Hipparchus*, *Ptolemy*, and *Tycho*, ſtanding in a triangle, and ſupporting the whole Cœleſtial Machine on their heads; on one ſide, *Copernicus* turning all the Orbs about with his right hand; and this *Heros* on the other ſide, with a Table in his left hand containing the Figures in *Euclids* Elements, and with the Fore-finger of his right, pointing to the Planetary Spheres, as demonſtrating the theory of their Motions, by the maxims of Geometry. And ſure I am, He deſerves to have his name aſſigned to ſome honorable place, among the worthy

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Advancers of Aſtronomy, in the Selenographicall map of *Ricciolus*. I could bring you to *Another*, who hath likewiſe diſcovered a Method, whereby the *Parabola*, *Circle*, *Ellipſis*, and *Hyperbola* really are (and moſt, if not all other *regular Curve-lined Figures*, may be) ſquared: A Problem that hath long perplex't the thoughts of the greateſt Geometricians, and of late very neere turned the brains of even the great *Leviathan* himſelf, who arrogating the ſolution of it to himſelf, thought thereby not a little to juſtifie his pretences to the Monarchy of Knowledge, and Reformation of not only the Arts and Sciences, but alſo of the Univerſities that teach them.

Here are ſome, who perceiving the great advantage ariſing to Students from the uſe of *Symbols* (whereby the underſtanding is exempted from the encombrance of words, and brought, as it were, with one glance to behold the long continued ſeries of complex and intricate ratiocination, which would otherwiſe oppreſſe the memory, and confound the ſtrongeſt imagination to ſuſtain it) invented by *Vieta*, and brought to perfection by Mr. *Oughtred* and *Des Cartes*, for the more compendious tradition of the Mathematicks; and conſidering that the ſame way was capable of being accommodated to the Facilitation of diſcourſes in Philoſophy, Phyſick, and other parts of Learning; have made a very conſiderable progreſs toward the invention of Symbols, or Signes, for every thing and notion: inſomuch that one of theſe Wits hath found the variety of many millions of Signes, in a ſquare of

a quarter of an inch, as himſelf profeſſeth, in a moſt ingenious diſcourſe of his, entituled *Vindiciæ Academiarum.* Which perhaps you have read; and if you have, I need not tell you how little he wants of finiſhing that ſo long talked-of and deſired deſign of an *Univerſal Character* and *Language.*

And as for the *Optiques*, ſhew me the men in the whole World; who have more illuſtrated the nature, affections, and motions of that moſt ſubtle and glorious Creature, Light; Or given clearer demonſtrations of their Knowledge of all ſorts of Radiations, and the manner and reaſons of Viſion, than ſome Mathematical Wits, now flouriſhing in this Univerſity, have done. It is their uſual recreation, to practiſe all Deluſions of the ſight, in the Figures, Magnitudes, Motions, Colours, Diſtances, and Multiplications of Objects: And, were you there, you might be entertained with ſuch admirable Curioſities, both Dioptrical and Catoptrical, as former ages would have been ſtartled at, and believed to have been Magical. They will repreſent to you, the Images of Things and Perſons intire, and to the life, from Tables whereon the naked eye cannot diſcern ſo much as one part of them, unleſſe in fractures and ſeemingly confuſed diviſions; and this by collected reflections from mirrours Conical, Cylindrical, Concave, Convex, Multangular, *&c.* They will imitate Nature to the height of perfect reſemblance, in counterfeiting Rambows, Halo's, and Circles of various Colours about Lights, by artificial Refractions of their beams. They have all the ſeverall waies of Multi-

Multiplying and Corroborating Light, and tranſmittting it in concourſe to very great diſtance; And this, as well by conveying the diſperſed rayes through Diaphanous bodies, of convenient figures, and reuniting them in a cone or point, after their various refractions, for the encreaſe of their force; Or by repercuſſion from Concave (Elliptical, Parabolical, Circular) ſuperficies of polite Indiaphanous ones. Inſomuch, that if *Niceron*, *Kircher*, and other great Maſters in the Art of Light and Shadowes, would ſee the errors of their Optical Theory amended; and all the ſecrets of Catoptrical Magick, familiarly reduced into practice: hither and only hither they muſt come. And, were *Friar Bacon* alive again, he would with amazement confeſſe, that he was canonized a Conjurer, for effecting far leſſe, than theſe men frequently exhibit to their friends, in ſport. They have, moreover, *Optick Tubes*, or *Teleſcopes*, in ſuch perfection, that they magnifie more, and take in more of the rayes proceeding from illuminate Objects, than any other of the ſame length, that ever were made before: And have brought them alſo to as great a length, as can well be managed. Theſe they uſe for obſervations of Eclipſes of Sun and Moon, of the ſeveral Phaſes or Apparences of the Moon, of Saturn, and other Planets, both primary and ſecundary, of the Galaxy, the magnitudes and figures of the fixt ſtars, and other Cœleſtial Speculations. They have likewiſe *Microſcopes*, that magnify the dimenſions of minute and otherwiſe undiſcernable bodies, even

to

to an incredible rate, and bring the ſight to a familiar acquaintance with the ſhapes of not only whole ſmall Flies and other Inſects, but alſo of the ſmalleſt part of them. Inſomuch as there is hope, if this Invention go on toward perfection as faſt as it hath begun, within this laſt four or five years; that the eye ere long may be enabled to diſtinguiſh even the Seminal Figures of things, which ſeem to regulate them in their productions and growth; and to behold the originary Schematiſms of Nature, drawn on the ſmalleſt *Moleculæ*, or firſt collections of Atoms concurring to determinate the Figures of Concretions.

And thus, Nobleſt *Iſodicaſtes*, have I eſſayd to yeeld you ſome ſatisfaction, concerning the ſtate of Learning, now in *England*; And the chief Particulars, wherein it hath received Advancement, by the proſperous endeavours of our Country-men, ſince your retirement here in *France*. I need not intimate to you, how imperfect and rambling an account I have given you of theſe Novell Inventions; and am ſufficiently conſcious, that I rather ought to excuſe my ſelf, by the frailty of my Memory, and want of judgment, how to repreſent ſuch excellent and uſefull Diſcoveries, in deſcriptions correſpondent to their Natures: And ask your pardon for thus abuſing your patience, and leſsning the merits of thoſe worthy Authors, who have thus enriched the Common-wealth of Philoſophy.

Iſodicaſtes.

Iſodicaſtes.

Good *Athanaſius*, how well you have deſerved both of thoſe Authors and my ſelf, in this your learned Harangue; I muſt forbear to ſpeak, till you are abſent. In the mean time, give me leave, a little to wonder, how it comes about, that *Apollo*, who ſeldom plants his Laurel in a Land yet wet and reaking with blood, and delights to reſide only where Peace and Plenty have long had their habitations; ſhould thus take up his manſion in a Nation ſo lately oppreſt by the Tyranny of *Mars*, and ſcarce yet free from the diſtractions of a horrid Civil War. *Pallas* and *Bellona* I know to be one and the ſame Goddeſſe: Yet I do not remember, I ever ſaw her pictured (like *Cæſar*) with a Spear in one hand, and a Book in the other. When I veiw the train of ſad and heavy Calamities, that commonly attend the Sword; I ſhould rather have expected the incroachment of Ignorance and Barbariſm upon our Iland, than the encreaſe of Letters and growth of Knowledge there.

Athanaſius.

You have reaſon for your wonder, Sir, I muſt confeſſe; Yet when you have conſidered, that every Age hath its peculiar Genius, which inclines mens Minds to ſome one ſtudy or other, and gives it a dominion over their affections proportionate to its ſecret influence; and that the viciſſitudes of things ordained by Providence, require a general prediſpoſition in mens hearts,

to co-operate with Fate, toward the Changes appointed to ſucceed in the fulneſſe of their time: You will think it leſſe ſtrange, that *Britain*, which was but yeſterday the Theatre of War and deſolation, ſhould to day be the School of Arts, and Court of all the Muſes. *Omnia ſecula ſuum habent Genium, qui mortalium animos in certa ſtudia ſolet inflectere. Quædam ætates præcipuè armis exercitæ; mox omnia in quietem compoſita; tum Regnorum, tum Rerum publicarum in populis amor; nunc veluti in barbariem homines naſci, deinde facilioribus animis manſueſcere; & poſt ſecula aliquot ad ſtipatum prima caligine ingenium redire:* was the obſervation of a Modern Writer, and hath been frequently verified. Beſides, our late Warrs and Schiſms, having almoſt wholly diſcouraged men from the ſtudy of Theologie; and brought the Civil Law into contempt: The major part of young Schollers in our Univerſities addict themſelves to Phyſick; and how much that conduceth to real and ſolid Knowledge, and what ſingular advantages it hath above other ſtudies, in making men true Philoſophers; I need not intimate to you, who have ſo long taſted of that benefit.

Lucretius.

I gueſſe the Author of that obſervation you alleage; and that put's me in mind of another remark of his, perhaps not altogether unſeaſonable. In his Character of the Engliſh Genius, he hath this ſaying: *In Philoſophia autem & Mathêſi, terrarumque & aſtrorum ſcientiis, nulla tam prodi-*

gioſa

gioſa eſt Sententia, quæ non ex hac regione Authores invenerit, vel turbam amatorum, vividam quidem, ſed modum ſubtilitati per innumeras diſputationes effuſæ non invenientem. Now, if this be true, why may we not refer theſe Innovations in Philoſophy, Phyſick, and the Mathematicks, you have here recounted, rather to the Engliſh Humour of affecting new Opinions, than to any reall defects or errors in the Doctrine of the Ancients?

Athanaſius.

How now, *Lucretius*; you an *Epicurean*, and yet againſt liberty of judgement among Philoſophers? It ſeems you have forgotten your Maſters Rule; *Quoties aliqua ſunt in natura, quæ poſſunt multis peragi modis (uti eclipſes ſyderum, uti eorundem ortus, occaſus, ſublimiaque cætera) tunc unum aliquem modum ita probare, ut improbentur cæteri, ridiculum profectò eſt.* Pray, do but proceed to the words immediately ſubſequent to that paſſage in *Barclay*, concerning the proneſſe of the Engliſh Genius to Novelties; and you will ſoon find, that he reflected chiefly on the Copernican Syſteme; which in his daies began to grow into high repute, and obtained many Sectators among the learned of our Nation. So that confirming that Reproach, he endeavoured to fix upon our ingenious Spirits, by no better an inſtance, than that of our admiſſion and promotion of the Pythagorean Hypotheſis, of the Motion of the Earth, revived and adorned by *Copernicus* (which all Aſtronomers now allow to be the moſt intelligible

and moſt convenient, that ever was invented) it eaſily appears, with how much more juſtice himſelf may be accuſed of groſſe ignorance in matters Aſtronomical, which yet he would pretend to judge of; than we can be of Levity and affected Innovation, for embracing and cultivating an opinion, of whoſe ſingular probability and excellency we are fully convinced. And as we have not ſubmitted to that change in Aſtronomy, but upon grounds of as much certainty and clearneſſe, as the ſublime and remote nature of the ſubject ſeems capable of: So neither have we introduced any Alterations in Natural Philoſophy, Phyſick, and other parts of Human Learning, but what carry their utility with them, and are juſtifiable by right reaſon, by autoptical or ſenſible demonſtration, and by multiplied experience. So that every intelligent man may eaſily perceive, that it hath been the Reformation, that drew on the Change; not the deſire of Change, which pretendeth the Reformation. Did you, *Lucretius*, but know the Gravity, Solidity, and Circumſpection of theſe worthy Reformers of the ſtate of Learning now in *England*; you would not ſuſpect them of incogitancy, or too much indulgence toward the Minerva's of their own brain: but confeſſe that they have preciſely followed that counſel of the Scripture, which injoynes us, *to make a ſtand upon the Ancient way, and then look about us, and diſcover, what is the ſtraight and right way, and ſo to walk in it.*

Iſodi-

Iſodicaſtes.

For my part, truly, I conceive it fitting, that all Schollars ſhould have a reverend eſteem of Antiquity, as a good guide of our younger Reaſon into the waies of Nature; Yet I think it ſcarce ſafe for any man to follow it implicitly, and without examination, as if it were impoſſible for him to erre the whiles, or as if the light of his own underſtanding were given him to no other uſe, but to be ſet in the drak-lanthorn of Authority. The Ancients indeed, (thanks be to their bounteous induſtry) have left us large and noble Foundations; but few compleat Buildings: and who ſo intends to have his underſtanding ſeated commodiouſly, and in a pleaſant Manſion of Science, muſt advance ſuperſtructures of his own; otherwiſe he wil lie open to the weather of Doubts, and Whirlewinds of various Difficulties, nor will he be ever able to entertain his friends with decency and ſatisfaction. It was gravely and wittily ſaid of the Lord *Bacon*, that thoſe who too much reverence Old times, often become a ſcorn to the New. But, Gentlemen, I perceive the evening haſtens upon us, and I have already detained you longer, then ſuits with the civility of an accidentall encounter; Pray, therefore, let me beg the favour of your company to a light Collation of a Sallade and a bottle of good Wine, at my Houſe: Or, if your occaſions have otherwiſe preingaged you, let me reſign you to the purſuit of them, with thanks for the content your learned converſation hath given me,

and

and hopes of enjoying the like again, as often as your vacancy from ſerious affairs will permit.

Athanaſius.

Nobleſt Sir, I moſt humbly thank you for the honour of your invitation; and would attend you home, with all joy and gratitude imaginable, would the urgency of a buſineſſe I have appointed to diſpatch, this evening, diſpenſe with me.

Lucretius.

I can aſſure you Sir, *Athanaſius* is preingaged, and upon a matter of ſome moment; but for my ſelf, I am at liberty to meet the happineſs you are pleaſed to offer me.

Iſodic a ſtes

I love not to hinder buſineſſe; nor to importune a friend to his diſadvantage. And ſo adieu, worthy *Athanaſius*. Come *Lucretius*, I will bring you the ſhorteſt way; I have a key will let us forth at yonder Privy door, that opens into the fields, that lie within the proſpect of my houſe.

Athanaſius.

Honour'd *Iſodicaſtes*, farewell.

DIA-

DIALOGUE THE SECOND.

LUCRETIUS.

I See you are very preciſe in keeping your time prefix't, *Athanaſius*; And I hope, I have not made you ſtay, many minutes, for me. If I have, you muſt impute it to the diſagreement of our Watches, not to any tardineſs in my ſelf; For, I aſſure you, I was here before you, in my deſires.

Athanaſius.

I love alwaies to be punctuall in my appointments, and rather to prevent my Friends, than put them to expect me. But, have you acquainted this Noble perſon *Iſodicaſtes*, with the occaſion of our preſent meeting?

Iſodicaſtes.

Yes, *Athanaſius*, he hath; and I acknowledge my ſelf ſingularly obliged to him for importuning you to a divertiſement, than which none could

could be more agreeable to me, as well in reſpect of the Argument you have promiſed to diſcuſs, as of your ſelf, whoſe Writings and yeſterdaie's Conference have created in me a deſire of converſing with you, oftner than (I fear me) your ſtudies and affairs will permit. And now we are convened, let us loſe no time, but repoſe our ſelves upon this ſhady Seat, and omitting all Complements and Prologues; addreſſe immediately to the Subject intended. For my part, I promiſe you all attention of Mind poſſible, and as much Equity in judgement, as my ſlender ſtock of reaſon can attain to.

Athanaſius.

Among Us, who are ſo happy, as to be Sacramentally engaged to fight under the Standard of the Crucified God, I obſerve, in the generall, two different perſwaſions concerning the nature of Faith. *Some* there are, who ſeem to have ſo active and long-winged a power of belief, as that they can mount up to an eaſie and quick apprehenſion of all the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Doctrine; and are ready to complain, that they want Difficulties enough to exerciſe the ſtrength of their Belief. *Others* there are, who though their Faith be lively and ſtrong enough to embrace even the moſt ſublime Article of the Creed; and eſtimate the Verity of each Religious Principle only by its dependence on Authority Divine: are nevertheleſſe ſo ſenſible of the frailties of Human Nature, as that they think it neceſſary to have often recourſe to that Pathetical

cal Ejaculation of the man in the Goſpel, *Lord I believe, Lord help my unbelief.* The *Firſt*, wholly refuſe the aſſiſtance of their Reaſon, even where it offers it ſelf and the ſubject is capable of illuſtration by the diſcourſes it might raiſe thereupon; as judging any Fundamental of Religion much debaſed, and in a manner prophaned, if once it be brought to the Teſt of the Light of Nature, though meerly for Confirmation and more familiar admittance. The *Others*, humbly reſign up their Aſſent to all Poſitions contained in Sacred Writ; and yet are glad, when they can bring up the Forces o f their Reaſon to aſſiſt them in the conqueſt of their fleſhly oppoſitions: And conceive they then make the beſt uſe of the talent of their Underſtanding, when they imploy it toward the ratification of Divine Traditions.

Now, albeit I admire, and could moſt willingly emulate the perfection of the *Former* ſort; Yet, I confeſſe, I am not aſhamed to rank my ſelf among the *Latter*. For, although (thanks be to the Mercy of God) I do not find my ſelf ſubject to diffidence in any point of the Chriſtian belief, taught me by that Oracle of Sacred wiſdom, the Word of God: Yet me thinks I perceive my faith ſomwhat *Corroborated* and *Encouraged*, when to the evidence therof I can ſuperadd alſo the concurrent teſtimony of my *Reaſon*. Nor do I fear the frowns of Theology, if I adventure to affirm, that that Soul muſt have a clearer preception of the Excellency of Objects Supernatural, who can attain to ſpeculate them both by the light

of Grace and that of Nature together. I am very far ſhort of their Audacity, who are ſo conceipted of the ſubtility of their Wit, as to permit it to fly at all that a Chriſtian is bound to believe; inſomuch as even the *Arcana Deitatis*, the Myſteries of the Trinity, of the Hypoſtatick Union, and other the like Divine Abſtruſities (which poor Mortality is unqualified to contemplate; and, indeed, which Cherubins themſelves cannot look into, without raptures of holy wonder) have hardly eſcaped their prophanation. No, far be it from me, to entertain a thought of ſo wild and dangerous a preſumption. All I durſt ever aſpire unto, is only with pious humility to apply my Reaſon to ſuch of the Articles in my Creed, as ſeem to be placed within the Sphere of its comprehenſion: Of which ſort I conceive the *Firſt* and *Laſt* Article to be, *viz.* the *Being of God, as Father Almighty, and Maker of Heaven and Earth*; and *the Immortality of Mans Soul*, or *Life everlaſting*. Nor, indeed, need I ſeek further for my Confirmation in the belief of all the reſt, when once I have advanced my Underſtanding to that due height, as clearly to behold the Verity of theſe two Poſitions, that are the Pillars and ſupporters of all the others. Nay, I have ſomtimes thought the Single poſition of the Immortality of the Human Soul, to be the grand Baſe of Religion, and like the Key, or midle ſtone in an Arch, which bears the weight of all others in the building. For, if the Soul be mortal, & ſubject to utter diſſolution with the body; to what purpoſe doth all Piety and Religion ſerve? What iſſue

iſſue can we expect of all our Prayers, of all our Adorations, of all our Self-denying acts of obedience, of all our unjuſt Sufferings? Why ſhould we worſhip God at all? Nay, more, why ſhould we conſider whether there be a God or no? For, the aſſurance of his Being could not much conduce to encreaſe our happineſſe in this tranſitory life; ſince that would then conſiſt only in the full fruition of Senſual pleaſures: And as for future expectations after death, there could be none at all; For, abſolute Diſſolution imports abſolute Inſenſibility; and what is not, cannot be capable of Reward or Puniſhment, of Felicity or Miſery.

What hath not an Exiſtence, can ne're know
The want of Bliſs; Nothing can feel no Wo.

And from this Conſideration was it, that I began firſt to apply my ſelf to ſearch for other Reaſons, for the eviction of the Souls Eternal ſubſiſtence after death, beſides thoſe delivered in Holy Scripture; that conjoyning the evidence and certainty of thoſe deſumed from the Light of Nature, to that of my former belief ariſing from the Light of Grace: I might be the better able to withſtand the Convulſions of my own frailties, and convince others, who are ſo refractory, as to ſubmit their aſſent to no inducement of perſwaſion, but what is drawn meerly from Natural Reaſons.

Now, for my encouragement and *Juſtification* in this deſign, I need not go far; it being well

known, that many Doctors of the Church, and thoſe of the beſt note both for Learning and Piety, have exerciſed their wits and pens in the ſame ſubject: and have unanimouſly concluded, that though in the Chriſtian Creed there be ſundry Articles, concerning the Condition of Mans Soul, after its ſeparation from the body, which by infinite exceſſes tranſcend the capacity of his reaſon; Yet that general one of the perpetual exiſtence of it after death, may be ſatisfactorily evinced by the ſame reaſon. To mention all the excellent Diſcourſes written by theſe Church-men and others, upon this Argument; would be both tedious and unneceſſary: Eſpecially to you, who I preſume have peruſed the greateſt part, if not all of them. It may ſuffice, that I have them for my Precedents, both for the warrantableneſſe, and probability, of this my undertaking. However, if you require farther juſtification of me; I refer you to the undeniable Authority of the *Lateran Council*, held under Pope *Leo* the tenth. Which having decreed the Anathematization of all Atheiſts, who durſt queſtion *the Being of God*, or *the Immortality of the Human Soul*; in the cloſe of the Canon not only exhorteth, but expreſsly commandeth all Chriſtian Philoſophers to endeavour the demonſtration of thoſe ſacred Truths, by ſolid and Phyſical Arguments. And, certainly, ſo pious and prudent an Aſſembly would never have preſcribed that task, in caſe they had not conceived it both commendable and poſſible to be effected.

Lucre-

Lucretius.

As for the Goodneſſe and Piety of your Undertaking, truly I think few underſtanding men will queſtion it; and, on the other ſide, I fear me, you will meet with as few, that will acknowledge the *Poſſibility* of your accompliſhing it. For, if I am not much miſtaken, the greateſt number of thoſe eminent Doctors of the Church, and chiefeſt of the School-men, whom you intimated to have been your examples, in this particular, do, after all their labours and ſubtle diſputes, ingenuouſly confeſſe, that the beſt of their Arguments are not rigorouſly Convincing, or ſuch as conſtrain aſſent as inevitably as *Mathematical Demonſtrations*. And, if ſo, though I expect to receive as high ſatisfaction from you, as from any, who ever gave me the ſame hopes: Yet I humbly begg your excuſe, if I ſuſpend my belief of your ability to prove the Immortality of mans Soul, by Reaſons of evidence & force requiſite to the Conviction of a meer Natural man (ſuch as I, for this time at leaſt, ſuppoſe my ſelf to be, and ſuch as indeed all men would, when they come to examine the ſtrength of Diſcourſes of this nature) untill you ſhall have given me more pregnant teſtimonies thereof, than any Author, whoſe writings I have read, hath hitherto done, touching this ſubject. In a word, I believe the Soul to be Immortal, as firmly, as you, or any perſon living can; Yet I ſhould account it no ſmall felicity, to ſee a perfect Demonſtration of it,

it; ſuch as might for ever ſilenſe all Doubts and Contradictions, and make a Convert of my old Maſter *Epicurus*, in caſe he were now among the living: And any thing leſſe than that, would hold no proportion to my expectation.

Athanaſius.

I will not deny, *Lucretius*, but ſome of thoſe School-men, who have alleaged congruous and ſinewy Reaſons, in favour of the Souls Immortality, did afterward themſelves confeſſe, they were not compleatly Apodicticall: But, you may be pleaſed to remember alſo, that ſome others of them ſtiffly maintained the contrary; and all of them unanimouſly concur in this, that howbeit thoſe Reaſons do not aſcertain equally with Geometrical Demonſtrations; yet they are ſuch as import either a Phyſicall or Moral evidence, ſufficient to perſwade a mind well affected toward truth, and free from the obſtruction of prejudice. Nor ſhould I fear to obtain the Cauſe, however the Arguments I ſhall bring, to aſſert the Immortality of the Soul, arife not to the height of abſolute Demonſtrations: Provided they be found of greater certainty, clearneſſe, and conſequence, than thoſe that have ever yet been urged by thoſe of the contrary perſwaſion; and ſuch as being ſuperadded to the Authority of Holy Writ, become ineluctable. And more than this, (*Lucretius*) conſidering the ſingular obſcurity and abſtruſe condition of the ſubject, you have no reaſon to expect at my hands. Pray, do but reflect a little on the modeſty of that great man,

man, *Ariſtotle*, declared in ſundry places of his Writings, but more eſpecially in the beginning of his Ethicks, where he ſaith, *Hominis probè inſtituti eſt, tantam in unoquoque genere ſubtilitatem deſiderare, quantam rei ipſius natura recipit.* "A "man of Erudition, and a ſound Judgement; "ought to require only ſo much ſubtility and "exactneſſe in any kind of Argument, as the "nature of the thing treated of, will admit, and "no more. And, having obſerved the ſame unreaſonable humour of curioſity in others of thoſe times, that now poſſeſſeth you, and too many of the ſublime Wits of the preſent age, who look for nothing below Demonſtrations, though in the Metaphyſicks, and other Sciences that are really incapable of them; he addeth this poſitive rule, *Mathematica certitudo non eſt in omnibus quærenda*; Mathematical Certitude is not to be required in all things. To convince you the more clearly of the Unreaſonableneſſe of what you would exact from me in this caſe, let me a while divert you to the conſideration of the nature of a Demonſtration. The Method of Demonſtration, you know, is twofold; the one by *Analyſis*, the other by *Syntheſis*.

The *Analytical* teacheth the true way, by which the truth of a thing may be found out Methodically, and as *à priori*; ſo that if the Reader or Hearer ſhall ſtrictly follow the ſame, and attentively heed all the Antecedents and Conſequents therein propounded, he ſhall come at length to underſtand the thing demonſtrated as perfectly, and make it as much his own, as if himſelf

himſelf had firſt found it out. But yet it contains nothing, whereby either the heedleſs, or diſſenting reader may be compelled to aſſent; For if any one of the leaſt Propoſitions therein delivered, be not exactly and fully noted, the neceſſity of its Concluſions doth not ſufficiently appear.

The *Synthetical*, by a way oppoſite to the former, and as it were ſought *à poſteriori* (though the Probation it ſelf be oftentimes more *à priori*, than in the former) doth clearly demonſtrate, what is concluded, and uſeth a long ſeries of *Definitions*, *Poſtulates*, *Axioms*, *Theorems*, and *Problems*, that if any thing be denied of the Conſequents, it ſpeedily ſheweth the ſame to be comprehended in the Antecedents, and ſo extorts belief from the Reader, though formerly repugnant and pertinacious. Nevertheleſſe, this doth not ſatisfie, nor fil the mind of him who comes to learn, ſo amply as the other: Becauſe it teacheth not the way or manner, how the thing proved was firſt found out. And this Latter is that, which the Ancient Geometricians generally made uſe of in their Writings; not that they were ignorant of the other: But (as I conceive) becauſe they valued it ſo highly, as that they deſired to reſerve it to themſelves, as a great Secret, and too noble to be prophaned by vulgar communication. Now, this is that ſtrict and vigorous Method, upon which I ſuppoſe you reflect, when you ſay; you would gladly meet with a perfect Demonſtration of the Immortality of Mans Soul: And I muſt therefore advertiſe you

you of the Incompetency thereof to Metaphyſical ſubjects. And the reaſon doth conſiſt in this Difference; that the *Firſt Notions*, which are preſuppoſed, in order to the demonſtration of things *Geometrical*, agreeing with the uſe of the Senſes, are moſt eaſily and promptly admitted by all men; & ſo there is no difficulty, but only in deducing right Conſequences from them, which may be done only by remembring the Antecedents: And the minute diſtinction of propoſitions is therefore made, that each of them may, upon occaſion, be quickly recited, and ſo recalled to the memory of even the moſt heedleſſe Reader: But on the contrary, in things *Metaphyſical*, all the difficulty lies in clearly and diſtinctly perceiving the *Firſt Notions*; For, though of their own nature they be not leſſe known, or, even more known, than thoſe conſidered by Geometricians: Yet, becauſe many prejudgements of the Senſes, to which from our infancy we have been accuſtomed, ſeem repugnant to them; therefore cannot they be perfectly known, but by ſuch as are very attentive to them, and withall abſtract their Minds from the Images of Corporeal things, as much as is poſſible; and being propoſed alone by themſelves, they might eaſily be denied, by ſuch as delight in contradiction. But, as for the *Analytical* method; I would not have you deſpair of ſeeing it in ſome meaſure accommodated to the ſubject, of which we now diſcourſe. Provided you ſhall firſt tune your Mind to a fit key, to bear a part in the harmony of truth, when it reſounds from the ſtrings of

all the Antecedents and Conſequents propounded. Which you muſt do, both by abſtracting your thoughts many times from the groſſe repreſentations of Corporeal things, that hold no commerce of proportion or ſimilitude with the Incorporeal Nature of the thing enquired into: and by wholly deveſting your ſelf of all prejudice, and inclination to impugn truth, when it preſents it ſelf clad in ſufficient evidence. For, whoſoever comes to the examination of an intricate truth, with the cloud of inveterate averſion, and mask of affected contradiction, before his eyes; doth thereby make himſelf the leſſe fit to perceive it: becauſe he diverts his mind, from the due conſideration of thoſe reaſons that might convince him, to the hunting after ſuch as may diſſuade him.

Lucretius.

You do well, *Athanaſius*, thus to prepare my belief before-hand, by telling me, how neceſſary it is, that I ſhould abſtract my Mind, as well from the Images of Material Objects, as from prejudice; when it remains on your part, firſt to ſhew me the way of that *Abſtraction*, and then to deveſt me of prejudice. For, for my own part, I confeſſe ingenuouſly, I can ſpeculate nothing, without the help of my Imagination; ſo that whatever I can think upon, comes to my mind in the dreſſe of Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and other the like conditions of Matter. Truth is, I have often heard, among your ſoaring and long-winged Wits, of *Abſtracted and Unbodied Notions*; and

and have ſomtimes perplexed my mind, and almoſt crackt the membranes of my brain, in ſtriving how to comprehend them: And yet I alwaies found my Phanſy ſo inſepa rably conjoined to my Intellect, as if they were both one and the ſame Faculty. Nor am I yet able to diſtinguiſh betwixt my Imagination and Intellection: And when once you ſhall have ſatisfied me of a reall Difference betwixt them; I ſhall ſoon confeſſe, you have gone very near the Demonſtration of the Souls Immortality. Becauſe, if the operations of the Intellect be clearly diſtinct from thoſe of the Phanſy, which is a Corporeal Faculty, and therefore limited to the perception and repreſentation of only Corporeal Natures: It will almoſt follow, that the Intellect, which is capable of knowing Incorporeals, is a ſubſtance clearly diſtinct from the body, and ſo Immaterial; ſince different effects muſt have different Cauſes. And, as for your other *Poſtulate*, viz. the exemption of my mind from contrary *prejudice*; This alſo is what I ſhould expect from the efficacy of your intended Arguments. For, (as I told you before) I believe the Immortality of the Soul; but cannot perſwade my ſelf of the poſſibility of its Demonſtration, by any other but Divine reaſons: And it muſt be your work, to convince me of the error of that perſwaſion. Nevertheleſſe, I will aſſure you of my beſt Attention, and that I come not with a reſolution not to be ſatisfied.

Athanaſius.

Dear Sir, have patience a while, and you ſhall ſoon perceive both the Neceſſity and Equity of what I require: And in the mean time, do not take occaſion to anticipate my Notions, but leave me to deliver them in their due places and order.

Lucretius.

I ſhall punctually obſerve your commands; and therefore, if you think fit, immediately addreſſe your ſelf to your Demonſtration.

Athanaſius.

Firſt, it will be convenient, in order to the prevention of all Equivocation and Logomachy, that may ariſe from the various uſe of the word, *Soul*; that we inſiſt a little on the examination of that vulgar Opinion, which admitteth a real diſtinction betwixt *Animus* and *Anima*, the *Mind* and the *Soul*: In regard it ſeems to be the very ſame, according to which many Doctors of the Church have conceived the Soul to have Two Parts, a *Superior* and *Inferior*; the one being the *Mind*, *Intellect*, or *Reaſon*; the other comprehending the *Senſe* & *Appetite Natural and Bruiſh*.

There are (you know) many eminent men, as well Theologues, as Philoſophers, who, as they hold Man to be compoſed of two parts, a Soul and a Body; ſo do they conceive, that his ſoul is likewiſe compoſed of a twofold ſubſtance, the one Incorporeal or Immaterial, immediately created by God, and infuſed into

into the body, at the inſtant of its Empſychoſis or firſt Animation, in the Mothers Womb: The other Corporeall or Material, originally contained in the Parents Seed, and derived *ex traduce*, from the Seminalities of Male and Female commixed in coition; which is as it were the Medium or Diſpoſition, by the intermediate nature whereof the Diviner part is conjoined and united to the Elementary, or Body. And this Opinion they ground chiefly upon that ſpeech of the Apoſtle, Βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νόος μου, καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου: *I perceive a Law in my members warring againſt the Law of my Mind*, &c. For (ſay they), ſince it is impoſſible, that one Simple Eſſence or thing ſhould war againſt, or have contrariety to it ſelf; from this Repugnancy betwixt the Senſe, and the Mind or Reaſon, it ſeems neceſſarily conſequent, that the Senſitive and Rational Soul are things eſſentially different each from other. Whereunto they ſuperadd alſo, that unleſſe this Diſtinction be admitted, we can never well underſtand, how Man, as a living Creature, can be ſaid to be, in one part, little lower than the Angels: and in another, to be like the Horſe or Mule, that have no underſtanding. How, in reſpect of one part, he is made after the Image of God: and in reſpect of another, he is compared to the Beaſts that periſh. How, in one reſpect, he acknowledgeth God to be his Author and Principle: and in another, he owns his production upon his Parents. How, in one relation, he is ſaid to be

be Immortall : and in another, ſubject to death equally with the ſmalleſt worme.

Notwithſtanding, it is not either the Authority, or Arguments of theſe Men, that ſeem prevalent enough to bring me to be of their perſuaſion. For as to their *Authority*; I could thereunto oppoſe that of ſome Fathers, yea and Councils, who not onely reprehend, but condemne all ſuch, as make a duality of Souls in man : were not the thing already well known to you. However, ſuffer me to put you in mind, that the pious and learned *Conimbricenſes* (who certainly, have moſt profoundly and judiciouſly, of all others, handled this Queſtion) though they proceed not ſo far, as to cenſure this conceipt to be Hereticall (as ſome others before them had don) yet they expreſly declare their Diſſent from it. And as for their Reaſons alledged; *I* thinke them likewiſe inſufficient. For all that *Pſychomachy*, or inteſtine Conflicts which theſe men imagine to be betwixt the inferior part of the ſoul which is called the ſenſitive, and the ſuperior called the Rational, or betwixt the Natural Appetites and the Will; doe ariſe onely from the repugnancy or contrariety which is between thoſe motions of the ſpirits, which are on one ſide cauſed by the ſenſes affected by externall objects; and thoſe motions of the ſpirits which on the other ſide are cauſed by the will, after the ſoul hath deliberated upon their conveniency and utility. And, in truth, each individuall man hath one and onely one ſoul; in which is no variety of parts : that which is the

Senſitive

Senſitive is alſo the Rationall, and all her Appetites are abſolute Volitions. The cauſe of theſe mens error ſeems to be this, that they could not well diſtinguiſh the Functions proper to the ſoul, from the Functions proper to the body; to which alone we ought in right to aſcribe whatever we obſerve in our ſelves to be repugnant to our Reaſon. So that in Man, there is no other Contract or Contrariety of Affections, but what conſiſteth in the contrary motions cauſed by the ſpirits and purer part of the blood, in that part of the body, in which as in its principall and more immediate organ, the ſoul is enthroned and exerciſeth her faculties; whether that be the Plexus *Choroides* in the brain, as moſt Phyſicians conceive; or the Heart, as the *Scripture* ſeems to intimate; or the *Glandula pinealis*, in the centre of the brain, as *Des Cartes* affirmeth; or any other part whatſoever: one of theſe motions ariſing from the determination of the ſpirits by the will one way; and the other, from the determination of them by the corporeal Appetite, another way. And hence it comes often to paſs, that theſe impulſes being contrary each to other; the ſtronger doth impede and countermand the effect of the weaker. Nor is it difficult to diſtinguiſh theſe two kinds of impulſes or motions, made by the mediation of the ſpirits upon the principal ſenſory, or chief ſeat of the ſoul. For inſmuch as ſome of them repreſent to the ſoul, the Images of objects either at that time moving the ſenſes, or the impreſſions formerly made and remaining in the brain; but offer no force or violence to it, ſo far as to engage

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the will toward their proſecution : and others prove ſo effectual, as to diſpoſe the will accordingly ; as may be obſerved in all thoſe, which produce paſſions, or ſuch motions in the body, as uſually accompany paſſions. As for the former, though they often impede the actions of the ſoul, and are againe as often impeded and ſuppreſſed by them ; yet, becauſe they are not directly oppoſite each to other, we can obſerve no conflict or wreſtling betwixt them ; as we may, betwixt the latter ſort of Motions, and acts of the will or Volitions that oppoſe them, as (for example) betwixt that impulſe, by which the principall organ of the ſoul is diſpoſed to affect her with the cupidity or deſire of any one particular object ; and that, by which the will counterdiſpoſeth her to an averſation from, or avoydance of, the ſame. And this Conflict chiefly demonſtrate thits ſelfe hereby, that the will being not able to excite paſſions directly, and immediately, is conſtrained to caſt about and uſe a kind of art, in order thereunto ; and to apply it ſelfe to the conſideration of ſeveral things ſucceſſively, or one after another ; whereupon it comes to paſſe, that if any one of thoſe things occurring, chance to be prevalent enough to change the courſe or current of the ſpirits, at that inſtant ; yet another that followes next after it, be not powerfull enough to ſecond the former in that change, the ſpirits then immediately againe reſume their firſt courſe or motion (the precedent diſpoſition in the nerves, heart, and blood, being not yet altered) and thereupon the ſoul perceives her ſelfe to be impelled to purſue and avoid

avoid the ſame object, almoſt in one and the ſame moment. And this alone was that, which gave occaſion to men, to imagine Two Diſtinct and mutually repugnant Powers or Faculties in the ſoul. Nevertheleſs, we may conceive another ſort of Conflict conſiſting in this; that many times the ſame cauſe, which exciteth a paſſion in the ſoul, doth, even in the ſame moment, excite alſo in the body, certaine motions, to which the ſoul doth not at all conduce, and which ſhe ſuppreſſeth or at leaſt indeavours to ſuppreſs, ſo ſoon as ſhe obſerves them to be begun. For inſtance, whatſoever cauſeth Feare, doth at the ſame inſtant cauſe alſo the ſpirits to flow into thoſe muſcles, which ſerve to move the thighs and legges to flight or avoidance of the terrible object; but if the Will ſuddainly riſe up, and determine to exerciſe the vertue of Fortitude, and oppoſe the danger threatned, the ſoul then giveth check to that motion of the ſpirits, and converts them to the heart and armes the better to make reſiſtance.

And here I ask leave to make a ſhort Digreſſion, while (with the excellent *Des Cartes*) I obſerve to you; that it is from the *Event* of theſe inward Conflicts, by which a man may come to underſtand the ſtrength or weakneſs of his own ſoul. For ſuch perſons, who have their wills ſufficiently ſtrong to ſubdue paſſions, and countermand thoſe ſuddain motions in the body which accompany the paſſions; are without doubt, endowed with Noble and Generous Souls: And thoſe who have their wills ſubject

to the impetuosity of passions, and cannot check the motions of the spirits resulting from them, must be men of *abject*, *effeminate* and *pusillanimous* ones. Not that every man can make this Experiment of himselfe, as to Weaknesse or Fortitude; because many and indeed most men come to these Duells, armed, not with the true and proper weapons of the mind, but with false ones borrowed from some contrary Affection: so that the conflict may seem to be rather betwixt two opposite Passions, than betwixt the Will and either of them; and the Will may be said to follow the fortune of the conquering passion, rather than to be it selfe the conquerour. By the true and proper weapons of the Mind, I meane certaine right and firme judgments concerning the knowledge of Good and evill; according to which it hath decreed to regulate it self in all the actions and occurrences of life. And, certainly, of all Souls, those are the most weak and feminine, which have not their wills thus determined to follow certaine settled Judgements, but suffer them to be drawn aside by present Affections; which being many times contrary one to another, and equally prevalent, counter-incline the Will alternately, and so keep it on the rack of suspence. Thus, when Feare representeth Death, as the worst of evils, and which cannot be otherwise avoided, but by flight; if on the other side, *Ambition* step in, and represent the infamy of flight, as an Evill worse then Death: these two contrary Affections variously agitate and distract the Will,

Will, and by putting it to a long conflict and irreſolution, render the ſoul moſt ſervile and miſerable.

Now from this conſideration it is manifeſt, that there is no ſuch neceſſity, as hath been imagined, of allowing a diſtinction of the ſoul into *Animum* and *Animam*, or making the *Reaſonable* ſoul and the *Senſitive* two diſtinct beings, in order to the explanation of that Pſychomachy, or Conteſt betwixt Reaſon and Senſe, or the Superior and Inferior Faculties, of which the Apoſtle complained, and indeed which every man feels within himſelfe: all that repugnancy conſiſting in a Contrariety, not of the ſoul to it ſelfe (which in a Simple Eſſence is impoſſible) but onely of the Motions of the ſpirits; cauſed by the Senſes, on one ſide, and thoſe cauſed by the Will, on the other, as hath been declared. And, as for the other Reaſons that remaine; what I have now ſaid, may be eaſily extended to the ſolution of them alſo: for, that Man is compoſed of a Reaſonable Soul, and a Body; is ſufficient to our underſtanding him to be, in one reſpect, little lower than the Angells, made after the Image of God, and Immortall; and in another, like the Horſe and Mule, that have no underſtanding, and ſubject to death equally with the beaſts that periſh.

Iſodicaſtes.

By your favour, good *Athanaſius*. You were ſaying even now, that there were ſome Fathers and Councils, who condemned all ſuch as maintained

tained a Duality of Souls in Man: But, if I am not miſtaken, that condemnation doth cheifly concern the *Maniches*, who held two diſtinct Souls in every man; the one derived from an evill Principle, and ſo contaminated with the tincture of Vices; the other immaculate, pure, and having its origine immediately from God, yea being a certain Particle of the Divine Eſſence it ſelf; And, perhaps, it may be extended alſo to the *Platoniſt* and *Averrhoiſt*, who affirm the Rational Soul not to be the *Forma informans*, and ſo make two forms in every individual perſon; both which opinions, are erroneous and hereticall. But, that it doth include alſo thoſe, who diſtinguiſh the Soul into a Superior and Inferior part; the one comprehending the Mind Intellect or Reaſon only; the other the Senſitive Faculties and Appetites: I am yet to learn. Which I advertiſe you of, not that I am unſatisfied with the reaſon you have given of thoſe Conflicts we daily have within us; For, in truth, it ſeems conveniently to explain the myſtery of that Repugnancy betwixt our Rational and Corporeal Appetites: but, to intimate to you, that I ſee no reaſon, why the Human Soul may not be admitted: to conſiſt of two parts, the one Immaterial and Intellectual, called the Mind, or Underſtanding, and (by way of excellency) the Human Soul; the other Material, and only Senſitive, by the mediation whereof that Divine part is united to the body during life. And, without admitting this Diſtinction, I do not underſtand the meaning of that Sentence of *Plato, Men-*

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tem recipi in Animam, Animam, in corpore: nor of that of *Triſmegiſtus* (or whoever was the Author of *Poemander*) *Mentem in Animam, Animam in Spiritu, Spiritum in corpore vehi:* Both which not obſcurely intimate a certain *Third* Nature in Man, intermediate between that Divine eſſence, his reaſonable Soul, & that Material or Elementary one, his body; which can be no other, but what we call the *Senſitive* part of the Soul.

Athanaſius.

Whether that condemnatory Sentence mentioned, doth extend to ſuch, as hold the Reaſon to be one part of the Soul, and the Senſitive power to be another, in this moderate ſenſe you are pleaſed to ſtate it; I will not much contend, it being the proper buſineſſe of Divines to determine that doubt: But, thus much I am certain of, that it expreſly toucheth all, who aſſert a *Duality of Souls Coexiſtent* in man; and that is enough, I preſume, to juſtifie my quotation of it, againſt them. As for thoſe remarkable texts of *Plato*, and the great *Hermes*, which you alleage; I anſwer, that it is very probable, that thoſe Philoſophers, who held the Soul to be Compoſed of two different Natures, as theſe ſeem to have done; had for their principal argument that inteſtine Repugnancy, we have explained, and that nothing can be contrary to it ſelfe. Now, their ground or *Suppoſition* that this Repugnancy is in the Soul it ſelf, or betwixt the Reaſonable part and the Senſitive, and not betwixt the Soul and Body only (as I have clearly proved

ved it to be) being manifestly erroneous: Assuredly, their *Inference* cannot be longer considerable. Nevertheless, if what I have already urged, be not sufficiently clear and valid; rather than shew my self so vain an Opiniator, as to put my judgement into the ballance against so solid a one as yours, I am content, you should continue the possession of your present perswasion, till you shall please to afford me some other opportunity of demonstrating the Unity and Simplicity of the Soul: My present undertaking being only to evince the Immortality of it; and this more out of compliance to *Lucretius* importunity, than any confidence of singular ability in my self, to manage so noble and weighty an Argument. If therefore I have not already discouraged your patience; permit me now to apply my self wholly to that Province.

The Considerations which I have designed to alleage, at this time, in favour of the Souls Immortality, are either *Physical*, or *Moral*; And the *Physical*, or such as arise from the Nature of the Soul it self, seem all to refer themselves to this one Capital Argument.

The Reasonable Soul of Man is Immaterial; and therefore Immortal.

Here, notwithstanding the main Difficulty be concerning the *Antecedent*, yet convenience of Method requires me first to manifest the Force or Necessity of the *Consequence*. The *Reason* therefore, why what is Immaterial, must also be Immortal,

mortal, is deduceable from hence ; that what wants Matter, wants likewise parts, into which it might be distracted and dissolved : and what is uncapable of being dissolved, must of perfect necessity alwayes continue to be what it is. For, whatever is of a nature free from the conditions of Matter or Body ; doth neither carry the principles of dissolution in it selfe, nor fear them from External Agents : and by pure consequence, cannot but perpetually last, or (which is the very same) be Immortall. And this Reason seems to me, both most evident and ineluctable.

Lucretius.

I perceive no such unavoidable Necessity. For, though an Immateriall thing cannot perish by the Exsolution of parts, which is the only way, by which all Corporeall natures are destroyed : yet it is not impossible, but the same may be destroyed some other way proper to Incorporealls, and unknown to us. Forasmuch as what ever is Principiate, or once produced, must have some cause of its production; and then why may it not be againe destroyed by the selfe same Cause, or by an action of that Cause, contrary to that action by which it was at first produced ?

Athanasius.

There are but two wayes, comprehensible by the Understanding, how any thing, that hath existence in nature, can perish : the one is (as I have

have already expreſſed) by the Exſolution and Diſſipation of its parts, of which it was compoſed; the other by abſolute Adnihilation of its Entity, as the Schoolmen phraſe it. Now, though I confeſſe, that as the former way of deſtruction is peculiar to Corporeall natures; ſo I know nothing to the contrary, but the *Latter* may be competent to *Incorporeals*, which are produced *ex nihilo*; for, every dependent, or what hath not its Being from its ſelfe, but deriveth it from another, is liable at the pleaſure of that, on which it doth depend, to be depoſed from that eſſence or ſtate of Being, in which it was, by the ſame, created: yet, that there is any ſuch thing as *Adnihilation* though conſiſtent with the *Omnipotence* of God, is hardly conceiveable, without derogation from his *wiſedome*, which pronounced all to be good that he had made, and the formal reaſon of the Creatures goodneſſe doth conſiſt only in this, that it ſeem'd good to the Divine will ſo to make them; and to argue *à poſſe ad eſſe*, that God doth or will adnihilate any thing, becauſe it is in his power to adnihilate, is much below ſo good a Logician, as *Lucretius* is. Nor are we to ſuppoſe any *Innovation* in the generall ſtate of things; but that the courſe of the Univerſe or Nature, doth conſtantly and invariably proceed in the ſame manner or tenour of method, which was at firſt inſtituted by the wiſedome of the Creator. There is, you know, a twofold Immortality, the one *Abſolute*, the other only *Derivative*. That the Firſt is competent onely to God, cannot be denyed; ſince it is impoſſible

poſſible that that eſſence, which is Non-principiate, or never had beginning, nor any Cauſe of its production, ſhould be determined, or ever ceaſe to be, or meet with any cauſe of its deſtruction. And that the latter may be competent to the whole Genus of *Immaterial* Eſſences, notwithſtanding the power of God, which can reduce them to Nothing, as well as it hath educed them from nothing; is likewiſe undeniable: for, ſuppoſing (as we ought) that God doth nothing contrary to the eſtabliſh't Lawes and decreed order of Nature, and that this Generall ſtate of things doth continue ſtill the ſame, which his Wiſedom at firſt inſtituted; it doth evidently follow, that what He hath once made Incorporeal, ſhall perſever to be the ſame to all eternity. I remember a paſſage in *Scaliger* (*Exercit.* 307. *ſect.* 20.) that moſt fitly expreſſeth the ſumme of this conſideration, and therefore ſhall recite it to you. *Solus Deus eſt verè immortalis & incorruptibilis, quia ſolus ex ſe ſuum eſſe habet, atq; à nullo dependet; Dei verò reſpectu omnia creata mortalia & corruptibilia ſunt, quæ à Creatoris nutu deponi poſſunt ab eſſentia illa, in qua conſtituta ſunt. Non corumpuntur tamen quædam, ut Angeli & Anima Rationalis, quia Creator non vult ea corrumpi, & nihil contrarii ipſis, à quo corrumpantur, condidit, nec eas ita materiæ immerſit, ut extra eam nec ſubſiſtere, nec operari poſſint.* And this I conceive ſufficient to manifeſt the neceſſity of Immortality from Incorporiety.

Lucretius.

But I am not ſatiſfied of any neceſſity, why you ſhould have recourſe to Immateriality, for the proof of Immortality; ſeeing that even among the Fathers there are ſome who maintain Immortality to be conſiſtent with *Corporality*: aud amongſt the beſt Philoſophers, ſome aſſert the Cœleſtial Bodies to be Incorruptible, and deduce that their incorruptibility from the nature of their Forme, which nevertheleſſe they account not incorporeal.

Athanaſius.

Thoſe Fathers held ſome Corporeal natures to be Immortal, not *ex ratione eſſentiæ*, but *ex Divina Gratia*, only from the decree of the Divine beneplacet; otherwiſe than I affirme of Incorporeals, and particularly the Soul of man. And as for that opinion of ſome Philoſophers, it is enough that it doth not oppoſe our Conſequence *i. e.* that granting ſome bodies to be Incorruptible, it follo·ves not, that therefore Incorporeals are the leſſe, but rather the more inccorruptible. Whatever becomes of that Opinion, I ſay, that becauſe there is no Body, which is not in proceſſe of time, exſoluble into ſuch parts, of which it doth conſiſt: in as much as whether their principles be Atomes, which by their naturall agility and contrary impulſions alwayes cauſe inteſtine commotions, and a conſtant civill warre in the very entrals of Concretions, or whether they be Elementary Qualities, active and

and reciprocally repugnant, which cannot be idle, but unceſſantly act one upon another; they carry the poſſibility of Diſſolution in their own Compoſition: I ſay, conſidering this, it is clearly neceſſary, that all bodies, according to the Fundamental Laws of Nature, be ſubject to Diſſolution, their parts being at length exturbed from their primary ſite, or Poſition and Union, and a total reſolution ſucceding thereupon. Beſides, you well know, that that Tenent of *Ariſtotle*, of the *Incorruptibility of Cæleſtial Bodies*, hath been exploded long ſince: And that what his *Interpreters* have ſo magnificently talked, of the Nature of the *Cæleſtial Form*, is a meer dream, a chimera of immoderate ſubtility, and worthy only to be laught at; eſpecially after thoſe many obſervations of changes in them, made by the Modern Aſtronomers, evincing the contrary.

Lucretius.

But, do not you incur an Abſurdity, in ſuppoſing that there is any *ſubſtance Immaterial*, or produced-Nature Incorporeal; when as the Fathers many of them have judged, that what is not a Body, is Nothing; and that my Tutor, *Epicurus* hath expreſsly taught, that in Nature, nothing is Incorporeal beſide Space or Inanity?

Athanaſius.

I know no Father, but only *Tertullian* (whom St. *Auguſtine* doth ſmartly reprehend for aſſerting it) of that unſound opinion; and to him we may oppoſe the Authority of all, at leaſt of moſt the others, who ſolidly juſtified the contrary. And to *Epicurus*, I oppoſe *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and ſundry others, who would not admit any ſuch thing as Emptineſſe in the Univerſe; but expreſsly affirmed, that there were [χωριστὰς, ἀσωμα, τὰς, καὶ ἀμερεῖς οὐσίας] *Subſtances ſeparate, incorporeal, and deſtitute of parts.* What if there were a few, who could not elevate their minds ſo high, as to conceive any thing Incorporeal, beſides Inanity; doth it therefore follow, that thoſe many, and great men, who did conceive the contrary were fools, and that I, who likewiſe affirm the exiſtence of Incorporeal Natures, doe run my ſelf upon an Abſurdity? I hope, *Lucretius*, you will be more favourable to your ſelf, than to own the impertinence of any ſuch Sequel.

Lucretius.

To deal freely with you, I find the Notion of *Immaterial Subſtance*, to be ſomwhat too ſublime for the comprehenſion of ſo humble and ſhort-ſighted a reaſon as mine is. But, perhaps, you may aſſiſt it with the Teleſcope of yours, upon occaſion of ſomwhat or other in the proceſſe of your diſcourſe: And, therefore, go on directly to the conviction of your *Antecedent*, viz. that the

the *Rational Soul is Immortal*; for, upon that hang's all the weight of the buſineſſe.

Athanaſius.

The *Antecedent*, viz. *that the Reaſonable Soul is Immaterial*, is evident from the Nature and Manner of its Operations. For, ſince it is a certain rule, that every Agent is known by its Effects, and that all Formes reveal themſelves by their peculiar and diſtinct energies, and waies of Operation; and as certain, that the Actions of man, as a Cogitating and Intellectuall Eſſence, are of ſo noble and divine a ſtrain, as that it is impoſſible they ſhould be performed by a meer Material Agent, or Corporeal ſubſtance, however diſpoſed, qualified, or modified: What truth can be more perſpicuous, more ſtrong, than this, that the Soul of man, by which alone he is impowered to think and underſtand, is an Immaterial Subſtance?

Now, all the Actions of the Human Soul, are referrible to two General Heads or Fountains; whereof the one is *Perception*, or the ſingle Operation of the *Intellect*; the other, *Volition*, or the ſingle Operation of the *Will*: For, to be ſenſible, to Imagine, and purely to underſtand, are only diverſe manners of *Perceiving*; and to deſire, to hate, to affirm, to deny, to embrace, to refuſe, are only divers manners of *willing*.

To examine theſe Actions, therefore, more particularly; let us in the firſt place, turn our eye, for a glance or two, upon the Will, which though but a branch of the Soul, and as it were a ſecundary Faculty, in reſpect of the Intellect, doth

doth clearly ſhew the Immateriality of the Soul, whoſe Faculty it is. For, inſomuch as the Will doth by Natural and Congenial tendency, proſecute *Bonum Honeſtum*, which is for the moſt part repugnant to *Bonum Delectabile*, or ſuch Good, as is only Senſual and Corporeal: It is a good Conſequence, that the Will is an Incorporeal Faculty; it being impoſſible for a Corporeal Faculty to apprehend an Incorporeal Object, ſuch as Good abſtracted from all relations of the Senſe.

Again, foraſmuch as the Will is abſolutely *Free*, to elect, or refuſe what Objects ſhe pleaſeth; and ſuch a Freedom cannot conſiſt with an Appetite immerſed in Matter and obliged thereunto inſeparably (becauſe all Diſpoſitions of Matter are determinate and neceſſary, and the effects reſulting from thoſe certain diſpoſitions, are likewiſe determinate and neceſſary:) therefore is the Will Superior to all Conditions and Obligations of Matter. And, that the Will hath this arbitrary Liberty of Election or Refuſal, is demonſtrable from hence; that it is in the power of every man living to ſuſpend or withold his aſſent to any propoſition whatever, until he is able to make a certain judgement of the Verity or Falſity, convenience or inconvenience thereof: Which reaſon is ſo manifeſt, out of our own experience, that *Des Cartes* (and He, you will confeſſe, was a man of admirable circumſpection and ſtrictneſſe in examining Fundamental and Proleptical Notions) doth ſecurely account it among the Firſt and moſt common Notions, that

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are Congenial and Innate in the Mind of every man. But, becauſe the Will is only the Branch, and the Underſtanding the Root, upon which it growes, and by which it is to be regulated; and that what I ſhall ſay of the Intellect, may be eaſily accommodated to the Will, with equal competency: I ſhall no longer inſiſt upon the conſideration of the Will, but fix my diſcourſes wholly upon the Intellect, as the Principal and Primary Faculty, for proof of the Souls Immateriality; drawing my Arguments firſt from the *Actions* of the Underſtanding, and then from its proper *Objects*.

The Operations of the Intellect, which give evidence of the Souls Immateriality, may be reduced to *Three* diſtinct *Orders* or *Claſſes*: The *Firſt* conſiſting of ſuch, by which it may be evinced, that Intellection and Imagination are Acts perfectly diſtinct each from other: The *Second* of ſuch, as are called Reflex Acts, by which the Intellect doth underſtand it ſelf, and its own proper functions, and perceiveth that it doth underſtand: The *Third* of thoſe, by which we do not only form Univerſals, or Univerſal Notions of things; but alſo underſtand the very reaſon of Univerſality it ſelf. And of each of theſe, I intend to ſpeak plainly and ſuccinctly, according to this method.

I begin with Acts of the *Firſt* Claſſis; not that they are of any ſingular dignity or excellency above the reſt, but that I may ſeaſonably remove that obſtacle of common prejudice, which men generally have (and you, *Lucretius*, among the reſt,

reſt, as your ſelf profeſſed even now) that the Intellect is not a Faculty diſtinct from the Phanſie or Imagination; as if, what we call Imagination in Beaſts, were really the very ſame with that, which we call Underſtanding in Men, and only different from it, *ſecundum magis & minus*, according to the degrees of more and leſſe, ſtrength and acutenels.

In Man we cannot but obſerve a certain ſort of Intellection, by which the ſoul exerciſing her Faculty of Ratiocination, doth advance her ſelf to the aſſured and diſtinct knowledge or underſtanding of ſome things, which is impoſſible for the Imagination ever to have any apprehenſion of, in regard there can be no Images or repreſentations of them in the Phanſy, though we ſhould with never ſo much intention or earneſtneſſe imploy our mind to frame ſuch reſemblances. For example, when conſidering the Magnitude of the Sun, we follow the conduct of our Reaſon, and deduce inferences from ſound premiſes (which is Diſcourſe) we ſoon come to know moſt certainly, that the magnitude of the Sun is at leaſt an hundred and ſixty times greater than that of the Earth: Yet, do what we can, we can never bring our Imagination to apprehend any ſuch vaſtneſſe, but ſhall find it to conſiſt only in ſuch a ſmall repreſentation of the Solar Globe, as the Senſe hath delivered into the brain. Nay, if we ſet our ſelves to meditate well and ſeriouſly upon the matter, we ſhall ſoon be ſatisfied, that we cannot imagine the Globe of the Earth (which is yet vaſtly ſhort of that of the Sun) to be

be neer ſo great, as Demonſtrations Geometrical convince it to be; foraſmuch as the Imagination (which doth no more but copy out the pictures drawn on the tables of the Senſes, and that as well in dimenſions, as figure, colour, *&c.*) conceiveth the Vault or Arch of the Heavens to inſiſt upon the limits of the viſible Horizon, on every ſide, and that the Clouds, Sun, Moon, Starrs, and whatever elſe we behold within that Arch or Semicircle, are not more diſtant from us, than the Horizon is. So that you ſee plainly, how little the Imagination doth apprehend the Heavens, and the whole World to be; and how vaſtly ſhort we come of imagining the Sun (a ſmall part only of the Heavens, and of the Univerſe) to be ſo great, as really it is; while we cannot imagine the whole World to be as great, as the Earth really is: But, if we appeal to our *Underſtanding*; that doth inſtantly aſſure us, by irreſiſtible demonſtrations, that the World, Heavens, Sun, and Earth are of certain magnitudes incomparably greater, than thoſe to which the Phanſy can poſſibly extend its power of comprehenſion. Which I think, *Lucretius*, doth not obſcurely import, that there is more than an imaginary difference between the Underſtanding and the Phanſy.

Lucretius.

I do not think ſo, *Athanaſius*. For, though perhaps I cannot ſo extend my Imagination, as to bring it to fathom or graſp ſo great a magnitude, as that of the Sun, all at once: Yet I can

imagine a greater and greater magnitude by degrees, till at laſt I come to equal the whole real magnitude thereof. Nor is it neceſſary, that I ſhould have in my Phanſy an Image of greatneſs equal thereunto, while that ſmall one exhibited to me by my ſight, is ſufficient to make me conceive, that the real magnitude is greater than the apparent: which I can do, only by comparing the ſeveral apparent magnitudes of one and the ſame Object, at ſeveral diſtances from the eye. *Athanaſius.*

Hear you, Sir. That *Addition* you make of one degree of magnitude to another ſucceſſively, till you attain to an apprehenſion of the real magnitude of the Sun; is not an act of your Imagination, but purely of your *Reaſon*, which finding the Image of the Suns greatneſſe in your Phanſy to be incomparably too ſmall, to anſwer to that immenſe diſtance that you underſtand to be betwixt the Sun and your eye, doth, by its own proper Faculty, ſupply that diſproportion, not by enlargement of the Image, but by inferring, from Geometrical Maxims, that a viſible Object at that ſuppoſed diſtance, though it ſeem to be no bigger than a Coach-wheel, muſt yet in reality be by vaſt exceſſes greater. For, if you had no other Conception of the Suns Magnitude, but what is deduced from the ſight; how could it ever enter into your mind, that the Sun is really ſo much larger than it appears to be? Manifeſt, therefore, it is, that that enlargement of your conception of the Suns Magnitude, beyond that of its apparence, is an act of your Intellect, wholly

ly above the power of your Imagination. So likewiſe is your *Comparing* the ſeveral apparent magnitudes of one and the ſame Object, at ſeveral degrees of diſtance. Where give me leave to obſerve to you, that the Imagination or common ſenſe can have no Idea of *Diſtance*, beyond one or two hundred feet: as is evident from hence, that the Sun and Moon, which are amongſt Objects of the greateſt remoteneſſe from the eye, and whoſe Diameters are to their Circumference, as one to an hundred, or thereabouts, ſeem to us to be at moſt two feet over; though Reaſon doth aſſure us, that they are very great and very far diſtant. And nothing is more certain, than that we eſtimate the magnitude of a thing, from the cognition, or opinion at leaſt, which we have in our mind of the Diſtance of it comparatively to the magnitude of the image of it drawn in the bottom of the Eye, and not abſolutely by the magnitude of that image; as I have amply and demonſtratively declared in my diſcourſe of the *Manner of Viſion*, and as *Des Cartes* alſo hath demonſtrated, in the *ſixt Chapter* of his *Dioptricks*: Both which I am ſure you have peruſed. However, becauſe it conduceth ſomwhat to our preſent argument, permit me to give you this evident reaſon thereof; that though the Image of an Object may be an hundred times greater, when the Object is very neer, than when the ſame is removed to a diſtance ten times greater: yet the Object it ſelf doth not therefore appear to us an hundred times greater, but almoſt equal. So that the

Comparation of Magnitude and Diſtance, is an act of the Underſtanding, not of the Imagination, as you preſume.

Lucretius.

If all our Cognition doth proceed originally from our Senſes, as all men concede, and *Ariſtotle* affirms in that Maxim, *Nihil eſt in intellectu, quod non prius fuit in ſenſu*; and that Intellection is made by Analogy, by Compoſition, Diviſion, Ampliation, Extenuation, and the like waies of managing the Species or Images of things immitted into the Common Senſe, by the External Senſes: Then certainly can we have no knowledge of any thing, whereof we have no Image; and conſequently without Imagination there is no Intellection, ſo that in fine to Imagine and to Underſtand a thing will be all one.

Athanaſius.

Your Inference is not juſtifiable. For, the Common Notions, that are as it were engraven on our Minds, and that are not derived originally from the Obſervations of things by our ſelves, or the Tradition of them by others, do undeniably atteſt the contrary. Nor can any thing be more abſurd, than to ſay, that all thoſe Proleptical and Common Notions, which we have in our Mind, do ariſe only from impreſſions made upon the Organs of our Senſes, by the incurſe of External Objects; and that they cannot conſiſt without them: Inſomuch as all ſenſible Impreſſions are ſingular, but thoſe Notions Univerſal, having no affinity with, no relation unto,

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Corporeal motions or impreſſions. And, if you think the contrary, pray oblige me ſo far, as to teach me, what kind of Corporeal impreſſion that may be, which formes this one Common Notion in our Mind, *Quæ ſunt eadem uni tertio, ſunt eadem inter ſe.* Not that I am affraid, to queſtion the truth of even your *Suppoſition*, notwithſtanding the generall allowance of that Maxim of the Philoſopher. For, whoever dothwel obſerve, how far our Senſes extend themſelves, and what that is, which can ariſe from them, in order to our Faculty of Cogitating; will eaſily be brought to confeſſe, that they exhibite to us no ſuch Idea's of things, as we form of | them in our thoughts, and that in thoſe Idea's we form, there is nothing, which is not Innate and Congenial to our Mind or Faculty of Cogitating, except only thoſe Circumſtances, which relate to experience, or whereby we judge, that thoſe Idea's, wehave now preſent to our Cogitation, may be conveniently referred to thoſe external Objects, which we ſpeculate. Not that thoſe Objects have immitted thoſe very Idea's into our Mind, by the Organs of the Senſes; but becauſe they have immited ſomwhat, which hath given occaſion to the Mind to form ſuch Idea's, by its own Innate and proper Faculty, at this time rather than at any other. For, nothing comes to the Mind, from External Objects, by the mediation of the Senſes, beſides certain Corporeal Impreſſions; and yet neither thoſe Impreſſions, nor the Figures reſulting from them, are ſuch as we conceive in the Mind; as *Des Cartes*

Cartes hath amply proved in his Dioptricks: Whence it follows, that the Idea's of Motions and Figures are innate to the Mind; that is, that the Mind hath an eſſential power to form them: for, when I ſay that ſuch an Idea is in the Mind, I intend that it is not alwaies actually there, but *Potentially*, and the word *Faculty* will juſtifie that manner of ſpeaking. I add moreover, that no Corporeal Image or Species, is ever received into the Mind; and that pure Intellection, as well of a Corporeal, as an Incorporeal thing, is made without any Material Species or Image at all; but, as for Imagination, to that, indeed, is required the preſence of ſome Corporeal Image, to which the Mind may apply it ſelf; becauſe there can be no Imagination but of Corporeal things; and yet nevertheleſſe that Corporeal Image doth not enter into the Mind. For inſtance, the Intellect or Mind hath no material Species of that Magnitude, which it underſtands the Sun to be of: but comprehends the ſame to be in the Sun, by its own proper Virtue or Faculty, *i. e.* by Ratiocination. Whence we may ſecurely conclude, that the Intellect, underſtanding a thing without a Material Image, muſt it ſelf be immaterial: as on the contrary, the Imagination confeſſeth it ſelf to be Material, becauſe it is obliged to the uſe of Material Images. Truth is, the Intellect alſo makes uſe of Images conceived by the Phanſy (and therefore they are called Phantaſms) yet only as certain Means, or Degrees, that progreſſing through them, it may at length attain the knowledge of ſome things, which

which it afterward perceives as ſequeſtred, and in a manner ſublimed from thoſe Phantaſms: But this is that, which doth ſufficiently argue its being Immaterial, becauſe it carrieth it ſelf beyond all Images material, and comes to the Science of ſome things, of which it hath no Phantaſms.

And thus you may perceive, that we do not owe all our Cognition to our Senſes: And conſequently, that to Underſtand and to Imagine is not (as you would infer) all one thing.

Lucretius.

I know not, what ſingular Faculty you may have, of abſtracting your Underſtanding from all commerce with the Senſes, in its negotiation for knowledge; but ſure I am, that the moſt learned and moſt ſubtile among the *Peripateticks* have unanimouſly held, that all our Cognition is made by the working of our Phanſy; *and that the Soul doth not underſtand, but by the Speculation of Phantaſms.* Nay, *Pomponatius* and Sir *K. Digby* (both which flew up to an admirable ſublimity in their Contemplations, concerning the nature and operations of the Soul) openly profeſſe the Verity of that Axiome, from their own experience. So that unleſſe you can give me ſome more pregnant teſtimony, of the Intellects knowing, without the immediate help of Images, pre-admitted by the Senſes, than yet you have done: you muſt pardon me, if I believe, that in this point you affect to be paradoxical.

Athana-

Athanasius.

The Sum of what I have said, of this Argument, is this; that though the Intellect doth come to understand Corporeal Natures, by the mediation of Phantasms: Yet the Notions, which it frameth it to self of them, are Different from those Phantasms; and that it hath the Knowledge of some things, whereof the Phansy can have no Images. And for Confirmation hereof, since you seem to desire it, I shall offer you this one Argument more.

All the particular Knowledges, that man hath, or can have, concerning finite and compleat Entities (except only the Notion of *Being*) are only certain *Comparisons* or *Respects* between particular things: But of Respect, there can be no Image or representation at all, in the Phansy: and therefore our Knowledge is without Images.

The truth of the *Major* proposition is evident from hence; that of all the particular Notions we have (except that of *Being*) there is no one, which doth belong to some one of the Ten *Prædicaments*; all which are so manifestly *Respective*, that no man doubteth them to be so. In particular, *Substance* hath a respect to *Being*; *Quantity* doth consist in a respect unto *Parts*; *Quality* hath a respect unto that *Subject*, which is denominated from it; *Action* and *Passion* result from the Union of *Quality* and *Substance*; *Relation* denoteth the respect betwixt the *Relatum* and *Correlatum*; *Ubi* & *Quando*, or Where & When, arise from

substance

ſubſtance conſidered with the circumſtances of *Place* and *Time*; *Situation* is from the reſpect of *Parts*, to the *Whole*; *Habit* is a reſpect to the Subſtance wherein it is, as being the propriety, by which it is well or ill, conveniently or inconveniently affected, in regard of its own Nature. Forasmuch, therefore, as all the Ten Predicaments do conſiſt only in diverſity of Reſpects, and that each one of all the particular Notions which man is capable of, in this life, doth naturally fall under the comprehenſion of ſome one of thoſe Predicaments: What Conſequence can be more genuine, more manifeſt, than this, that all our Cognition is drawn from Compariſons or Reſpects.

For the *Minor*; if you queſtion the verity thereof, pray, exerciſe your mind in ſeriouſly reviewing all things that have been derived from the Senſes, and ſee if you can find among them any ſuch thing as what we call a *Reſpect*. It hath neither Figure, nor Colour, nor Sound, nor Odour, nor Taſt: and ſo cannot poſſibly be repreſented to the Senſe, nor Imagination. And, if you cannot either meet with any Image of Reſpect, or frame one in your Imagination; nor deny that all the Negotiation of the Intellect is in and by Reſpects: I hope, you will have little cauſe left for your ſuſpicion, that I affect to be Paradoxical, in that I affirm, that the Notions of things in the underſtanding, are extreamly different from whatſoever is immitted into the Mind by the mediation of the Senſes; and ſo, that the Intellect hath a knowledge of ſome

things, whereof the Imagination can have no Phantaſms.

Lucretius.

But, all this while, you give me no *Criterion*, or certain Rule, by which I may be able to diſcern betwixt meer Imagination, and pure Intellection, within my ſelf; ſo as to know when I apprehend a thing by my Common Senſe or Imaginative Faculty alone, and when by my Intellect alone, and without the immediate concurrence of my Imagination. Pray, therefore, aſſiſt your alleaged argument, by preſcribing me ſome ſuch infallible Note of Diſtinction: And then perhaps, I ſhall ſubmit to your opinion.

Athanaſius.

In ſimple Imagination, the Mind doth alwaies apply it ſelf to the Image of the thing ſpeculated; and in pure Intellection, it quitteth the Image, and converteth it ſelf upon it Self: The former act being ſtill accompanied with ſome labour, and contention of the Mind; the latter free, eaſie, and inſtantaneous. As in this Example. When I think upon a Triangle, I do not only inſtantly conceive it to be a Figure comprehended in three lines, but I alſo behold thoſe three lines, with the eye of my Mind, as if they were really preſent; and this is that I call Imagination. But, when I think of a Chiliogon, or Figure with a thouſand Angles; albeit I as well underſtand, that the ſame is a Figure conſiſting a thouſand ſides, as I do

do a Triangle to be one of only three ſides: Yet I cannot as well imagine all thoſe thouſand ſides, or behold them diſtinctly and at once, with the eye of my Mind, as if they were really preſent; for, though then, becauſe of my cuſtom of alwaies imagining ſomthing, I have ſome certain Figure confuſedly repreſented to me; yet that that is not the repreſentation of a Chiliogon, is manifeſt from hence, that it is no whit different from that, which I ſhould repreſent to my ſelf, in caſe I thought upon a Myriogon, or any other Figure with more ſides: nor doth it help me at all to the knowing of thoſe proprieties, by which a Chiliogon differs from other Polygon Figures. And, if the queſtion be of only a Pentagon, I can underſtand the nature of that Figure (as of a Chiliogon) without the help of my Imagination; and I can alſo imagine the ſame, by applying the acies of my Mind, to the five ſides thereof, and to the Area contained in them: But, here, I plainly perceive, that to imagine thus, there is required a certain peculiar ſtrife, or Contention of my Mind, ſuch as I uſe not in the meer underſtanding of that Figure, or any other Polygon; which new *Contention and Labour* of my Mind doth clearly ſhew the Difference betwixt Imagination and pure Intellection: And this is the beſt Note or Character of Diſtinction, I can in the preſent think upon to give you. But, it requireth ſtrict and profound Meditation to obſerve it; and therefore let me deſire you to conſider what I have ſaid of this Difference betwixt Imagining and Underſtanding, to morrow

morning, in your bed, when your Spirits are clear and active, your Faculties vigorous, and your Mind quiet and ſerene.

Iſodicaſtes.

You ſay very wel, Sir. For, notwithſtanding you have argued with ſingular ſubtility, in defence of this Diſtinction; yet, untill a man ſhall find his own Experience give light and Confirmation to your Reaſons, the thing will remain involved in much obſcurity. And, therefore, ſince frequent and calm Meditation is ſo neceſſary, to the habituating our Mind to ſpeculate abſtractedly, without material Phantaſms, and to know when it doth ſo: *Lucretius* and *I*, will take ſome time, to meditate as ſeriouſly and profoundly, as we can, upon this Nicety, before we declare our final determination therupon; and in the mean time leave it *tanquam Problema utrinque diſputatum*, as a Problem well diſputed on both ſides, but not fully decided by either. And ſo, if you pleaſe, you are at liberty to proceed to ſome new Argument of the Souls Immateriality.

Athanaſius.

The *Second* Branch of the Method I propoſed, ariſeth (as you may remember) from that kind of Operation in the Soul, whereby the Intellect, *Reflecting upon it ſelf*, doth become its own Object, and ſo underſtand it ſelf, and its own Functions, and know it ſelf to be an Intellect, or thinking and diſcerning Nature. If therefore we well conſider theſe Reflex Acts of the Under-

Underſtanding; we can no longer doubt its being Immaterial. That the Intellect doth thus reflect upon its ſelf, and diſcern its own knowledge, needs no other teſtimony but that of a mans own Experience; it being impoſſible for any perſon living not to know, that he knows what he knows, as is implied in that common Proverb, *I very well know what I know.* And, that this Operation is far above the power of whatſoever is Material, deriveth its evidence from hence; that every Material thing or Agent is ſo ſtrictly obliged to ſome certain place, either permanently or ſucceſſively, as that it cannot move toward it ſelf, but if moved at all, is moved toward ſome thing divers from it ſelf. Which truly is the Reaſon of that Canon Law in Nature, that *Nothing can act upon it ſelf.* For, however one and the ſame thing may ſomtimes ſeem to act upon it ſelf; yet really it is only one part of that thing act's upon another part of the ſame thing: As when one of a mans hands ſtriketh againſt the other, or the end of one finger againſt the palm of the hand, but the end of the ſame finger cannot ſtrike upon it ſelf. And hence comes it, that the Sight cannot ſee it ſelf, nor the Hearing hear it ſelf, nor the Imagination perceive that it doth imagine, nor any Corporeal Faculty whatever perceive its own Functions. We know, indeed, when and what we ſee, or hear, or imagine, *&c.* but that Knowledge is the ſole and proper effect of that Power or Faculty within us, which being Superior to all Senſe and Imagination, and ſo comprehending all their

their activity in its own, doth perceive them, their Objects and Operations, judge of them, and reflect upon both those judgements, and it self that frames them. And the Reason, why the Imagination cannot perceive it self, or its own actions, is because the Act of the Phansy tendeth only to the Image of the thing imagined, not to the perception of that Image; for, of a Perception there can be no Image. It being then most certain, that the Intellect doth familiarly reflect upon it self, and understand its own Intelligence; and as certain, that such a power doth transcend the capacity of any thing inseparably immersed in Matter, and confined to the conditions of Matter: I cannot see how it is possible for you to avoid or decline the necessity of the Consequence, *viz*, *That the Intellect is a Faculty Immaterial.* And here I dare you, *Lucretius*, or the subtilest *Epicurean* in the World, to try the strength of your Philosophy, upon this Argument; for to me, I profesſe, it seems not much inferior to a Demonstration.

Lucretius.

Why Sir, do you conceive, that what you affirm of the impossibility of internal Reflection, in any but an Immaterial Agent, is of Universal truth?

Athanasius.

Seriously I do, and upon the Authority of that Reason, I now alleaged, I think it justifiable to persevere in that perswasion, untill your self, or

or ſome other perſon ſhall offer me an Inſtance, wherein that General poſition doth admit of an Exception.

Lucretius.

What think you, then, of ſundry admirable actions of ſome Brute Animals, which ſeem to implie *Dubitation*, *Reſolution*, *Invention*, and the like effects of a diſcourſive and ſelf-knowing Principle within them? For example, when you obſerve a Dogg in hunting to caſt about, trie the ground, ſtand ſtill, run ſomtimes forward, ſomtimes turn aſide, and then on a ſuddain change his courſe and return back; will you not allow this to ariſe from a kind of *Examination* of the actions of his Senſe? And doth not that Examination import a *Reflection* of the diſcerning Faculty both upon it ſelf, and its action of diſcerning?

Athanaſius.

Alas, *Lucretius*, this is ſo light an Objection, that I cannot but wonder, that it ſhould retard your aſſent to a poſition of ſo much weight, as that, *that no Material thing can act upon it ſelf*; eſpecially ſince you have read the excellent diſcourſes of *Monſieur Des Cartes*, and *Sir K. Digby*; wherein they have ſo clearly ſolved all the moſt ſeemingly rational actions of Beaſts, by ſenſible motions and corporeal principles. However, that you may no longer be deluded, in conceiving, that the ſuddain ſtopping, turning aſide, returning, *&c.* of a Dogg, doth argue this eminent

nent Reflection of a Faculty upon it ſelf, which I attribute to a Man, as the propriety of his Intellect; be pleaſed to know, that the moſt it doth import, is only *Reminiſcence* in the Dogg, by reaſon of ſome new Species in his Phanſy, accidentally intercurrent, and diverting him from the purſuit of that other, which immediately before poſſeſſing, and as it were beating upon his Phanſy, had engaged him to a different courſe: For, as often as the Species that move and affect his Senſe, and ſo his Imagination, are changed, ſo often doth he change his courſe and vary his purſuit. And certainly nothing comes nearer to a manifeſt abſurdity, than to ſuppoſe, that a Dogg can, as it were, ſay within himſelf, *I imagine that I do imagine, or I perceive that I am a perceiving eſſence,* and the like; which is an action of ſuch ſingular eminence above all what we obſerve to proceed from Doggs, or any the moſt docible and cunning Beaſts in nature, that it ought not to be imputed to any thing below an *Immaterial and ſelf-Cognoſcent Being*, ſuch as the Reaſonable Soul of Man is.

And it was upon this eſſential prerogative of the Human Soul, that *Des Cartes* ſeemeth to have reflected, when under the terme *Cogitation*, he underſtood all things that are done in us, *cum Conſcientia*, with knowledge that we do them; ſo as that not only to underſtand, to wil, to imagine; but alſo to have the ſenſe of a thing, is the ſame as to Cogitate, or Think. "For (ſaith he) "if I argue thus with my ſelf, I ſee, or I walk; "therefore I am; and underſtand this only of "that

"that Viſion, or walking, which is performed "by the help of my body, then the Concluſion is "not abſolutely certain, becauſe it often hap- "pens that in my ſleep, I dream that I ſee, and "walk, when in truth I do neither: But, if I un- "derſtand it of my Perception, or Conſcience of "my ſeeing or walking, with reference only to "my Mind, which alone doth perceive or think, "that it doth ſee or walk; then the Concluſion "is moſt certain, becauſe it is of the nature of "my Mind to be Conſcious of its own actions. Which Deſcription of Thinking, I the rather commemorate, becauſe I have obſerved many to quarrel at it, as incompetent and ſomwhat extravagant; not comprehending the Authors principal Ground, the conſtant Reflection of the Mind upon its own Operations.

Lucretius.

So that I perceive, you wholly exclude all Animals (except Man) from being conſcious of their own actions: But with how much reaſon; I ſhall beſeech *Iſodicaſtes* here to judge, who cannot but frequently have remarked the contrary, nothing being more common, then to ſee a ſetting Dog to come creeping and trembling with fear and ſhame to his Maſter, when either through too much ſpeed in hunting, or the averſeneſſe of the wind carrying away the ſcent from him, he hath chanced to ſpring the Partridges, which he ought to have ſet: And on the other ſide, when he hath made a fair Set, and the game is taken, you ſhall have him leap and exſult

fult for joy, and run confidently to his Maſter for his reward. And what can his fear and ſhame be referred unto, but his being conſcious that he hath committed a fault, and ſo deſerves to be beaten for it? or his exultation in his own cunning, but to his being conſcious that he hath done well, and ſo ought to be encouraged and recompenſed with ſome ſhare of the Prey?

Athanaſius.

I thought I had prevented your recourſe to all Objections taken from the actions of Brute Animals, that carry a ſemblance of Reaſon in them; by remitting you to your remembrance of what you have read in the ſatisfactory Diſcourſes of *Des Cartes*, and *Sir K. Digby* concerning them: but ſeeing you will not acquieſce in that reference, let me tell you briefly, that what you now urge of a Dogs owning his faults, and exultation in his own skill and cunning, is not ſufficient to entitle him to that tranſcendent capacity of acting with Knowledge, and Reflection, which I affirm to be the propriety of Mans informing Principle within him. For, the Dog having been uſed to be beaten, as often as he ſprings the game; no ſooner ſee's the Birds upon their wings, but inſtantly the Image of the ſmart he hath formerly ſuffered from his Maſter, upon the like occaſion, recurrs to his Phanſy, and affecteth him with fear: As on the other ſide, the ſight of the birds in the Net, brings afreſh into his memory the Image of that pleaſure, wherewith his Senſe was affected, in eating the heads of

of the Partridge, and ſtrongly poſſeſſing his Imagination, cauſeth that paſſion of joy in him, which betrayeth it ſelf by his leaping and skipping. For, in the Phanſy of Beaſts there is alwaies a conjunction of the Image of that particular good or harm they have formerly received from ſuch or ſuch things, with the Images of the things themſelves: which is, indeed, the cauſe of all thoſe ſo much admired effects, called Sympathies and Antipathies, amongſt Animals of different kinds, as I have more particularly declared in my *Phyſiology*, where I treated of the *Manifeſtation of Occult Qualities*. And this reaſon may ſerve to ſolve what you object, concerning Beaſts being Conſcious when they have pleaſed, or diſpleaſed their Maſters; without entrenchment upon the Prerogative of Man, whereby he is capable of acting with knowledge, and reflecting upon that knowledge, as part and the principall part of his Eſſence. But, ſince you have appealed to the judgement of *Iſodicaſtes*, I humbly expect his Verdict.

Iſodicaſtes.

That many Brute Animals, eſpecially ſuch as are made tame and domeſtick, and frequently converſant with men, are conſcious of their faults; daily experience doth teſtifie: But, that they are therefore animated with a Soul capable of knowing it ſelf, and its actions, by reflecting upon it ſelf: ſeems to me to be altogether inconſequent; becauſe, as *Athanaſius* hath explained the reaſon and manner of that particular action

in them, it doth import no more than what belongs to a meer Senſitive Soul. So that, *Lucretius*, unleſſe you can impugne his Argument now alleadged, for proof of the Immateriality of the Human intellect by ſome more important Objection; I ſhould be unjuſt not to allow it to be ſtrongly perſwaſive.

Athanaſius.

Being free, then, from any impediment of further Contradiction to this Argument of the Intellect's being an Immaterial Faculty, from its Reflex acts; I come now to the Third ſort of its Operations, which teſtifie the ſame, *viz.* thoſe *whereby we do not only form to our ſelves Univerſals, or Univerſal Notions, but alſo underſtand the reaſon of Univerſality it ſelf.*

In Univerſal Notions we are to obſerve Two conſiderables; (1.) their *Abſtraction*; (2.) their *Univerſality*: And either of theſe Conditions is alone ſufficient to inforce a perſwaſion of the Immateriality of that Faculty, the Intellect, which doth ſo apprehend them.

For, as to the *Firſt*; it being evidently impoſſible, that any Corporeal thing ſhould be exempted from all Material conditions, and differences of ſingularity, as Magnitude, Figure, Colour, Time, Place, *&c.* and undeniably certain, that the Underſtanding hath a power to deveſt them of all and every one of thoſe conditions, and circumſtances, and to ſpeculate them in that abſtracted ſtate, devoid of all particularities; it followeth of pure neceſſity, that the Underſtanding

ing, which hath this power ſo to abſtract them, muſt it ſelf be exempt from all matter, and of a Condition more eminent, than to be confined to material Conditions.

And, as to the *Other*, viz. their *Univerſality*; this addeth to their abſtraction one admirable particularity more, which is, that they abſtract in ſuch ſort, as to expreſſe at the ſame time the very thing, they abſtract from. Which is not a little wonderful; ſince it is not eaſie to conceive, that the ſame thing ſhould be, and not be, in one and the ſame Notion. And yet if we ſeriouſly reflect upon what we mean, when we ſay thus, *Every man hath two hands*; we ſhall ſoon perceive, that we therein expreſſe nothing, whereby one individual man is diſtinguiſhed from another: though that very word *Every*, doth import that every ſingle perſon is diſtinct from another; ſo that here is (as *Sir K. Digby* moſt wittily ſaith) *Particularity it ſelf expreſſed in Common.* Now, this being impoſſible to be done, in any Corporeal repreſentation whatſoever, it is a neceſſary conſequence, that the Intellect, which hath this ſingular propriety of thus comprehending and expreſſing Univerſals, is it ſelf Incorporeal.

Now, if you ſhould require of me to declare, how the Underſtanding doth frame to it ſelf Univerſals, when there are no ſuch things in Nature; I ſhall explain the *Manner* of that tranſcendent Operation to be thus. When we Cogitate or think upon Individuals, that have reſemblance each to other; we accommodate one and the ſame Idea to all particulars comprehended under

under that one General notion: and ſo uſing to impoſe one and the ſame name upon all the things repreſented by that Common Idea, that name becomes Univerſal. Thus, when we ſee two ſtones, and apply our Mind to conſider, not their Nature, but only that they are Two; we form to our ſelves an Idea of that Number, which we call a Binary, or Two: And afterward, when we ſee two Birds, or two Trees, and conſider not their Nature, but only that they are two; we repeat the ſame Idea we had before, which comes thereby to be Univerſal, and we call this number by the ſame Univerſal name. After the ſame manner, when we behold a Figure comprehended in Three lines, we form in our Mind a certain Idea thereof, which we call the Idea of a Triangle; and we afterward alwaies uſe the ſame Idea, as an Univerſal one, to repreſent to us all other Figures conſiſting of three lines. Again, when we perceive, that among Triangles there are ſome, which have one right angle, and others which have not; we form in our ſelves the Univerſal Idea of a rectangle Triangle, which in relation to the former Idea, as more General, we call a *Species*: And that rectitude of the Angle, is the Univerſal *Difference*, by which all rectangle Triangles are diſtinguiſhed from others. Further, that in all ſuch Triangles, the Baſis is in power equal to the powers of the ſides; this is a *Propriety* competent to all ſuch, and only to ſuch Triangles. And laſtly, if we ſuppoſe that ſome of theſe Triangles are moved, and others not; this will be in them

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an Univerſal *Accident*. And after this Manner doth the Underſtanding frame thoſe Five Univerſals, *Genus*, *Species*, *Difference*, *Propriety*, and *Accident*: which really are but ſo many ſeveral *Modes*, or *Manners* of our *Cogitating*, or Thinking; and having no exiſtence in Nature, but only in Mans *Underſtanding*, do bear pregnant teſtimony of its being *Immaterial*.

Lucretius.

Here you ſay, it is undeniably certain, that the Underſtanding hath a power to abſtract things from all conditions of Matter, and all Particularities; when for my part, I profeſſe, I can find no ſuch power in my ſelf. For, after many the moſt ſerious eſſayes I could make, I could never yet conceive an Univerſal, but there doth alwaies occur to my Mind ſomwhat of Particularity, and that under ſome certain Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and the like adjuncts of Body. So that it ſeems, either I have not an Underſtanding as Active and Comprehenſive, as other men have: or elſe thoſe Unbodied and Univerſal Notions; of which you and other Philoſophers talke ſo ſolemnly, are meer Chimera's, invented by curious and wanton Wits, to amuſe ſuch vulgar heads, as mine is.

Athanaſius.

You cannot be ignorant of that power in your ſelf, as you pretend, *Lucretius*. For, though your Mind is not capable of deveſting Objects of their particular Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and the other concomitants of Matter, altogether, and

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at once: yet it can easily doe it *successively, or one after another*; and that is sufficient to attest and manifest, that the Intellect hath this power of Abstracting, and forming Universals; as I have explained.

Lucretius.

I have read a certain book, written by one *Hieronymus Rorarius*, a learned Prelate, conteining a collection of all Arguments commonly urged to prove, that many Brute Animals have the use of Reason not only aswell as, but in a greater proportion than Man himself hath: and among the rest He affirmes, that they also frame Universals, as in particular the species of Man, according to which as often as they see a two-legged and erect Animal, they take it to be a Man, and not a Lion, or Horse, or the like: And if so, what becomes of this Prerogative of the Human Intellect, you so much depend upon, for testimony of its Incorporiety?

Athanasius.

If this were true, yet doubtless Brutes can have no knowledg of the Universality of that Species, or universal Nature of Man, viz. Humanity, as abstracted from every degree of singularity. But, we have no reason to grant the Suppositions; for, as Brutes doe not apprehend things abstracted, but concrete, as not Colour, but a body coloured, not a sapour, but a body sapid, &c: so ought we to conceive, that there is nothing else in a Dog (for instance) but only the Memory of singulars,

gulars, or of thoſe ſingle men, whom he hath ſeen, and taken notice of; and when he meets a man, whom he hath not ſeen afore, his phanſy inſtantly preſents him the image of ſome one he hath ſeen afore, and ſo he takes him to be a man. Nor can you recurr to that vulgar ſubterfuge, that we are not ſo well acquainted with the nature of Beaſts, as to underſtand what is done in the ſecret cells of their brains, and after what manner they apprehend object: ſeeing it is not difficult for us, to inferr as much, from their operations or external actings. For, in caſe they could aſpire to ſo much perfection, as to frame Univerſal Notions of things, as we doe, and reaſon upon them, as we doe; it were not to be doubted, but it would come into their minds, to enquire into the acts of their progenitors, what they knew before them; how they might ſignify to others at diſtance, what themſelves have thought and done; and how they might devolve memorials to their poſterity. They would likewiſe attempt to frame Arts uſefull in their lives, and doe many noble actions; of which it is impoſſible they ſhould have the leaſt hint or notice. For as much, therefore, as no age can give us an Example of any ſuch action done by any Beaſt whatever; we may ſafely conclude, that they have no notion of Univerſals, as *Rorarius* and you from him ſeem to ſuppoſe. So that this prerogative of Mans Underſtanding in framing Univerſals, remains entire and untoucht: and while it doth ſo, I need not fear the ſtability of what I have founded thereupon, viz. that the

Human Intellect is Incorporeall. And therefore, if you have no more to object againſt this my reaſon; I doubt not but *Iſodicaſtes* will give his vote on my ſide.

Idoſicaſtes.

I ſhould, be groſsly par tial, *Athanaſius*, if I did not confeſs, that you have foiled your adverſary at this weapon: yet I am ſure *Lucretius* is ſo candid an Antagoniſt, as to account it no diſhonour to be overcome by Truth; and I preſume He doth contend, only to make your conqueſt the more abſolute.

Athanaſius.

To theſe few Reaſons of the Immateriality of the Human Soul, deſumed from the excellency of her operations, I might here add a multitude of others, of the ſame extraction and equivalent force, as in particular, that *of the exiſtence of Corporeal natures in the Soul, by the power of apprehenſion; that of her drawing from multitude to unity, her apprehenſion of Negations and Privations; her conteining of Contraries without oppoſition; her capacity to move, without being moved herſelf; the incompoſſibility of oppoſite propoſitions in the underſtanding*; and ſundry others: the leaſt whereof is of evidence and vigour ſufficient to carry the cauſe againſt all thoſe Enemies to her Immortality, who would degrade her from the divine dignity of her nature, to an equality with the ſouls of Beaſts, that are but certain diſpoſitions of Matter, and ſo obnoxious to diſſolution upon change of the ſame by contrary agents. But, conſidering that the certainty of truth ought to be eſtimated rather

rather by the weightthan number of teſtimonies; and that the diſcourſes I have already framed concerning ſome of the Soul's proper operations, are clear enough to give light to any judicious and well diſpoſed perſon, how to inferr the like concluſion from thoſe other of her operations, which I have not inſiſted upon: I ſhall now withdraw my owne and your thoughts from her operations, and convert them, for onely a few minutes upon her *Objects*, that ſo we may examine whether they be ſuch, as that it is poſſible for them to fall under the apprehenſion of any, but a faculty ſuperior to Materiality.

Concerning the *Objects*, therefore, of the Underſtanding, they are all things in the Univerſe, and ſo not only Corporeal and ſenſible natures, but Incorporeals alſo, and ſuch as are many ſpheres above the utmoſt capacity of the Senſe. That *Corporeals* belong to the Cogniſance of the Intellect, I think no man will diſpute: and that this knowledge doth prove it to be incorporeal, is manifeſt from hence, that it knowes the formal reaſon of Body, or Corporiety it ſelf, and that it doth conſiſt in extenſibility: which it could no more doe, unleſs it ſelf were above Corporiety, than a man could ſee the amplitude of the ſea if he were immerſed into the bottom of it. Nay I might hence deduce it to be Inorganical; inſomuch as it knowes not only corporeal organs, but comprehends alſo the very reaſon and forme of an Organ. For, ſince an Organ is alwayes ſomewhat intermediate betwixt the Faculty and the Object, or thing for the percep-

tion of which it was made; and therefore cannot act upon it ſelf, or be that thing on which the Faculty worketh by an Organ: The Intellect could no more be exerciſed in knowing an Organ, or the reaſon of it, if it ſelf were an Organ, or Faculty Organical, than one Inſtrument, or tool of an Artiſt can imploy it ſelf upon another Inſtrument, or ſerve to that end, for which it was framed, without the help of the Artiſt.

Lucretius.

You ſay here, *Athanaſius*, that no man doubteth of the knowledge of Corporeal Natures, by the Underſtanding; when you cannot but remember that *Pyrrho* and *Sextus Empiricus* have many Diſciples in the World, who renounce all Knowledge whatſoever, unleſſe it be that of their own invincible ignorance: And for my own part, though I ſhall not go ſo high, as to ſay, we know nothing at all; yet ſure, I am, we do not know the intimate Nature of ſo much as the ſmalleſt Plant that grows upon the ground. And if ſo, I cannot ſee how you will avoid the blame of begging the Queſtion.

Athanaſius.

How dangerous a Doctrine that of the *Sceptick* is, as to the regulation of our Minds, in all the Actions and Occurences of our lives, by certain ſetled Judgements in the Underſtanding, drawn from Philoſophical Maxims, and confirmed by experience; I have profeſſedly declaclared elſe where, and therefore ſhall not now repeat.

repeat. But, as to your Objection, *that we do not know the intimate Natures of even Corporeal things*; *I anſwer*, that though there be nothing in the World, to which the capacity of mans Underſtanding is not extenſible, yet there are ſundry things, which by reaſon of many impediments, it doth not actually know. But is this, think you, to be charged upon a defect in the Underſtanding; or upon the obſcurity of the things themſelves? Do you but find a Cauſe, that may reveal theſe things, and as it were draw them out of that obſcurity, wherein they are ſo deeply involved; and the Intellect, I will undertake, ſhall ſoon diſcern and know them to the full. The Eye doth not perceive what is at the Centre of the Earth; will you therefore conclude an abſolute incapacity therein, of perceiving what is there concealed, in caſe there were ſome Cauſe found out, which ſhould unlock the bowels of the Earth, and lay open whatever is therein contain'd? I believe you wil be more adviſed; conſidering that the drawing of a Curtain betwixt a viſible Object and the ſight, doth not diminiſh the power of the ſight, but only render the Object inconſpicuous. However, therefore, our Reaſon be not ſo perſpicacious, as to transfix the Eſſences of things, and diſcern what is the intimate Nature of Objects; yet by ratiocination we advance ſo far toward it, as to know, that beſides all thoſe qualities, and accidents, which are obvious to the Senſe, and to the imagination, there is yet ſomwhat more remaining, which is not obvious to either the Senſe, or Imagination.

on. And to underſtand thus much, is enough to exalt the Underſtanding many degrees above all Senſe and Imagination; and conſequently above all Corporeal Conditions. Whereunto I ſhall add, that there is no Corporeal Faculty, but is confined to the perception of only ſome one certain Genus of things; as in particular, the Sight to Viſibles, the Hearing to Sounds, *&c.* and though the Imagination ſeems to be extended to very many kinds; yet all thoſe are contained under the Claſſis of Senſibles; and thence it comes, that all Animals, which are endowed only with Phantaſy, are addicted to only Senſibles, no one affecting the Knowledge of any thing which falleth not under the Senſe. But the Intellect alone is that, which hath for its Object, *omne verum*, and (as the Schools ſpeak) *Ens ut Ens*, every Being in the Univerſe; and therefore hath no mixture of matter, but is wholly free from it, and Incorporeal. A truth ſo clearly revealed by the Light of Nature, that *Anaxagoras* ſaid, and *Ariſtotle* ſubſcribed, *Eſſe Intellectum neceſſario* ἀμιγῆ, *Immiſtum*, ὅτι πάντα νοεῖ, *quoniam intelligit univerſa.*

And as for *Incorporeals*, that they likewiſe are within the Orb of the Intellects activity; and do not eſcape the apprehenſion of this unbounded and Univerſal Capacity; needs no other proof, beſides that of our own ſublime ſpeculations concerning the Nature of God, of Intelligences, of Angels, of the Human Soul, and whatever elſe belongs to the Science of Metaphyſicks,

ſicks, which teacheth us to abſtract from all Matter and Quantity. Nor doth the Underſtanding reſt in the inveſtigation of all ſubſtances immaterial, but flieth out of *Triſmegiſtus's* Circle, and breaks through the battlements of the World into the *Extra-mundan Spaces*, and there finds the notion of a certain Being, which belongs not to the Categorie either of Subſtances, or Accidents, but is independent even upon God himſelf: and that is *Space*, and to this it gives Imaginary Dimenſions. Nay, I preſume it will not be accounted paradoxical in me to affirm, that Immaterial Objects are moſt genuine and natural to the Underſtanding; eſpecially ſince *Des Cartes* hath irrefutably demonſtrated, that the Knowledge we have of the exiſtence of the Supreme Being, and of our own Souls, is not only Proleptical and Innate in the Mind of man, but alſo more certain, clear, and diſtinct, than the Knowledge of any Corporeal Nature whatever: according to that Canon of *Thom. Aquinas* and moſt of the School-men, *Nulla res, qualiſcunque eſt, intelligi poteſt, niſi Deus intelligatur priùs.* However, this is moſt indubitable, that the principal and moſt congenial *Motives* or incitements of the Soul, are abſtracted Conſiderations; as hope of what is to come, of Eternity, Memory of what is paſt, Virtue, Honour, and the like, which ariſe not from material principles, and have no commerce with Elementary compoſitions. Now, if the Underſtanding were not it ſelf purely Immaterial, it would be abſolutely impoſſible for it ever ſo much as to ſuſpect, much leſſe to know.

aſſured-

assuredly, that there were any such things as Incorporeals in the Universe: The Reason being obvious from that rule of *Aristotle*, *juxtim apparens prohibet alienum.* For, as the eye when discoloured with a yellow humour in the jaundice, can see no Object, but it appears tincted with the same colour: So could not the Intellect perceive any other but Corporeal Natures, if it self were not only perfused with, but wholly and intirely immersed into, Corporiety; so that of necessity it must be Incorporeal.

Lucretius.

Me thinks now, you might with equal reason inferr the quite Contrary, *viz.* that the Intellect could not have any perception of Corporeal Natures, if it self were not likewise Corporeal; there being required some kind of proportion and compossibility betwixt the Faculty percipient, and the Object perceptible, as is exemplified in each of the Senses: which is the sole reason of their opinion, who contend, that the Sensitive part of the Soul is Material.

Athanasius.

I positively deny that, *Lucretius*. For, since the Order or Degree of Incorporeal is superior to that of Corporeal; thence it follows, that by virtue of that its superiority or excellency, it possesseth all the perfections of the inferior, and that in a more eminent manner. So that as the degree Animal, being nobler than the degree meerly Vegetable, doth in a more excellent pro-

portion

portion and manner, comprehend Vegetation, or Nutrition, Accretion, and Generation, which are the functions of the Vegetable: In like manner, doth the degree Spiritual or Incorporeal, being more noble and perfect than the meer Animal, and Corporeal, comprehend cognition Corporeal, or Senſation and Imagination, which are the functions proper to the degree Animal. And thus you ſee, that my inference of the Intellect's capacity to know Incorporeal eſſences, from its own being a Spiritual Faculty, is genuine and orderly: but yours, of its being Corporeal from its capacity to know Corporeals, is falſe and prepoſterous.

Lucretius.

But may not I lawfully object, that we do not conceive God, or Angells, or Intelligences, as Immaterial Subſtances; when we find in our ſelves, that the mind doth alwaies ſpeculate the Divine Eſſence it ſelf under ſome Species of a Body, and though not of a Human Body (which yet is moſt uſual) yet of an aereal, or ethereal one, or ſomwhat more fine and ſubtile, if any ſuch there be?

Athanaſius.

You may make this Objection, there is no doubt; but it will not be ſufficient to prevail againſt what I have urged, concerning the Intellect's extenſibility even to God and other Intellectual eſſences. For the underſtanding, though it make uſe of thoſe Phantaſms, that

are proper to the Imagination, as the means or degrees, by which it mounteth it ſelf up to a ſublimity above all Corporeal ſpecies; doth yet, by ratiocination, at length attain to that height, as to be aſcertained; that, beſide all body of whatſoever thinneſs purity and ſubtility, there is moreover a certain ſupereminent ſubſtance, which hath nothing of Corporiety in it. The Intellect, I confeſs, doth not *poſitively or intuitively* (as they ſay) know this Subſtance: but, ſince this is its condition, while immerſed in a body, which doth as it were infect it with corporeal repreſentations or Phantaſms, and eclipſe its power of Intuition; it is abundantly ſufficient to our Concluſion, that even in this mortal body it doth retein and conſerve its incorporeal nature, that it doth underſtand that ſubſtance *Negatively* or *Abſtractively*. For, this inveſtigation or ſearch after God, and our concluding him (out of the force of contradiction, or by way of Negation) to be Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent, Omniſcient, Immutable, with all other perfections imaginable eſſential to his nature; doth clearly demonſtrate, that though the Intellect be obliged to make uſe of Corporeal images, in order to its knowledge; yet it is not obliged to acquieſce in them, ſo as to enquire no further, but hath ſuch a liberty and energy, as that it doth ratiocinate beyond them, and conclude, that there is ſomewhat elſe in being, which cannot be repreſented by any Corporeal Image or ſpecies; and which though it cannot underſtand what it is in the fullneſs of its nature,

yet

yet is it certain *that ſuch a nature there is*; and more than that, is not required to juſtify my Aſſertion. You may remember, how *Ariſtotle* and other great Philoſophers aſſerted the exiſtence of *Cæleſtial Intelligences*, *Abſtracted Movers*, *and Immaterial Subſtances*; not that they could ſee them, with the eye of the body, or frame any Idea's of them in their Imagination: but that by profound reaſoning, from the magnitude, forme, ſituation, motion and duration of the Celeſtial bodies, they came to underſtand, that in nature there could not but be ſuch Abſtracted and Immaterial Movers, which governed and continually regulated thoſe vaſt and glorious Orbs, in their Admirable and well ordered Motions.

Lucretius.

If what you ſay, were true; it would follow, that in diſeaſes of the brain, and ſuch as cauſe a depravation of the Phanſy; the Intellect, as being more at liberty to exerciſe its faculty of pure and abſtracted intellection, would ariſe to the cognition of Immaterial things with more facility and promptneſs, than at any other time. But we daily ſee, that men of diſturbed Phanſies, and alienated minds (as the vulgar phraſe is) are ſo far from underſtanding more clearly and diſtinctly, than before, that they cannot reaſon at all; and it was not without cauſe, that ſome Philoſophers have held, that a man deprived of any one of his ſenſes, can not rightly diſcourſe of that ſenſe, or the objects belonging to it.

Athanasius.

You have no reason to urge this upon me; for, I formerly rejected that error of the *Averrhoist*, that the Soul is a Forme meerly *Assistent*, and in its functions altogether independent upon the body; and what I averr is this, that the soul of Man doth truely and intirely informe the body, and to that purpose nature hath added senses and Imagination, as handmaids to attend it in its operations, and to give it opportunities of reasoning from what they bring in. So that it ought not to seem strange, that upon the loss of a sense, or perturbation of the Phansy, men cannot reason so exactly as before: and it sufficeth, that when the whole oeconomy of mans nature is in tune and order, his understanding is capable of reasoning so as to advance itself above the body, as far as is permitted to its nature, and at length to conclude, that there is somewhat Incorporeal. And now I have recited all the Arguments, which I thought most material towards the proof of the Soul's Immortality, drawn from considerations *Physical*, and in particular from the souls *Operations* and *Objects*: I referr my self to the Noble *Isodicastes* here, who is pleased to assume upon himself the trouble of acting the part of an Arbiter betwixt us in this dispute, whether you have been able to dissolve them.

Isodicastes.

How unfit I am, to have the casting and decisive voice, in a matter of this high and abstruse nature

nature, I am ſufficiently conſcious. But, ſince you are both pleaſed to create me judge of this your Debate, I ſhall adventure to give you my ſentiments briefly and clearly upon this laſt Argument of the Soul's being Immaterial, drawn from the unboundedneſs of the Intellect, as to its Object (for, of the reſt, I delivered my opinion freely, as they were alleaged). Truly, I judge it to be as highly convincing, as any of which the ſubject is capable. And, for my owne part, I derive to my ſelf from thence, a full confirmation of my beleif; that there is nothing in the world too vaſt for the comprehenſion of mans underſtanding, nothing too ſmall for its diſcernment: and whether ſuch a divine Capacity be competent to any but an Immaterial Eſſence, is not hard to determine. Now, the Intellect being thus found to be above all conditions of Matter, I doubt not but *Lucretius* will readily allow, what you have ſo learnedly concluded upon, viz, that the Human ſoul, whoſe Faculty it is, is above all poſſibility of Diſſolution, at leaſt from Natural Agents. And therefore, *Athanaſius*, if you are not already weary with diſcourſing ſo long and ſtrictly, be pleaſed to proceed to thoſe *Moral* Conſiderations importing the ſouls Immortality, which I remember you promiſed, in the beginning.

Athanaſius.

The *Moral* Conſiderations uſually brought in defence of the Souls Incorruptibility, are Principally Three: (1) *The Univerſal Conſent of Mankind*;

kind. (2) *Mans Innate and Inſeparable Appetite of Immortality.* (3) *The Juſtice of God, in rewarding Good men, and puniſhing evil, after death.*

Concerning the Firſt; howbeit there ever have been, and ſtill are among men, ſome differences about the ſtate of the Soul, after death; about the place of its poſthume Manſion; and other circumſtances: Yet there ever hath been and ſtil is an Univerſal concurrence among them in this Tenent, that it doth ſurvive the body, and continue the ſame for ever. Now, as *Cicero* judiciouſly obſerveth, *Omni in re Conſenſio omnium gentium, Lex Naturæ putanda eſt*, in every thing the general conſent of all Nations is to be accounted the Law of Nature: And conſequently the Notion of the Soul's Immortality muſt be implanted, by Nature's own hand, in the Mind of every man; and who ſo dares to deny it, doth impugne the very principles of Nature.

Lucretius.

Your Aſſumption here, that all Nations conſpire in the belief of the Souls Eternal ſubſiſtence after death; is contradicted by many good Authors, who writing of certain ſalvage and barbarous Nations diſcovered in the New World, ſay of them, that their rudeneſſe and ignorance approacheth ſo nearly to that of Beaſts, that they have not the leaſt thought or conceipt of any ſuch thing as the Souls being a diſtinct ſubſtance from the Body, or that it is indiſſoluble. And, as I remember, *Pliny* affirms the ſame of the *Calaici*, a wild and Atheiſtical people of Old *Spain*.

Athanaſius.

Athanaſius.

Granting theſe relations to be true, yet if we profoundly examine, wherupon their idolatrous devotion (and there never was any Nation without ſome kind of Religion and Veneration of a Deity) is grounded, and what dark belief lies blended under their ridiculous worſhip, we ſhall ſoon find, that thoſe Indians have ſome implicite belief of the Eternity of their Souls, as may appear from hence, that they aſſign the Soul ſome certain place of reſidence after its ſeparation from the body, and that either beyond the Sea, or beyond great Mountains, or the like. Again, being obſerved, to ſtand in awe of Devils, to be terrified with mightly Spectr's and apparitions, and to be aſtoniſhed at Magical impoſtures: it is evident, that if we diſſect all their perſwaſion to the bottom, we ſhall detect it to contain an opinion of the Souls Immortality. But, though it may be true, that there are now, or formerly have been any ſuch Salvage people, as were wholly deſtitute of any the leaſt thought or hint of the Souls ſuperviving the funerals of the body; yet we may return the ſame Anſwer, concerning them, that is due to thoſe, who ſhould object, that there alwaies have been, and now are ſome particular Perſons of all Nations, with whom the belief of the Souls Immortality can find no entertainment or credit: which is, that therefore it doth not follow, that the perſwaſion of its Immortality ought not to be reputed General; and that the diſſent of a few perſons

perſons doth not make a General Conſent not to be Natural. For, as, though ſome men are born only with one foot, and ſome lay violent hands upon themſelves; it is not lawful for us thence to argue, that it is not natural to men to have two feet, or that the deſire of life is not natural to all men: So, though ſome are ſo unſound and monſtrous in their judgement, as to perſwade themſelves, that their Souls are Mortal; yet is not the contrary perſwaſion of all other men, therefore to be eſteemed *Non-natural.*

Lucretius.

You cannot be ignorant, that there have been not only rude and vulgar heads, but even Philoſophers, and thoſe of ſound judgement too, who have poſitively denied, and ſtrongly impugned the Immortality of the Soul; and among thereſt, my Maſter, *Epicurus*, who hath the reputation of one of the moſt piercing and ſublime Wits among all the Ancients: and therefore this poſition of the Soul's Incorruptibility ſeems not to be ſo Univerſal, as you preſume.

Athanaſius.

But, pray, conſider; theſe Philoſophers were but Men, and ſo might erre, in their ſolitary conceipts and opinions, as well as the moſt rude and illiterate among the vulgar; as is evident from hence, that the ſame perſons held many other opinions of things more obvious and familiar, which yet are highly abſurd and manifeſtly ridiculous.

culous. And what though *Epicurus* and ſome few other of the Grecian Scholiarchs aſſerted the Mortality of the Soul; are there not ten times as many others, as high in eſteem for Solidity and Wit, who have with excellent arguments defended the Immortality of it?

Lucretius.

Let us leave your Aſſumption, and reflect upon the validity of your *Inference*. Though all men living ſhould be perſwaded of the truth of this opinion, That the Soul is Superiour to death and corruption; yet would it not follow, that therefore that perſwaſion is *Natural* and *Congenial* to our very Eſſence, as you conclude. For, it is not impoſſible that an Univerſal perſwaſion may be erroneous, every man living being, by the imperfection of his Nature, obnoxious to Error; and *Cicero* (deriding the vanity of Auſpices, which in his time were in great eſteem among all Kings, People, and Nations) ſaith, *quaſi quicquam ſit tam valde, quàm nihil ſapere, vulgare*; Is any thing ſo perfectly common among men, as to have fooliſh opinions?

Athanaſius.

Moſt evident it is, that there is no better Criterion, or truer and ſafer rule, whereby to examine and confirm the truth of any thing belonging to Men in the General, than the General Conſent of Mankind concerning it. For, as when it is enquired, what belongs to *jus Animale* (vulgarly called *jus Naturale*) we perpend the matter

by the obſervation of ſuch things, as are common to all Animals: Even ſo, when we enquire, what is *jus Humanum*, or what by ſpecial right doth belong to Men, as Men, we muſt direct our judgement, by what is allowed of by all Men. And doubtleſſe this is to be accounted *Lex Naturæ*, the Law of Nature, or *vox Naturæ*, the voice of Nature; or elſe there is none at all. And, as to *Cicero's* ſmart ſaying; I confeſſe, nothing is more common with the multitude, than to be deluded with falſe opinions: But that is only in things Arbitrary, and ſuch whereof Nature hath implanted no ſetled Senſe and Notion in their Minds. And, in ſuch things, erroneous conceipts many times ſpread themſelves abroad, and diffuſe by what ſubtle contagion I know not; eſpecially when they have been firſt taken up upon preſumption of Authority, Antiquity, Utility and the like inducements to belief: but it is obſervable, that ſuch fallacies, as they had no ground in Nature, ſo by degrees, in proceſſe of time, they decay inſenſibly, and at length come to be totally obliterated and forgotten. Of which ſort, was that of the uſefulneſſe of Auſpices, and other waies of Divination, againſt which the Orator pleaded; all which are long ſince laid aſide, and laughed at by every one. But, as for ſuch things, of which Nature her ſelf hath implanted a certain Knowledge in our Minds; it is not vulgar for men to be miſtaken in them: unleſſe you will affirm that this natural Maxim, *That every Father ought to take care of his Children*; or this, *That every man is bound to endeavour his own preſer-*

preſervation, and the like coeſſential Notions, are vulgar miſtakes. And of this ſort, certainly, is the opinion of the *Soul's Immortality*, as may be deduced from hence, that it ſeems to have been connate to the firſt man; and confirmed from the great antiquity of the opinion of Hell; and from hence, that it is ſo far from decaying, by length of time, that on the contrary it growes every day more ſtrong and lively.

Lucretius.

This Tenent of the Soul's Immortality which you averr to be as ancient as Humanity itſelf, and implanted by Nature in the Mind of every man, may have been, for ought we know, the *politique invention of the Firſt Law-makers:* who, obſerving that the puniſhments denounced upon capital Delinquents in this life were not ſufficient to deterre them from committing enormities deſtructive to the common right and ſafety of Societies; prudently perſwaded men that their Souls were not obnoxious to diſſolution together with their bodies, but Immortal, and ſo capable of torment, after death, for their evil deeds; and of Felicity, by way of reward for their good. Than which, there could be no more powerfull conſideration to coerce men, who were not ſenſible of the preſent benefits of Virtue: it being in all times true, that ſuch audacious Malefactors, as are not moved by the whole arme of the Civil Magiſtrate, will yet tremble at the finger of Divinity. And this opinion could not but take ſo much the deeper root in mens breaſts, by how

much the more agreeable it is to that desire and love of life, which is naturall to us all: so that being the most gratefull and correspondent to our nature, the promise of Eternal existence in our better part, found a general belief; and, by common tradition, came at length to be in a manner naturalized. But, how it is otherwise Natural, I profess, I doe not yet comprehend.

Athanasius.

That this perswasion of the Soul's Eternity, was the invention of the primitive Legislators, the better to keep men in obedience to their Lawes; hath, I confess, been often said, but never proved: and what the first supposers thereof have told us, of the manner of mens being convened into common societies, after they had long lived abroad in the fields, and upon mutuall spoyles, rapine and slaughter, after the manner of wild Beasts; is altogether fabulous and unreasonable. Whereas, on the contrary, we are able to prove, by those memorials that remain to us, of the First Law-makers we read of in History; that they found this Tenent of the Soul's Immortality setled and radicated in the hearts of the people, from the very beginning of Mankind. I conceive it probable enough, that the wisdom of these Law-makers might teach them to make use of this perswasion, in order to their more facile governing and restraining the vulgar, otherwise more prone to all kind of exorbitancy and violence; and it was a piece of eminent prudence in them so to doe: but I have no reason, to allow,

allow, that therefore it is a meer politique Fiction; unleſs you think it lawfull to conclude, that becauſe an Husbandman doth turn the ſtreams of a river upon his grounds, to make them the more fruitfull, therefore the river is only a Fiction. Again, though I concede, that the belief of Immortality is very conformable and gratefull to our Nature, which by inſtinct inclineth us to abhorr Diſſolution: yet this conformity and gratefullneſs doth not ariſe to us from hence, that Immortality is offered to us as undue by Nature (as Poets report of *Chiron* the great Chirurgeon, who refuſed Immortality, when proffered him by the Gods: and of *Prometheus*, who exclamed againſt *Jupiter*, for exempting him from death) but, on the contrary, becauſe it is Natural, and that we have the aſſurance of it engraven on our very eſſence; and therefore it can be no Fiction, as you would ſeem to imagine.

Lucretius.

It is poſſible (and experience ſaith, frequent) that an Opinion may be General, and poſſeſſe the minds of all men, for many ages together without diſpute; which yet at length may be diſcovered to be falſe and abſurd, and the quite contrary ſucceed into the room thereof: as may be exemplified in that of the *Antipodes*, and the *Circumvolution of the Earth*; both which till of late years were held wholly unreaſonable and Phantaſticall. And perhaps this of the Soul's Eternity may have the ſame fate.

Athanaſius.

Athanasius.

If there be any Opinions, which all men at some time maintain; we are to judge of the Verity or Falsity of them, by this general rule. If they be confirmed by the judgement of all ages; and that the Mind find it self carried and inclined to them, by secret assent and complacency, as to things generally concerning every man alike: Then, without doubt, those Opinions are sound, natural and congenial to man. But, if otherwise there be a tacite Reluctancy in the Mind against the admission of them; and that their importance or concernment is not equally diffusive to all men: they are false, arbitrary, and such as may be embraced, or rejected indifferently; for of themselves, they neither promove, nor impede Mans felicity (unless only by accident, or as their speculation may be pleasant, for the time) and it little relateth to mans happiness, whether there be Antipodes or not, for we in our Hemisphere can live without commerce with them; or whether the Earth, or Sun be moved since all the Apparences are the same, either way. But, as for the Opinion of the Soul's surviving the body; it is not indifferent, whether it be true or not: Nor is Man destitute of a Natural propension to believe it, when it relateth to his Supreme and everlasting Felicity.

Isodicastes.

From the Antiquity, Universality, and Perpetuity of any Opinion, I think we may safely con-

conclude upon the Verity of it. From the *Antiquity* of it; becauſe, according to that Rule, *Idem eſſe verum, quodcunque primum; id adulterinum, quodcunque poſterius*, that which is the moſt antient, is likely to be the moſt true, in reſpect of the purity and ſincerity of mens Minds in the Primitive Age of the World, their Underſtandings being then more clear & perſpicacious, and their judgements leſſe perverted by irregular Affections and temporal Intereſt. From the *Univerſality*, becauſe it ſeems inconſiſtent with the Goodneſſe of God, to have made us of a Nature ſo ſubject to error, as that All Mankind ſhould be deluded. From the *Perpetuity*, becauſe, as *Cicero* worthily noteth, *Opinionum commenta delet dies, Naturæ judicia confirmat*, Time deſtroyeth all thoſe fancies, which have no other ground, but only human opinion; but it ſtrengthneth all thoſe judgements, which are founded upon Truth and pure natural Reaſon. And therefore, this Notion of the Souls Immortality, being ſo *Ancient*, as that it ſeems to have entered into the World together with the Firſt Man, and what *Plutarch* (out of *Sophocles*) ſaith of the Antiquity of Religious principles,

Non nunc enim, neq; heri ſunt iſta prodita,
Semper valuere, nec, quando inierint, liquet;

may be moſt aptly accommodated thereunto: and ſo *Univerſal*, as that the apprehenſion of a Deity (without which no man ever lived, for, as *Tully* remarketh, *Multi quidem de Diis prava ſentiunt.*

ſentiunt, omnes tamen eſſe vim & Naturam Divinam arbitrantur) ſeems not to have been more Common: And laſtly ſo *Perpetual*, as that Time doth rather confirm, than decay it; I muſt judge it, to be a ſound and proleptical truth, eſpecially when I reflect alſo upon that other Character *Athanaſius* hath given of the verity and naturalneſſe of a General Tenent, viz. *that the concernment of it, is equally diffuſive to all men.* And did I not know, *Lucretius*, that your preſent buſineſſe is Contradiction; I ſhould a little wonder, how you could alleage that ſo in-conſiderable an Objection, of the opinion of the Soul's Immortality being a *Fiction of the Firſt Law-makers.* For, you well underſtand from what incredible Authority that impious Whimſy was derived, even from *Euripides* the Poet; who ſuborning the Perſon of *Siſyphus*, in his Tragedy, to ſpeak ſuch Atheiſtical conceipts, as otherwiſe he durſt not vent, introduceth him telling this formal tale. "That the life of men in old time, was ſal-
"vage and barbarous, like that of Wild Beaſts;
"the ſtronger, by violence oppreſſing the weak-
"er, untill at laſt, men were neceſſitated to de-
"viſe certain ſevere Laws, for the ſuppreſſing
"of mutual ſlaughter, and other acts of inju-
"ſtice. But, when they found (after long expe-
"rience) that all thoſe Laws were ineffectual
"to the coercing men from enormities and out-
"rages; becauſe they could take hold of only o-
"pen and publick offences, and reached not to
"cloſe and ſecret ones: There aroſe up among
"them a certain ſubtle and politique Gover-
"nour,

"nour, who invented a mean to provide againſt "that miſchief alſo, and to prevent clan- "deſtine and ſecret violations of common Right "and Juſtice, as well as manifeſt and notorious. "And that was, by inſinuating into the peoples "heads,

Quod ſit perenni vita vigens aliquis Deus,
Qui cernat iſta, & audiat, atq; intelligat, &c.

"that there was an Immortal Power, or Deity "above them, who took notice of all their moſt "ſecret actions, and deſignes, and would moſt "ſeverely puniſh all injuſtice, in another life, "which was to ſucceed this, and to continue e- "ternally. The like to which is very ſolemnly told by *Cicero*, in the perſon of *Cotta*, in his firſt Book *de Natura Deorum*; and alſo by *Seneca*, in his ſecond Book of *Natural Queſtions*: But, how contrary to Reaſon, as well as to the authenticall Monuments (both Divine and Human) of Ancient times, and the firſt foundation of Republicks, or Societies; is too well known, even to your ſelf, *Lucretius*, to need my further inſiſting thereupon. However, this praiſe is due to you, that you have omitted nothing, that might impugne *Athanaſius* his Argument of the Soul's Eternity, deſumed from the Univerſal belief of it by men of all Nations, and in all Ages.

Athanaſius.

Having received not only your Approbation, Noble *Iſodicaſtes*, but your Aſſiſtance alſo, in this

my First Moral Argument; I need no other other encouragement to proceed to the *Second*; which ariſeth from *Mans inbred, or rather innate, and inſeparable Appetite of Immortality.*

For, there is no man who doth not deſire to ſubſiſt Eternally; nay, not thoſe very perſons, who ſeem to impugne and diſavow that deſire, by a contrary opinion (as *Epicurus* and all his *Sectators*) could ever ſuppreſs or extinguiſh it from glowing perpetually in their breaſt, notwithſtanding all their pretences of being free from any ſuch expectation: as may be inferred from hence that they endeavoured to perpetuate their names and memories to all poſterity, by their Books and opinions. And, therefore, it is not needfull for us to confirme this Aſſertion, by the Example of *Cleombrotus*, and the Diſciples of *Hegeſias*, who were ſo far tranſported with the force of *Plato's* and His diſcourſes of the Souls eternal ſtate after death, that they could not forbear to lay violent hands upon themſelves, that ſo they might ſet their impatient ſouls at liberty from the weariſom priſon of Fleſh, and emancipate them into that their more proper and delightfull manſion. All we ſhall urge, is only this, that *There is no man, who thinks himſelf unconcerned in Futurity.* Witneſs that general ambition all men have, to perpetuate their names in the records of immortal Fame; ſome, by the founding and inſtitution of Common-wealths, Sects, Societies, and the preſcription of Lawes for the continuation of them; others, by valiant acts in warre, even to the loſs of health, limbs, and life itſelf

itſelf; others, by erecting pyramids, obeliks, Tombs, ſtatues, and other monuments of their greatneſs and heroical atcheivements; others, by writing learned and uſefull Books, and even ſuch as import the contempt of poſthume Glory and fame; others, by begetting of children, adoption of heirs, publick legacies of piety, and the like: all which are ſtrong and lively teſtimonies, that this Appetite of ſurviving their funerals, is implanted in their Minds, by Nature's owne hand, and ſo impoſſible ever to be totally eradicated. Now, foraſmuch as Nature doth inſtitute nothing in vain; and that it is unreaſonable to conceive, that ſhe would infuſe into us a continuall deſire of, and providence for, ſuch things in the future, whereof we ſhall then have no ſenſe: it is more than probable, that our ſouls ſhall after death be inveſted in that ſtate of Immortality, which we ſo unceſſantly aſpire unto, and to which we are carried by a ſecret and inſuppreſſable tendency. To this purpoſe *Cicero*, in the firſt of his *Tuſculans*, hath a remarkable ſaying, which I ſhall therefore rehearſe, *Neſcio quomodo inhæreat in mentibus quaſi ſeculorum quoddam augurium, idque in maximis ingeniis altiſſimiſque animis exiſtit maximè, & apparet facillimè: quo quidem dempto, quis tam eſſet amens, qui ſemper in laboribus & periculis viveret.* &c.

Lucretius.

This Affectation of Immortality, I confeſs, is very frequent, and almoſt General; yet doth it not appear to be ſo Eſſential or Natural, as that

it may not be *vain*, and ſo Nature no waies obliged to provide for its ſatisfaction. For, we have other Appetites, that ſeem as Univerſal, and conſequently as Natural as this; which yet import no neceſſity of ſatisfaction, but rather an impoſſibility thereof. For example, who doth not deſire and wiſh perpetuity of youth, ſtrength, and health; and to be exempted from the ſtroke of that common enemy, Death? and yet 'tis well knowne to themſelves, that theſe deſires are vain, and ſuch as Nature hath ordained an abſolute impoſſibility of their ſatisfaction. Wherefore, you cannot argue a neceſſity, nay not a probability of the Soul's being Immortal, from her affectation of Immortality.

Athanaſius.

But, pray, obſerve the Diſparity; and let the inſtitution of Nature itſelf be your rule, in diſcerning, what Appetite is vain, and what capable of ſatisfaction. Some Appetites there are, and thoſe almoſt General too, which yet are not inſerted into us originally by Nature, but ariſe from the preſumption of ſome profit, or pleaſure: ſuch is the deſire of being able to flie in the aire like Birds, which every man hath; for, who would not carry himſelfe with all poſſible expedition to the place whither he intends to goe? yet, becauſe Nature hath not furniſhed man with wings to that purpoſe, it is manifeſt, ſhe did not implant that deſire in our Minds, and ſo is not bound to ſatisfy the ſame. Other Appetites there are, which no prejudicate opinion, or preſumed

preſumed cogitation, but Nature herſelf hath created together with us; and at the ſame time ordained means for our attaining to the fruition of them: ſuch is our Appetite of conſtant Health and Indolency, which as Nature hath implanted, ſo doth ſhe endeavour to ſatisfy, and would really ſatisfy, if it were not for our owne Intemperance and other Accidents, that fruſtrate thoſe her endeavours. Now of the Former ſort, are thoſe Appetites of wealth, power, eternal youth, exemption from death, and the like: of the Latter ſort, is that of the immortal ſtate of the Soul. For, there being a twofold Immortality, at which we aime, the one of the *Species* or Kind, the other of the *Individual*; and we being certain that Nature hath provided for the ſatisfaction of the Firſt, by the Faculty of Generation: why ſhould we not conclude, that ſhe hath likewiſe provided for the ſatisfaction of the other, by giving our Minds, by which we are what we are, an inexſoluble or incorporeal ſubſtance?

Lucretius.

But, doe we not all abhorre Death?

Athanaſius.

Yes, generally we doe.

Lucretius.

Is that Abhorrence Natural, or not?

Athanaſius.

Suppoſe it to be Natural; what would you inferr? *Lucretius.*

Lucretius.

Why then, certainly, Nature hath inſtituted two Affections in us, the one point blank repugnant to the other; For how can it conſiſt with our deſire and hope of Immortality, that we ſhould ſo much fear and abhor Death, which muſt put us in poſſeſſion of it?

Athanaſius.

The fear of Death, *Lucretius*, and the deſire of Immortality, ſeem to be rather one and the ſame natural Affection, than two contrary ones; for to deſire Eternal ſubſiſtence, is to covet Immortality. But, our fear of Death ariſeth only from our being more concerned in, or moved by things preſent, than by things to come. Which, indeed is the main reaſon, why men generally offend not only in the inordinate love of this life, but in moſt other things appertaining to the ſame. Thus, meeting with occaſions of intemperance, or incontinence; we weigh not the loſſe of our health, abbreviation of life, and other evills conſequent thereupon, becauſe our thoughts are wholly intent upon the preſent pleaſure that offers it ſelf to our ſenſe: So that, as this our purſuit of ſenſual and hurtful pleaſures, doth not hinder the deſire of health and long life from being Natural to us; ſo doth not our deſire of perpetuity in this life, hinder our deſire of a better life after this, from being likewiſe natural.

Lu-

Lucretius.

The Induction you have here made, ſeems to prove no more than this, that men generally affect poſthume Fame, or Glory; which may indeed be accounted a kind of life in death, according to that of *Ovid*,

Ore legar populi, perq; omnia ſecula famâ,
Si quid habent veri vatum preſagia, vivam.

But, this is far from amounting to a real Immortality.

Athanaſius.

It is enough, if my Induction declare, in the General, that in this life, we have a preſenſion of ſome certain future ſtate after death, in which we ſhall have ſome ſenſe of what we have been in this life, and that accompanied with pleaſure or pain. For, as Hunger is an Appetite, not of this or that particular diſh of meat, but only of meat in the General; ſo though our opinion determine that general appetite to ſome one particular diſh before all others, which yet may be in it ſelf leſſe gratefull and wholſom; yet that is evidence enough that we have an appetite to meat in the general, and that our affecting a deceiptful diſh, doth not exclude our capacity of affecting a wholſome and more nutritive diſh. In like manner, it is apparent, we have an Appetite of Immortality in the General, or without determination to this or that particular ſtate or condi-

condition therein. And though the mind perchance may pitch upon Immortal Fame, as the moſt grateful means to ſatisfie that appetite, which in it ſelf is a meer vanity and deceiptful: yet that is ſufficient to teſtifie, that we have radicated in our Mind an Appetite of Immortality in the General, and ſuch a one as is true and germane. Whence, that you may not urge the examples of *Epicurus* and others, who believing the Souls of men to be Mortal, did yet long labour in compoſing Books, that might commend them to poſterity after their death; I ſay, that theſe men did indirectly, and upon conſequence give teſtimony of the true Immortality, in regard they were carried on, by the ſecret impulſe of nature, to affect that vain and falſe one of Glory or Renown. For, Nature hath not implanted in us any deſire of things vain; but it is our own folly and indiſcretion, which permitting our mind to be too deeply infected with things of this life, averteth our ſtudies and endeavours from the true and genuine ſcope of nature, to erroneous hopes, and deluſive expectations. And now, I hope, you have not much left to ſay againſt this Argument of the Souls Immortality, from our Appetite thereof.

Iſodicaſtes.

Whether *Lucretius* be convinced of the force of this Reaſon, or not; it appears by his ſilence, that he intends no longer to oppoſe it, but is willing you ſhould think you have made him your

your proſelyte, and ſo proceed to your laſt Moral conſideration that remains.

Athanaſius.

That may be deſumed from the *Neceſſity of Divine Juſtice*; for, as certain as God is, ſo certain is it, that He is juſt: and ſince it doth evidently conſiſt with the method of Gods juſtice, that it ſhould be well with Good men, and ill with evil men; and we do not obſerve Good and Evil to be accordingly diſtributed in this life, but rather the contrary; Good men generally being even overwhelmed with afflictions, and wicked men as generally ſwimming in pleaſures: It follows, that there muſt be another life, wherein Virtue is to receive its reward, and Vice its puniſhment. And, if it were otherwiſe, the gates of Piety would be ſhut up, and thoſe of Impiety opened; all Religion be ſubverted, all honeſty deſtroyed, and all Human Society diſſolved.

Lucretius.

If this Reaſon be concluſive, as to Men, methinks, it ſhould be no leſſe concluſive concerning Beaſts alſo. For, why ſhould the harmleſſe and patient ſheep be worried by the noxious and bloody Wolf? Or the innocent Dove become a prey to the greedy Falcon? and no ſtate remain after death, for the reward of the ſufferings of the one, and puniſhment of the cruelty of the other? How can this conſiſt, I pray, with the method of Divine Juſtice: All Animals being the Creatures of God, as well as Men; and (for

ought we know) as much the ſubjects of his Providence and Juſtice.

Athanaſius.

Foraſmuch as of all Animals, Men only are capable of knowing, revering, worſhiping and ſerving God; it is manifeſt, that They are as the principal care of his Providence, ſo the only Object of his Juſtice. And though this be ſufficient, yet I ſhall add two other Reaſons of weight and evidence enough to exclude the pretence of Brutes to a concernment in juſtice divine. The one is, that among men in Societies, there is a mutual Communion, ſuch as cannot be inſtituted among Beaſts, in regard they want reaſon to underſtand the benefit of ſuch Communion: And, that by this common compact, men are obliged to do good and not harm each to other, living in that communion; but Beaſts are not reciprocally obliged by any compact, and ſo are incapable of doing or ſuffering injury (rightly ſo called) one from another. And, therefore, the actions of Men one towards another, belong to the cognizance of Gods ſpecial Providence; but not the actions of Beaſts. The other is, that it is Natures own inſtitution, that ſome Brute Animals ſhould be Carnivorous, ſome feed upon Herbs, ſome upon fruits, *&c.* and ſo ſuch as are Carnivorous muſt deſtroy other weaker Animals, or elſe they cannot ſubſiſt. To theſe, if you pleaſe, you may add alſo a third conſideration, which is, that Man hath ſentiments of a ſtate after death, and deſires to be happy in that ſtate, and ſeems con-

convulst at the fear of the contrary: But, Beasts have no such thoughts, no such desires, no such fear; so that it is no wonder, that the provident Justice of God doth distribute Rewards and Punishments to Men, and to no other of his Creatures.

Lucretius.

As to this last Consideration; is it not possible, that Men, casting about for various devices and imaginations to palliate and sweeten the sowrenesse of their Miseries, in this life, may have both invented this comfortable opinion of a state of future Immortality; and introduced the supposition of this provident justice of God, relating only to mens actions, on purpose to support it: when other Animals, being destitute of the like use of reason, could have no such conceipt?

Athanasius.

Impossible; because the opinion of Immortality was before any sense of Misery, and elder than all Memory; and as it came into mens minds, at first, upon more weighty considerations, than any temporal concernment: so must it have been, as soon as there were men to entertain it. Wherefore, as it is true, that men who live in misery, do more frequently fix their thoughts upon Immortality, than those who live in happinesse: So is it equally true, that not only miserable, but many of the most prosperous and flourishing persons in the World, do nevertheless

leſſe contemn the delights and pleaſures of this tranſitory and umbratil life, and account it the only ſatisfactory and comfortable entertainment of their thoughts, to be conſtantly meditating upon that ſtate of Immortality, which ſhall receive them, when all the pageant pleaſures of the preſent life ſhall be vaniſhed away and come to not hing.

Lucretius.

But, is not Virtue, on one ſide, a ſufficient recompence to it ſelf? and Vice, on the other, a ſufficient puniſhment to it ſelf? and ſuch, than which no Executioner can inflict a more grievous and horrid? What need, therefore, of any ſuch ſtate to come, untill which the reward of Virtue, and puniſhment of Vice, is imagined to be deferred?

Athanaſius.

That virtue is not a ſufficient recompence to itſelf, may be naturally collected from hence; that all virtuous perſons have an eye of Affection conſtantly levelled at ſomewhat beyond it. For, though the *Stoicks* affected this high-ſtraind expreſſion of the exceeding amiableneſs of virtue; yet could they never perſwade themſelves, or others, but that Glory and Honour, at leaſt, were lookt upon, as the Conſequents of Virtue: nor can it be affirmed, that Glory doth alwayes ſeek out and court virtue, of its owne accord; forasmuch as really thoſe perſons were ever the moſt covetuous of Glory, who have pretended the

the moſt to decline and avoid it. Yea, the moſt Heroical among the Ancients ſeem to have propoſed Glory, and not barely Virtue itſelf, as the guerdon of their moſt difficult enterpriſes and atcheivements; which *Cicero* fully expreſſeth (*pro Milone*) in theſe elegant words: *Ex omnibus præmiis virtutis, ampliſſimum eſt præmium Gloriæ, quæ vitæ brevitatem poſteritatis memoriâ conſolatur*; & (*pro Arch.*) *nullam virtus aliam mercedem laborum, periculorumque deſiderat, præter hanc Laudis & Gloriæ; quâ detractâ, quid eſt in hoc tam exiguo vitæ curriculo, & tam brevi, quod tantis nos in laboribus exerceamus?* I add, that according to this drie and uncomfortable leſſon of the Stoicks, a Prince would be unjuſt to expect honour from his ſubjects, for his prudent and happy government; a ſouldier unreaſonable, in hoping for any recompence for his valour and wounds; an Artiſt worthy of blame in demanding a valuable price for an excellent piece of work; a Phyſician unconſcionable, in receiving a fee for a Cure, and the like: For if virtue, or the doing of a good action be a competent reward to its ſelf; it muſt be (as I ſay) manifeſt injuſtice to require or receive any other. The ſame likewiſe may be ſaid of Vice. For, no man, that doth an ill action, fears only leaſt that ill ſhould torment him: but fears ſomthing beyond it, and conſequent upon it, as infamy, impriſonment, torture and death. And theſe, truly, are more congruous puniſhments for vice, than vice itſelf; otherwiſe all Lawes would be unjuſt, that inflict them. We may conclude, therefore, that ſince virtue doth frequently

frequently want its due reward, in this life; and vice as frequently goe without its due punishment: it follows, that after death, there is to succeed a certain immortal state, in which both shall receive their due.

Lucretius.

Granting all this to be necessary, in respect of Justice Divine; yet I can see no necessity, why the Rewards of the Virtuous, and Punishment of the Vicious, should be Eternal. For, no Human action, though highly good and commendable, can yet be so meritorious, as to deserve an Eternal recompence from God: as, on the other side, no action, though superlatively criminal and detestable, can yet be so bad, as to require an everlasting punishment; because neither the one, nor the other is any thing but natural, transitory, and definite, and so can hold no proportion to what is infinite.

Athanasius.

Though a Good action, and so Virtue and Honesty, considered *Physically*, be but a slender thing; yet, because the worth or Merit of it is to be estimated according to the rule of *Morality*, it comes to be of such excellency, as that the Doer thereof, freely and upon election endeavouring to compose and regulate himself, by the best rules prescribed, and so ennobling his actions with divine perfection, as much as the frailty of his nature will permit; may in justice hope for a reward proportionable *i. e.* an Eminent, and Divine

Divine one, ſuch to which the Soul, by its inherent appetite and tendency, doth continually aſpire. And this reward cannot be other but Everlaſting; becauſe, if it were only Temporal and Finite, it could not deſerve the name of a reward, inſomuch as the Fear of being once deprived of it again, though after many myriads of years, would deſtroy the pleaſure of enjoying it. And the like may be ſaid of the perpetuity of Puniſhments due to vicious perſons ſo that there is no ſuch diſproportion as you ſurmiſe.

And here, if you pleaſe, let us ſet bounds to our Debate concerning the Immortality of that noble Eſſence, the Human Soul. For having run over the principal *Phyſical* Arguments, that ariſe from the *Operations* of the Soul, aſwell in *Volition*, as *Intellection*, and alſo from the *Nature* and *Univerſality* of her *Objects*; and added thereunto other *Moral* Conſiderations, of high importance, in order to the Conviction of this moſt comfortable and ſacred Truth, whoſe Aſſertion, in obedience to your yeſterdayes commands, I aſſumed upon myſelf: I find the clue of all my Notions and Collections concerning this ſublime ſubject, now wholly unravelled. Nor, after my ſolution of all your Scruples and Objections, doth any thing remain for me longer to exerciſe your patience withall, but only that I beg of you both your forgiveneſs, in that I have thus long abuſed it already; and that I render my thanks to you *Lucretius*, for the advantage you were pleaſ'd to give me, by your moſt ingenious and learned Oppoſition, as you ſaw occaſion, in the proceſs of my Diſcourſes

ſes; and to you, *Iſodicaſtes*, for your moſt impartial and judicious turning the ſcales on the ſide of truth, as often as *Lucretius* thought, or ſeemed to think them equilibrated betwixt his reaſons and mine.

Iſodicaſtes.

If I have been ſo happy, *Athanaſius*, as to judge according to truth; I aſſure you, it was the clearneſs of your Reaſonings alone, that gave me light ſo to do: and therefore, inſtead of that Forgiveneſs of your exerciſe of my patience, (as you call it) which your modeſty makes you require of me; I muſt return you infinite thanks, for your ſo fully compenſating my patience and attention with ſuch ſatisfaction, as greater ought not to be expected, concerning an argument of ſo much abſtruſity and difficulty, as this whereupon you have diſcourſed. And for *Lucretius*, I think it now time for him, to lay aſide his diſguiſe of a Contrary opinion which he put on only to experiment the ſtrength of your Allegations; for I muſt declare, that in my judgement (which yet I doe not take to be definitive) he hath been too weak for you, in all the paſſages of this conteſt; yet rather from the weakneſs of the Cauſe he undertook, than from any want of ſkill in himſelf to manage it to the utmoſt of its merit.

Lucretius.

We have yet an hour good, before ſupper time; and you were both pleaſed to devote this whole Evening to this particular Divertiſement:

ment: And therefore, if *Athanaſius* be not tired with ſpeaking, nor you, *Iſodicaſtes*, with hearing; let me beſeech you to continue your places a little longer, while I propoſe ſome certain Objections, long ſince made by *Epicurus* and ſome of my Fellow-Diſciples, againſt the Immortality of Mans Soul. For, until *Athanaſius* hath perfectly refuted them alſo; if he thinks to Triumph, it will be before he hath compleated his Victory.

Athanaſius.

You are a politick Enemy, *Lucretius*, it ſeems: like experienced Generals, you place your chiefeſt ſtrength in a Reſerve. But, come, draw up the remainder of your forces; I doubt not of as good ſucceſſe in the ſecond charge, as I have had in the firſt.

Iſodicaſtes.

But, pray, Gentlemen, let me conjure you both, not to extend your Contract, beyond eight a clock; for, at that hour, I have appointed my Cook to furniſh us with a ſhort repaſt; and my Watch ſaith, it is almoſt ſeven already.

Lucretius.

Leſſe than an hour will conclude our quarrel, I promiſe you, *Iſodicaſtes*: but leſt we loſe time in preparatory circumſtances, I immediately addreſſe to the propoſal of my intended *Objections*, which have alwaies hitherto been accounted of of moment.

The First is this, that the Soul is generated, grows up to maturity, then again declines, grows old, and at length wholly decaies, together with the body: So that, if that Axiome be true, *quicquid natum est, possit interire*, the Soul being produced, must be subject to dissolution.

Athanasius.

This Argument hath two parts; the one supposing, that the Soul is Generated: The other, that it grows old and languid, and decaies, as the body doth; and therefore I shall divide my Answer accordingly. To the *First* part I reply, that that Axiome, *quicquid natum est, possit interire*, is true indeed concerning all things Corporeal and Compound; but not concerning things *Incorporeal* and *Simple*, such as I have already demonstrated the Soul to be: so that the Production of the Soul doth not necessitate her Dissolubility. That Incorporeal Natures are incapable of destruction, I have formerly deduced from their want of parts into which they might be dissolved: all exsolubility consisting wholly in Partibility. And, that Simple Natures are likewise incorruptible, is manifest even from hence, that the General and First Matter, though Corporeal and produced from nothing by God at first, doth persevere the very same for ever. So that Dissolubility belonging neither to Incorporiety, nor Simplicity; it is purely consequent, that the Soul, which is an essence Incorporeal and Simple, cannot be obnoxious to Dissolution. And as to the *Production* of it, though it be not easie for

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us (eſpecially at the firſt thought) to conceive how an Incorporeal can be produced, without perfect creation, from which we have good cauſe to believe that God long ſince deſiſted; yet that the Soul is produced, we have the perſwaſion of ſundry good reaſons: As if it were improduct, or eternal *à parte antè*, it would and muſt be ſo, either as Coherent by it ſelf, and a ſubſtance ſejoyned or ſevered from all other things; or as a part adhærent to another, and deduced from that other, when it is induced into the body. But, that it is not a ſubſtance cohærent *per ſe & ab æterno*, may be inferred from hence, that there is remaining in us no memory of any ſuch eternal ſtate; that the Univerſity of things would want beginning, and ſo could have neither Author, nor Governour, which is monſtrous and abſurd, as I have demonſtrated in my *Book againſt Atheiſm*; that if Men had been from all Eternity, they muſt have been Infinite, and ſo either there muſt have been an infinite multitude of Souls, before all excogitable time, or the ſame numerical Souls muſt have, by tranſmigration, been inſervient to, or informed ſucceſſively, not only many, but infinite perſons; when yet it is repugnant, that there ſhould be an infinite number (leſt therein ſhould be admitted as many Binaries, Denaries, Millenaries, *&c.* as Unities: and ſo ſomthing be allowed more infinite than an infinite, which is abſurd) And that our Souls were formerly in other men, who lived before us, we have no monument, no record, but thoſe Fables of *Pythagoras*, *Empedo-*

cles, and the like. And, that it is not a Particle deſumed from another incorporeal, is demonſtrable from hence, that an Incorporeal is uncapable of diviſion into parts: Which reaſon is ſo plain and obvious, that I cannot but wonder that *Plato*, having aſſerted God to be a *Mind Divine and Incorporeal*, ſhould nevertheleſſe contradict himſelf in affirming, that Mans Soul was *a Particle taken from the ſubſtance of God himſelf*; or how he could imagine the Soul to be Inexſoluble, which he thought a part of an exſoluble nature. Wherefore, ſeeing the Soul cannot poſſibly be Improduct, either of theſe two waies (and certainly there can be no other) it muſt of neceſſity be *Product*, whatſoever the Manner of its Production be. And here I might (as I ſuppoſe you expect I ſhould) take occaſion to engulph my ſelf in that bottomleſſe Sea of Difficulties, concerning the Original and Extraduction of Mans Soul; but being digreſſive from my preſent Theme, and ſuch whereof I am not yet able to give any other account, than what you have met with, in *Sennertus*, *Harvey*, and other modern Phyſicians, who have more expreſly addicted themſelves to enquire into the myſteries of Generation; I think it prudence to wave the opportunity. Only thus much I may adventure to ſay, and it is pertinent to my buſineſſe in hand, that the Production of the Soul cannot be from Matter, becauſe ſhe is her ſelf Immaterial; nor from an Incorporeal, by way of deſumption or partition, becauſe Incorporiety and Diviſibility are incompatible: So that they are not altogether deſtitute

ſtitute of reaſon, who conceive that it is produced *ex Nihilo*, and by ſuch a Cauſe, whoſe power is immenſe, and ſuperior to all the Energy of of Nature, which muſt be God, the Author of Nature. But, however it is plain, that though it hath its beginning and origine together with the body; yet being Incorporeal, it is not capable of periſhing together with it, as you would conclude. And thus much for the *Firſt part* of your Argument.

As for the *Remainder* of it; to that *Ariſtotle* hath long ſince provided an Anſwer to my hand, *in the fourth Chapter of his firſt Book de Anima*, which is a Text very appoſite, and memorable (however it either import a Contradiction in the Author himſelf, or ſeem capable of their interpretation, who alleage him as a defendant of the Mortality of the Soul) and therefore I ſhall recite it. *Innaſci autem Intellectus videtur, & ſubſtantia quædam eſſe, nec corrumpi; nam ſi corrumperetur quidem, id maximè fieret ab hebetatione illa, quæ in ſenectute contingit: nunc autem res perinde ſit, ac in ipſiſmet ſenſuum inſtrumentis. Si enim Senex oculum juvenilem reciperet, non ſecus ac ipſe juvenis videret. Unde & ſenectus non ex eo eſt, quod quidquam paſſa Anima ſit; ſed quod ſimile aliquid, ac in ebrietate morbiſque eveniat: ipſaque intelligendi & contemplandi functio propter aliquid aliud interius corruptum marceſcit, cum ipſum interim, cujus eſt, paſſionis expers maneat.* Which words conſidered, we have good reaſon to affirm, that all that change, which the *Epicurean* would have to be in the Rational Soul, or Mind,

Mind, during the growth of the body in youth, and decay of it in old age; doth not proceed from any mutation in the Soul it ſelf, but in ſome other interior thing diſtinct from it, as the Imagination, or Organ of the Common Senſe, the Brain, which being well or ill affected, the Soul it ſelf ſuffereth no whit at all, but only the Functions of it flouriſh or decay accordingly. For, ſince the Intellect is enſhrined in the body, for only this end, that it might collect the Knowledge of things, by the interceſſion of the Phanſy, into which the images of things are conveyed through the Senſes; and that in order to its reaſoning concerning them, it might receive hints from thoſe images, which reſiding in the Phanſy, are therefore (as we have ſaid) called Phantaſms: hence is it, that the Soul, in the beginning of its age, or during Childhood, doth reaſon but little, becauſe it hath then but few images or phantaſms in ſtore, from which it might take occaſion of compoſing diſcourſes: but, in proceſſe of time, it comes to ratiocinate more copiouſly and perfectly, as having then both more, and more clear and ordinate Phantaſms; and laſtly in decrepite old age, it again falls to reaſon but little and brokenly, becauſe, by reaſon of the drineſſe of the brain, the Phantaſms are then either wholly, or for the moſt part obliterated, and thoſe few that remain, are repreſented both obſcurely and perturbedly. So that (as *Ariſtotle* ſaith) if it were poſſible to give an old man a young Eye, and a young Imagination; his Soul would ſoon declare, by exquiſite viſion, and

and quick reaſoning, that it was not ſhe, that had grown old, but her Organs; and that ſhe is capable of no more change from the impairment of the body by old age, than is uſually obſerved to ariſe (*pro tempore*) from a fit of drunkenneſſe, or ſome diſeaſe of the brain. For, as when the malignity of the Spirits of Wine is overcome by ſleep, and diſpelled by ſweat; or the violence of a diſeaſe poſſeſſing the brain, or ſeat of reaſon, is abated; a man doth no longer ſuffer a delirium, but returns to the clear uſe of his reaſoning Faculty, as before his head was diſordered: So, if the Brain and Phanſy were youthfully affected in an old man, the Soul would no longer ſeem to doat, but reaſon as perfectly as ever before in the vigour and flouriſhing ſtate of youth. From whence it is evident, that whatever of change men have thought to be in the Soul, by reaſon of that great decay generally attending old age; is not really in the Soul, but only in the Imagination, and the Organ thereof, which is not ſo well diſpoſed, as in the vigour of life. And this might be conveniently explained by the ſimilitude of a Scribe, who cannot write ſo ſmooth and fine a hand, with an old and blunted pen, as with a new and ſharp one: But the thing is of it ſelf too clear, to need the illuſtration of Compariſons. And this may ſuffice to diſſolve your mighty Argument objected.

Lucretius.

My SECOND Argument is deſumed from hence, that the Soul is not only diſtempered and miſ-

miſaffected with diſeaſes of her owne, but infected and touch't alſo by thoſe of the body: and what is capable of diſeaſe or miſaffection, either protopathically, or ſympathically, is doubtleſs capable of diſſolution. This you may remember, was long ſince urged by *Panætius* of *Epicurus* ſects for, *Cicero* (*primo Tuſcul.*) ſpeaking of him, ſaith; *alteram autem rationem affert, nihil eſſe quod doleat, quin id ægrum eſſe quoque poſſit: quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum; dolere autem Animos, ergo etiam interire.*

Athanaſius.

As for ſuch Diſeaſes of the body, which you ſuppoſe extend to the diſcompoſure of the Soul, by way of ſympathy; as particulary the Phrenſy, Madneſſe, Hypochondriacall Melancholy, the Lethargy, Hydrophobia, and others which work upon the brain, and perturb the Animal Faculties: the ſame Anſwer will ſerve to exempt the Soul from ſuffering any detriment from them, which I juſt now alleaged againſt her decay in old age. For, though in truth the Mind cannot exerciſe its proper functions duely and rightly, in fits of Delirium, the Phrenſy, and the like; nor at all in Lethargies, and Apoplexies: yet this ought not to be aſcribed to any depravation or change in the ſubſtance of the Mind itſelf, but only to an indiſpoſition in the Phanſy and Animal Organs.

And, as for Paſſions of Grief, Fear, Remorſe *&c.* which are reputed the proper Diſeaſes of the Mind; in the firſt place, we may derive our Anſwer

Anſwer concerning them, from the place of *Ariſtotle* newly cited. For, he there ſubjoyns, *Amores, odium, & alia, paſſiones eſſe non intellectûs, ſed corporis ipſum habentis; eſſe enim fortè Intellectum aliquid divinum & paſſionis expers.* By which, his meaning is, that the proper Function of the Intellect, is to underſtand and reaſon (though he was pleaſed to reckon Cogitation among the Paſſions) and that all Paſſions belong to the Appetite either Concupiſcible or Iraſcible, which is a Corporeal Faculty. For, though Paſſion be poſterior to Cognition, and dependent thereupon; ſo that it may ſeem to be received in the ſubject, to which Cognition doth belong, that is to the Mind: nevertheleſs, becauſe the Mind, while reſident in the body, doth make uſe of corporeal Images pre-admitted into the Imagination; and in the mean while the Phanſy, in imagining what things are, doth co-operate together with the Mind, and the motion of the Corporeal or Senſitive Faculty followeth after the perception of objects by the Phanſy; thence it comes, that the whole Commotion, or Paſſion doth belong to the Appetite and Body, the Mind all that while remain free and unmoved, after the ſame manner, as a Maſter and ſervant travelling together, the ſervant carries the burden, and the Maſter goes light and free, and unconcerned in the weight and trouble thereof. But, foraſmuch as we muſt admit a certain Appetite properly competent to the Soul itſelf, viz. the Rational Appetite (from the name of its action, uſually denominated the Will) by which we find our-

ſelves ſecretly inclined and carried towards things Honeſt and Divine, and which ought to remain in the Soul even after death, ſince it muſt then be ſenſible either of pleaſure in the ſtate of felicity, or of pain in the ſtate of miſery: therefore, I confeſs, we cannot deny but there are ſome certain Motions in the Soul itſelf, which in reſpect of the analogy they ſeem to hold to thoſe of the ſenſual or Corporeal Appetite, and that we cannot otherwiſe expreſs them, may well enough be called Paſſions, yet theſe are not to be conceived to ariſe from any dilatation, compreſſion, ſolution of continuity, and the like violent motions, that might adferr any harme or detriment to the ſubſtance of the Soul. Nor, indeed, ought this to ſeem ſtrange or difficult, in a thing that is Incorporeal; ſince even among Corporeals, we obſerve ſome, that have a ſubſtance unalterable, and ſo inconſumable, by the moſt violent motions in Nature, as Gold, Amianthus, and the like; and that *Ariſtotle* makes the ſubſtance of Heavenly bodies, ſuch as that it cannot be altered, heated, or diſſolved by the heat of the Sun, as all ſublunary bodies are.

Lucretius.

What think you then, *Athanaſius*, of *Drunkeneſs*, wherein both the Rational Faculty is highly perturbed, and the Motive as much enfeebled: neither of which could be, if the Soul did not ſuffer from the violence of the wine; and what is capable of ſuffering ſuch damage from external cauſes, cannot be incapable of totall diſſolution

diſſolution from the ſame, in caſe their force and activity become more intenſe. Therefore the ſoul is Mortal.

Athanaſius.

Why, truly, I think this Argument as light and trivial as your former, and that the ſame ſolution will ſerve to both. For, it is not the Mind, which is overwhelmed with the deluge of Wine, but the brain and ſeat or inſtrument of the Phanſy, whoſe images being beclouded and confuſed by the fumes or ſpirits of the wine, brought thither by the arteries; it is impoſſible the Mind ſhould make uſe of them with that clearneſs and diſtinction, as when they were pure and in order. And, as for that general weakneſs, which remaines for a while after the drunken fit is over, in all the members of the body; this is not to be referred to the Mind neither, but to the Motive-Faculty, whoſe inſtruments, and principally the Nerves, are then miſaffected, and in a manner relaxed, ſo as they become indiſpoſed to the regiment of the Mind.

The beſt Luteniſt in the world, you know, cannot play a tune upon a Lute, whoſe ſtrings are relaxed by moiſture, or otherwiſe altered from their requiſite temper: and yet his skill in muſick never a whit the leſs: why then ſhould you conceive, that the ſoul ſhould be able to conſerve the harmony of voluntary motions in the ſinewes, muſcles, and members of the body, when the requiſite tenour of thoſe her inſtruments is depraved, by the ſtupefactive and relaxing force of

the Wine, drank in exceſſe? The Members of the body are fit inſtruments to execute the motions by the Soul impreſſed upon them; but when they are ſurrounded with the malignant and Narcotical vapours of Wine, and thereby relaxed or oppreſſed; they become uncapable of the Souls mandates and government, till thoſe vapours being again diſcuſſed, they have recovered their natural temper, and due diſpoſition: and yet the Soul it ſelf all that while remain vigorous and ſtrong, as in Sobriety; contrary to what this your Objection ſuppoſeth.

Lucretius.

Since you ſo eaſily expede your ſelf from the Objections drawn from Diſeaſes, and Ebriety; I ſhall urge you with one, that ſeems more tough and knotty, and that is this. As the Body, ſo alſo the Soul or Mind is capable of being cured or rectified by the Art of Medicine; and if ſo, there muſt be either an addition to, or a detraction of ſomwhat from the Soul; Phyſick being a Detraction of what is ſuperfluous, and an addition of what is deficient in mans Nature: And therefore the Soul, being capable of addition and detraction, is capable likewiſe of deſtruction.

Athanaſius.

Alas, *Lucretius*, this is ſtill a branch of the ſame ſtock; and to it I may eaſily accommodate an Anſwer, out of what I even now replied to your

your ſuppoſed ſympathy of the Soul with the body, in ſome Diſeaſes. For, albeit, it be moſt true, that by Hellebor and other Antimelancholical remedies, we Phyſicians uſually cure Madneſſe, called *Inſania*, and *Amentia*, Unſoundneſs or Diſtraction of the Mind: Yet is it as true, that this Cure is wrought only upon the brain, or ſeat of the Imagination, which being purged of that aduſt and blackiſh humour, which oppreſſed it, and altered from the diſtemper therein cauſed by the noxious and intoxicating qualities of that humour; the Mind doth ſoon return to perform all its proper Functions as regularly and exactly, as at any time before the patient was invaded with that diſtemper of his brain, and depravation of his Phanſy. So that, as when a man go's haulting, becauſe one of his ſhooes is higher than the other, we may well enough ſay, that man doth hault, though all the cauſe of his haulting be only the inequality of his ſhooes; and to make him go right again, there needs no more, but to moke his ſhooes equally high: So, when a man haults, as it were, in his Reaſon, or fails in the evenneſſe and decorum of his Diſcourſe; we may ſay, that man is Unſound or lame in his Mind, though that unſoundneſſe conſiſt only in his Brain or Imagination, and to reſtore him to the right and becomming manage of his reaſon, there needs no more, but to rectify his Phanſy or Brain, in whoſe preternatural diſtemper alone his madneſſe doth conſiſt.

Again, foraſmuch as there are (as it were ſome

ſome certain diſeaſes peculiar only to the Mind; at leſt in that Metaphorical ſenſe, I have already explained: And that theſe depravities, commonly called *Diſeaſes of the Mind*, are capable of cure by, that which is truly the Phyſick of the Mind, *viz. Moral Philoſophy*: Therefore ought we to conceive, that as the Mind is ſubject to thoſe its Affections, without any the leaſt detriment or alteration of its ſubſtance; ſo alſo may it be cured of them again, without any alteration, addition, or detraction ſubſtantial. For, ſince the Diſeaſes of the Mind are nothing elſe but certain *Evill* or *vitious Habits*, contracted by cuſtom; and thoſe Habits are nothing elſe but certain *Modes* or *Manners of its ſtanding affected* to ſuch or ſuch objects: Thence comes it, that thoſe Vicious Habits may be ſenſibly expelled by the induction of contrary Habits, that is of Virtuous ones; like as a Crooked ſtaffe may be made ſtreight, only by bowing it the contrary way. And though no ſimilitude be exactly congruous in this caſe, becauſe the Affections of Corporeal Natures hold no correſpondence with thoſe of Incorporeals: Yet I chooſe to make uſe of this, of the rectification of a crooked ſtaff, becauſe the Crookedneſſe of the ſtaff doth in ſome ſort repreſent the Curvity of a Mind miſaffected by vicious Habits; and the Rectitude of a ſtaff, equally repreſent that Rightneſſe of the Mind, which is acknowledged in the Soveraignty and Habit of Virtue. And thus you ſee, that the Curability of the Mind by the preſcripts of Mo-

Morality, doth not import its diſſolubility, as you infer, but rather the Contrary; for no Moral precept can be applied to, or work upon a Corporeal or Diſſoluble eſſence.

Lucretius.

From Diſeaſes and Remedies both of Body and Mind, let us have recourſe to Death, and ſee if from the manner of its Tyranny we can raiſe an Objection or two againſt your opinion of the Souls being naturally exempted from the ſame. It is obſerved, that Men generally die *Membratim*, limb after limb, death advancing by ſenſible degrees from the extream parts to the Central and more noble: as if the Soul were not a ſubſtance intirely collected into it ſelf, or reſident in any one particular place of the body (as you ſeem to conceive) but diffuſed and ſcatter'd in ſeveral pieces, and ſo ſubject to diſſipation part after part.

Athanaſius.

The Solution of this is far from being difficult. For, conceiving the ſoul, as Incorporeal, to be diffuſed through the whole body, not by Extenſion of bulk, but by *Replication*, or (as the Schools ſpeak) by *poſition of the ſame Entity in each part of the body*; it is eaſy to underſtand, that the ſoul, when the members grow cold and mortified, doth then, indeed, inſtantly ceaſe to be in them: yet

yet is not cut off piece-meal, or diminiſhed, and ſo ſenſibly or gradually diſſipated, as you ſuppoſe; but the whole of it remains in ſo much of the body, as yet continues warme, and perfuſed by the vital Heat, untill ceaſing longer to animate the principal ſeat or throne of its reſidence (whether the Brain, or Heart) it at length bid adieu to the whole, and withdraw itſelf intire and perfect. What I here ſay, of the *Conſtitution of the whole Soul in the whole body, and the whole Soul in every part of the body, by way of Replication, or Poſition of the ſame Entity in divers places at the ſame time*; is, I confeſs, ſomwhat obſcure, and the imperfection of our knowledge in the affections of Immateriall natures, will hardly permit us to illuſtrate it: yet, leſt you ſhould think it meerly imaginary and ſophiſticall, I may aſſert the poſſibility and reaſonableneſs of it, by a ſimilitude of an *intentional ſpecies*, or *viſible Image*; Which all men allow ſo to be diffuſed through the whole medium or ſpace, as that it is at the ſame time whole in every part of that ſpace: becauſe in what part ſoever of the ſpace the eye of the ſpectatour be poſited, the whole Image is ſtill viſible therein. Now, if this manner of total diffuſion, without fraction or diviſion, be competent to the viſible ſpecies, which is Corporeal, as I have amply proved in my Phyſiology, where I treated expreſly of the nature of Viſion: certainly it muſt, with more reaſon, be competent to the Soul, which is Incorporeal. And as for what you obſerve, of the gradual

gradual encroachment of Death, and the ſenſible mortification of one limb after another, beginning at the feet and other extremities of the body, and creeping along to the heart; the reaſon thereof is only this, that the Vital Heat or Flame, being almoſt either ſuffocated by putrefaction of the blood (the only fewel by which it is maintained) in Diſeaſes, or exhauſted by old age, goes out, like a Lamp, by degrees; ceaſing firſt to enliven or irradiate the parts that are moſt remote from the Focus, or Heart, and then failing in its conſerving influence more and more, untill at length ſuffering a total extinction in the very Heart (as it were in the ſocket) it leave that alſo cold and liveleſſe. So that Death is an extinction only of the *Vital Flame*, not of the *Soul*, which as *Solomon* calls it, *is the brightneſſe of the Everlaſting Light, the unſpotted mirrour of the power of God, and the Image of his Goodneſſe: and being but one, ſhe can do all things, and remaining in her ſelf, ſhe maketh all things new.*

Lucretius.

There is another Argument of the Soul's Mortality drawn from hence; that the Soul is as well a part of the Body, as the Eye, Ear, or the other Senſitive Organs: But theſe are no ſooner ſeparated from the whole, than they become incapable of all Senſe; And therefore the Soul, when once ſeparate from the Body, muſt likewiſe become deſtitute of Senſe.

Athanaſius.

The Mind or Soul cannot, without great impropriety, be ſaid to be a part of the Body, as the Eyes and Ears, and other Organs of Senſe are;

insomuch as these belong to the *Integrality* of the *Body*, and the Soul belongs to the *Integrality* of the *Totum Compositum*, and is the Essence or Form of Man: And the Soul, indeed, is in them all, and in all the rest of the Body, but none of them is in the Soul. So that for this reason alone, you ought not to conceive a parity betwixt the Soul and the Instruments of sense, as to their incapacity of Sensation, after their division from the body: being the Soul is the very Principle of Sense, and the Organs can have no Sensation without Her. But, not to insist upon this, I deny the Soul to be a *part*, as the instruments of sense are; because, otherwise than those all are, she is *Incorporeal*, and is to her self, and hath, both in her self, and from her self, the principle of all her actions and energy, which none of those can pretend to. For, she doth not borrow or derive from any other principle her power of Understanding or Reasoning, as the eye doth its Faculty of seeing, & the Ear its faculty of Hearing: but hath it immediately and solely from her self; and therefore it is no wonder, if the Eye or Ear, once disjoyned from the body, can see, nor hear no longer, *&c.* but the Soul, when separated from the body, can understand and Reason of and within her self.

Lucretius.

But, pray Sir, reflect a little upon this; that the Soul and Body are mutually connected and as it were United by so neer a relation or Necessitude, as that look how the body, being once destitute of the soul, can no longer performe any vital Action: so neither can the soul, when once de-

departed from the body, and mixt with the Aer' performe any action vital, or Animal; unleſs you pleaſe to give yourſelf the liberty of imagining, that ſhe doth then animate that part of Aer, in which ſhe doth take up her new lodging, and of that forme her ſelf inſtruments fit for the execution of her faculties.

Athanaſius.

However the Conjunction of the Soul and body be very intimate; and the moſt part of vital and Animal actions belong to the *Totum Compoſitum*, or whole Compoſition: yet from thence it doth not follow, that though the body be incapable of any of thoſe actions, without the Soul; therefore the incapacity is reciprocall, and the ſoul can doe no actions, without the body; becauſe the ſoul is the Principle of life and activity to the body, but not the contrary. When we behold a ſouldier fighting with a ſword or other weapon, we cannot juſtly ſay, that when he is deprived of thoſe weapons, he can no longer ſtrike a blow: becauſe, though his weapons be gone, he hath ſtill his armes and hands, wherewith he can ſtrike, when and as often as he pleaſeth. So, when the Soul is every way provided of Members and Organs, as it were with a Panoplie or complete armour, and therewith performs ſeveral actions, vital, and Animal; we cannot ſay, that if once it deveſt itſelf of that armour, and become naked, it can no longer exerciſe its proper functions of Intellection and Ratiocination; becauſe, though the inſtruments, by the mediation whereof ſhe doth commonly underſtand and reaſon in the

body, be taken away, yet ſtill ſhe retains her Faculties. Nor will it be therefore neceſſary, that when the ſoul is departed from the body, and breathed forth into the Aer (as you, with the vulgar, ſeem to conceive) that aer ſhould be thereby Animated: becauſe it is eſſential to it, then to act, *i. e.* to underſtand and reaſon, without the mediation of any organs at all; and neither in the aer, nor any other body whatever can the ſoul either meet with, or create thoſe diſpoſitions, that are requiſite to vital information. This Compariſon, I have here made betwixt the Soul and a Souldier, is I confeſs incongruous, as to the point of *Information*; yet it holds with conveniency enough, as to the point of *Operation* (and your queſtion doth chiefly concerne that): the weapons of the ſouldier are as much dead and uſeleſs inſtruments, without the hands, that are to manage them, as the members of the body are without the Soul; and as theſe are Animated by the ſoul, ſo are thoſe in a manner, Animated by the hands of the Souldier. And this may be extended alſo to the ſolution of that ſo famous an Objection of *Ariſtotle* (1. *de Anim.* 8.) where he ſaith; *Eſſe quidem Animam ſeparabilem, ſi aliquam functionem habeat, quam ſine corpore exerceat, v. c. Intellectionem, quæ eſt ipſius maxime propria, ſi modo ea quæpiam Imaginatio non ſit, aut ſine Imaginatione fiat: neceſſe autem eſt, eum, qui ſpeculatur, ſpeculari ſimul aliquod phantaſma; Ergo* &c. "The ſoul is to be "accounted ſeparable, if it hath any function, "which it can exerciſe without the body; "namely Intellection, provided that be not a

"cer-

" certain kind of Imagination, or can be perfor-
" med without Imagination: but experience
" teſtifieth, that no man can ſpeculate, or under-
" ſtand, without Phantaſms; and therefore it
" is not likely, that the ſoul is a diſtinct ſubſtance
" and ſeparable from the body. For, the ground hereof is falſe, viz that *there is no Intellection, but what is either direct Imagination, or done by Imagination*; as we have formerly proved; and that with no ſparing hand, ſo that we need not here repeat it. Nor had I here remembred this Argument of *Ariſtotle*, but that this you now urge is very neer of kin thereunto, as to its force and importance, and ſo put me in mind of it afreſh.

Lucretius.

An *Eighth* Objection may be made from hence; that the Soul being once expired, the body ſoon corrupts, ſtinks, and reſolves to duſt: I ſay, *expired*, or like a vapour exhaled through the conduits and pores of the body; and therefore ſo divided into ſmall portions or particles, as that in that very Egreſſion or Expiration, it muſt be wholly comparated to Diſperſion; and what is capable of ſuch diſperſion, is capable of totall diſſolution.

Athanaſius.

You might well, *Lucretius*, have ſpared your-ſelf and me the trouble of this impertinent objection, had you thought my Anſwer to your *Fifth*, worthy your memory. For, ſince you could not then deny, that the ſoul, as Incorporeal, is diffuſed through the whole body; and therefore may iſſue out of it intire and unimpaired, as poſſeſſing no place, and in that reſpect,

as

as capable of passing through the solid and compacted parts, as through the conduits and pores: why should you now resume that gross conception, of the Souls expiring from the body, like a vapour, or exhalation? And, as for the *Putrefaction* of the Body, after the Soul hath withdrawn itself from it (though it nothing at all concern the business in hand) I say, the Cause thereof is the defect of that vital Agitation of the Heart, Blood, and spirits, by which the Humours most prone to putrifaction, were partly kept from subsiding and fermenting, and partly so extenuated, as to be discussed and expelled.

Lucretius.

A *Ninth* from hence; that in *Lipothymies* or swooning fits, the vigour of the Soul is so much abated and brought low, as that it would be totally dissolved and extinguished, in case the Causes of those its Failings or Dejections, were yet more violent, as frequently they are, and then they cause sudden death.

Athanasius.

Here you recur to the Symptomes of bodily Diseases again; but I wish I could as easily remove them from the body, as you from defending the Mortality of the Soul, by any considerations drawn from them, and their most fatal effects. For, as to *Lipothymies*, which according to the Etymologie of the word, you call *Failings of the Soul*; they are in truth only Failings of the Heart, or vital influence; arising from the precluſion or stopping of those passages, ordained for the continual transmission of vital Spirits; which as servants, the Soul makes use of to Life, Sense, and

and Motion. And, therefore, reflecting upon what I have already ſaid, it is obvious to conceive, that the whole Soul being diffuſed through the whole body; all the failing in Swooning fits doth fall, not upon her Self, but upon the Vital Organs, which at that time are rendred unfit for the uſes and actions, to which they were framed and accommodated. And, if the Cauſes of ſuch Failings ſhould chance to be ſo violent, as to induce ſuddain death; then the Soul, indeed, would and muſt wholly depart: yet not by reaſon of any diſſolution of its ſubſtance, or exceeding imbecility in it ſelf; but only for want of thoſe Diſpoſitions in the Organs of life, by which ſhe was enabled to enliven the body. And here I could mind you of a certain ſort of Lypothymies, that happen in *Ecſtaſies* of ſome Holy men, when the Soul being tranſported with the ſuperlative beauty and excellency of Divine Objects, in abſtracted contemplations, doth ſo much neglect her inferior functions, as that the body all that while ſeems ſenſeleſſe and liveleſſe: And yet this an argument rather of the ſtrength of the Soul, than of any Failing or Defection in it ſelf. I could alſo inſiſt upon this, that in ſleep there is a kind of Defection of the influence of the Soul upon her corporeal Organs, eſpecially thoſe inſervient to Senſe and Motion; and yet the Soul is then moſt her ſelf, as *Cyrus* long ſince obſerved, in one of *Xenophons* Orations, in theſe moſt elegant words; *Dormientium Animi maximè declarant Divinitatem ſuam; multa enim, cum remiſſi ac liberi ſunt, futura proſpiciunt: ex quo intelligitur, quales futuri ſint, cum ſe planè corporis*

vinculis

vinculis relaxaverint. But the Objection, being otherwiſe refuted, doth require neither.

Lucretius.

Experience teacheth, that no man, when dying, findeth his Soul to depart out of his body whole and at once; but rather to fail by degrees within his breaſt, juſt as he doth his Senſe, in each proper Organ: Which he would not do, in caſe his Soul took her flight whole and intire, out of his breaſt, as a bird out of a Cage; and therefore it is probable that the Soul, being diſſolved at the inſtant of death, is breathed out in diſperſed Atoms together with the Aer expired from the Lungs.

Athanaſius.

You muſt needs be ſtreightned for Objections, *Lucretius*, when you fly to uncertain Experiments, and incompetent conceptions of vulgar heads; and therefore I hope, you cannot much longer hold out againſt truth. I ſay, *to uncertain experiments*; becauſe, ſince it is impoſſible that any man, in the extream moment of life, wherein his Soul ceaſeth to be either in his breaſt, or any other part of his body, ſhould ſay to the ſtanders by, *Now I am ſenſible of the egreſſe or flight of my Soul*, and I perceive how it departs; becauſe while he is able to ſpeak, or be ſenſible of any thing, the Soul is ſtill in the body, and at the inſtant of its departure, the Speech & all Senſe fail for ever: The experience you alleage is uncertain and ſo no experience at all. *To incompetent Conceptions of vulgar heads;* becauſe the common people, not being able to underſtand the nature of an Incorporeal; and how poſſeſſing no place, no body

dy can hinder its paſſage or traiection; have a certain groſſe apprehenſion, that the Soul muſt iſſue out of the breaſt, the ſame way that the breath doth out of the lungs. And as for its Diſperſion into Atoms; you do ill to ſuppoſe it to be Corporeal, when you have been ſo often beaten from that ſtarting hole. Theſe Impertinences are much below ſo great a wit, as yours, *Lucretius*; and I ſhould very much wonder how you could fall upon them, but that I aſcribe it to your preſent humour of Contradiction, which doth many times tranſport even wiſe men themſelves to groſs extravagancies.

Lucretius.

If the Soul were Immortal, and conſcious of its Immortality, as you have affirmed; certainly it would not grieve to leave the body, which is rather its priſon, than delightful Manſion; but rather rejoyce to be ſet at liberty, and exult, as a ſnake doth to caſt her ſlough, or a ſtagg his old horns.

Athanaſius.

To this I prepared a Solution, when I proved the Appetite of Immortality to be Natural to the Soul, however this preſent life cauſe in us a love of it ſelf, above that we ought to have of our future ſtate; juſt as the Appetite or love of Health doth not ceaſe to be Natural, however the blandiſhments of Senſe, and flattering baits of ſome preſent pleaſure, that impugnes health, may create in us a ſtronger deſire, for the time: and therefore you might have well omitted here to argue the Mortality of the Soul, from its reluctancy againſt death, and unwillingneſſe to

leave its old companion, the body. However, without inſiſting upon this, that many men even in this life, long uſed to a mean and turbulent ſtate or condition, become ſo depraved and abject in their judgement and affection, as to refuſe to change it for a better, if they might: To what I have ſaid formerly of the Univerſal deſire of Immortality, I ſhall annex this one both pertinent and memorable conſideration, out of *Cicero* (*in Catone majore*) *Quid, quod ſapientiſſimus quiſq; æquiſſimo animo moritur, ſtultiſſimus iniquiſſimo? Nonne nobis videtur Animus is, qui plus cernat, & longiùs, videre ſe ad meliora proficiſci: ille autem, cujus obtuſior ſit acies, non videre? Equidem efferor ſtudio patres veſtros quos colui, & dilexi, videndi. Neque verò eos ſolùm convenire aveo, ſed illos etiam, de quibus audivi & legi, & ipſe conſcripſi. Quò quidem me proficiſcentem, haud ſcio quis facile retraxerit, & tanquam Peliam recoxerit. Quod ſi quis Deus mihi largiatur, ut ex hac ætate repueraſcam, & in cunis vagiam, valde recuſem; nec verò velim, quaſi decurſo ſpatio à calce ad carceres revocari.* 'Doth not every wiſe man die with 'extream content and ſerenity of mind; and only 'Fools with diſquiet, impatience, and reluctancy? 'Is not that mind to be accounted the moſt clear 'ſighted, which ſeeth things afar off, and diſcerns 'that it is to be tranſlated into a better ſtate: and 'that dim and weak, which doth not look beyond 'things preſent, and diſcern nothing of its future 'condition? For my part, truly, I am even tranſ-'ported with vehement longing to behold again 'the faces of thoſe brave men, your Fathers, 'whom, in their lives, I ſo much loved and hono-'red.

'red. And not only them, but ſome other worthy 'perſons alſo, whoſe fame I have heard and read 'of, and celebrated in my own writings. And, if 'I were ſo happy once, as to be on my journey 'toward thoſe Heroes; I know none, that ſhould 'eaſily draw me back again, or retard my ſpeed, , by reſtoring my youth, like *Pelias*. If any of the 'Gods ſhould think to do me a favour, in making 'me young again, now after I have attained to 'this my declining age: I profeſs, I would refuſe 'the proffer; nor would I, having run over the 'ſtage of life, be brought back again to the poſt, 'from which I firſt ſet forth. Hereunto I might add alſo that patheticall Exclamation of that Emperour of wiſedom, *Marcus Antoninus*; *Ecquando futura es, O Anima, bona ſimplex, una, nuda, corpore te ambiente dilucidior? Ecquando diſpoſitionem dilectioni et affectui genuino deditam deguſtabis? Ecquando futura es plena, rei nullius indiga, nihil deſiderans ulterius, nihil expetens* &c. As if He were angry, and paſſionately expoſtulating with his ſoul, that ſhe ſtaid ſo long in the indigent and vexatious condition of this life, and had omitted opportunities of tranſlating herſelf into a better, in which ſhe would be intirely Herſelf, and injoy thoſe pleaſures, that are more genuine and agreeable to her immortal nature. But, ſo clear a truth, as this of the Souls deſire of an Immortal ſtate, after death, notwithſtanding the unwillingneſs of ſome abject minds (loaden with earthy and baſe affections) to ſubmit to the ſtroke of Death, which alone can tranſport them into that ſtate: doth need no further teſtimonies, or illuſtration.

Lucretius.

If the Soul ſurvive the body, and be Cognoſcent or Knowing, after death; doubtleſs it muſt be furniſhed with ſenſes, that ſo ſhe may ſee, hear, *&c.* in order to her knowledge: but, when once divorced from her Copartner, the body, ſhe neither hath, nor can have Organs for any ſuch uſes at all; and therefore ſhe can have no knowledge.

Athanaſius.

Here again you touch upon that ſo often rejected confuſion of *Knowledge* and *Senſation*, as if they were one and the ſame thing; when from ſundry paſſages in my precedent diſcourſes, you might have eaſily collected, that the ſenſe aſcribed to the Soul, is neither Hearing, nor ſeeing, nor *&c.* but the very power of Underſtanding, or Intellection itſelf: which is indeed called many times [αἴσθησις] Senſe, in a general acceptation of the word; becauſe Cognition is a Perception, and becauſe it comprehends, in way of Eminency, all the ſubordinate ſenſes, or Faculties of ſenſation, i. e. by itſelf it knowes Colours, as the Eye; ſounds, as the Eare; and ſo of the reſt. And this is the proper prerogative of ſuperior Faculties, that beſides their owne higher and nobler Functions, they comprehend likewiſe all the Functions of Inferiors, and that in a tranſcendent and more excellent manner, as I have already explained. But, as for the particular manner of the Souls Knowledge, after death; I remit you to *Sr. Kenelme Digbies* ſublime Speculations concerning the condition of a ſeparate Soul; in which, though perhaps you may not meet with ſuch ſatisfaction, as you expect: yet you will meet

meet with more than I can now give you, without repeating his notions.

Lucretius.

Well, *Athanaſius*, you would not have referred me to another, but that you are almoſt exhauſted and wearied with ſpeaking thus long yourſelf; and therefore it becomes me in civility to conſider the weakneſs of your lungs, and ſlowneſs of your tongue (of both which I remember, you have many years ſince often complained) and to eaſe you of this penance my curioſity put upon you, as ſoon as I have propoſed one Objection more, which wiſer men than myſelf have thought not a little difficult to be ſolved; and that, in ſhort, is this. Conſidering the vaſt diſparity and (in truth) abſolute incompoſſibility betwixt the affections of a Corporeal and Incorporeal Nature; it ſeems unreaſonable to conceive, that they can be conjoyned in one Compoſition, ſuch as Man is, if (as you affirme) his ſoul be an Immortal ſubſtance, and his Body a Mortal. Pray, therefore, make good the poſſibility of ſuch a Conjunction: and, if you can, explain what is the common cæment or Glew, that unites and holds them together; and then I have done oppoſing you.

Athanaſius.

You very well underſtand *Epicurus* doctrine of an Eternal and Incorporeal Inanity, or ſpace diffuſed through the world, and commixed with all Bodies or Concretions, which are yet diſſoluble: and doe you pretend after this, that you cannot conceive it reaſonable, that an Incorporeal ſhould be conjoyned to a Corporeal? But, ſup-

ſuppoſe you really cannot conceive it reaſonable; muſt it therefore be unreaſonable, when ſo many and ſo eminent Philoſophers have underſtood, and allowed the reaſonableneſs of this Conjunction? What think you, in the firſt place, of *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and all their ſectators, who unanimouſly held the *Anima Mundi*, or Univerſal Soul, and that being diffuſed through all parts of the Univerſe, it aſſociateth and mixeth itſelf with all things, and *totam intus agitat molem*? And then what think you of thoſe words of the great *Hermes*, quoted by *Lactantius*; when diſcourſing of the Nature of Man, and how he was Created by God, he ſaith: *Ac idem ex utraque natura, immortali putâ, ac mortali, unam hominis naturam texebat, ipſum quadamtenus immortalem, quadamtenus mortalem faciens; ac eundem accipiens, in medio quaſi interſtitio, heinc divinæ, immortaliſque, illeinc mortalis obnoxiæque mutationi naturæ conſtituit, ut in omnia intuens, omnia miraretur.* And thus *Triſmegiſtus*; from whence it came, that Man was eſteemed as it were the *Horizon of the Univerſe*, in whom Supreme natures are joyned to the moſt Low, and the Heavenly to the Earthy: and this with admirable correſpondency, and as beſeems the perfection of the Univerſe; becauſe, ſince there are ſome Natures purely Incorporeal and Immortal, and others purely Corporeal and Mortal; that theſe Extremes might not be without a Mean, nothing ſeems more congruous, than that there ſhould be a certain ſort of third Natures, ſo mixed and compound of both the others, as to be Incorporeal and Immortal, on one part, and Corporeal and Mortal, on the other.

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Again, whereas you imagine it abſurd, that natures ſo extremely different ſhould concur to conſtitute one Compoſition; I beſeech you, *Lucretius*, are not Heat, and Cold, white and black, as different each from other, as Immortal and Mortal? and yet you ſee, they are often conjoyned together, ſo as that a Middle or Third nature doth reſult from their union, as in particular, warme, from Heat and Cold, and Grey or browne, from white and black. Nay, there ſeems ſo much the leſs repugnancy betwixt Immortal and Mortal, Incorporeal and Corporeal natures; by how much they are the leſs Different and Incompoſſible becauſe they are only as it were Diſparate among themſelves, and capable of conſerving a whole nature: but Heat and Cold, Whiteneſs and Blackneſs, are abſolute Contraries, and cannot conſiſt together, without reciprocal deſtruction, or maintain a durable Union. And thus much for the Firſt part of your Demand, viz, the Poſſibility of a Conjunction betwixt an Incorporeal and a Corporeal Nature.

As for the remainder, viz, what is the *Common Medium*, *Cement* or Glew, by which two ſuch different natures are married and united into one *Compoſitum*; I Anſwer, that I conceive it to be the *Blood*, eſpecially the ſpiritual and moſt elaborate or refined part thereof: according to that ancient opinion of *Critias*, *Sentire*, *maximè proprium eſſe Animæ*; *atque hoc ineſſe propter ſanguinis naturam*; commemorated by *Ariſtotle* (though with diſſent) *in the* 2 *Ch. of his* 1. *Book de Anima*; and with the teſtimony of ſundry admirable Experiments, both revived and aſſerted by our perſpicacious Countriman

Contryman, *Dr. Harvey*, in his *Exercitations concerning the Generation of Animals*. For, ſince the viſible obſervations of the Manner and proceſs of Nature, in the production of the Chicken in and from the Egg, doe aſſure that the Blood is the part of the body, which is firſt generated, nouriſhed, and moved; and that the Soul is *Excited* and as it were *Enkindled* firſt from the blood: doubtleſs, the blood is that, in which the operations vegetative and ſenſitive do firſt manifeſt themſelves; that, in which the vital Heat, (the primary and immediate inſtrument of the Soul, eſpeci ally as to Animation) is innate and congenial; that, which is the Common *Vinculum*, or Cæment of the Soul and body; and that, by the mediation whereof, as a vehicle, the Soul doth tranſmit her conſerving and invigorating influence into all parts of the body. Nay, conſidering that the Blood, by perpetual Circulation, doth flow (like a river of *Living* water) round the body, penetrating into and irrigating the ſubſtance of all the parts, and at the ſame time communicating to them both Heat and Life; and that the Heart is framed for no other end, but that by perpetual pulſation (together with the concurrence of the veins and arteries) it may receive this blood, and againe propell it into all the body: I ſay, theſe things duely conſidered, it can be but *a Paradox* at moſt, to affirme, that the Soul having its firſt, and perhaps principal reſidence in the Blood, may very well be conceived to be, in reſpect thereof, *Tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte*. And, laſtly, concerning the *Manner* of this Conjunction of the Soul and body

dy, by the Mediation of this vital Nectar, the Blood; it is not neceſſary, with the Vulgar, to imagine, that they ſhould mutually touch, and by hooks take reciprocall hold each of other, in order to Cohæſion and conſtant Union; for, that is competent only to Corporeals; but that Incorporeals ſhould be conjoyned either one to another, or to Corporeals, no more is required but an *Intimate Præſence*, which is yet a kind of Contact, and ſo may ſerve in ſtead of mutual Apprehenſion and Continency. So that this *ſpecial Manner of Præſence* is that and only that, by which an Incorporeal Entity may be united to a Corporeal. And now I have explained thoſe difficulties concerning the Conjunction of the Soul and Body, the one an Incorporeal and Immortal Being, the other Corporeal and Mortal; which you ſeemed to think in-explicable. I expect you ſhould be as good as your promiſe, no longer to oppoſe me, but hereafter concurr with me in opinion, that *The Soul is an Immortal ſubſtance*: and that *its Immortality is not only credible by Faith, or upon Authority Divine; but alſo Demonſtrable by Reaſon, or the Light of Nature.*
Lucretius.

You may remember, Sr: I told you in the beginning, that though I am an Epicurean, in many things concerning Bodies; yet, as a Chriſtian, I deteſt and utterly renounce the doctrine of that Sect, concerning Mens Souls: and that I askt your permiſſion to interrupt you ſometimes in your diſcourſes, by intermixing ſuch Doubts, and Objections, as ſeemed to render the Demonſtration of the Souls Immortality, by meer Rea-

ſon, exceeding difficult, if not altogether impoſſible; to this end only, that I might the more fully experiment the ſtrength of your Arguments to the Contrary. So that notwithſtanding all my Contradiction, you ought to believe me ſtill as ſtrongly perſwaded of the truth of what you have aſſerted, as if I had acted your part, and undertaken the aſſertion of the ſame myſelf: my diffidence being not of the Souls Incorruptibility, but of the poſſibility of its Demonſtration, by you or any man elſe. And now, though you have brought, I confeſs, moſt excellent Arguments to prove it, and both ſatisfied all my Doubts, and ſolved all my Objections: yet whether you have ſo Demonſtrated it, as to exclude all Dubioſity, and compell aſſent (which is the propriety of perfect Demonſtration) in a pure Natural Philoſopher, who refuſeth to admit any other conviction, but from the Light of Nature; I muſt leave to the judgement of our Arbiter, the noble *Iſodicaſtes*, who will not, I am well aſſured, deliver any but an equitable Cenſure in the Cauſe.

Athanaſius.

And you may remember too, *Lucretius*, how in the beginning I advertiſed you of the Unreaſonableneſs of ſuch over-curious Wits, as expect Mathematicall Demonſtrations in Metaphyſicall Subjects, which are really incapable of them; and gave you an undeniable Reaſon thereof. So that conſidering my timely prevention of your expectation in that kind; and your owne confeſſion that I have ſatisfied all your Scruples, and ſolved all your Objections: I cannot

not but wonder at your obſtinacy in your old opinion, that it is not poſſible to convince a meer Natural man, of the Souls Immortality, by the teſtimony of pure Reaſon. Nevertheleſs, I freely joyn with you, in your Appeal to the verdict of *Iſodicaſtes*, than whom certainly no man can be more judicious, no man more juſt.

Iſodicaſtes.

The matter now at laſt in diſpute betwixt you, ſeems to be this; *whether in a Theſis, or Propoſition, which is not capable of being evinced by a Geometrical Demonſtration* (as this of the Souls Immortality ſeems not to be) *there can yet be expected ſuch ſubſtantiall and ſatisfactory Reaſons, Phyſical or Moral, or both, as may ſuffice to the full eſtabliſhment of it's Truth, in the mind of a reaſonable man?* And therefore (that I may give you my opinion, in a word) I ſay; that though in things belonging to the cognizance of a pure Philoſopher, every one ought to ſeek for the beſt aſſurance, of which the nature of that thing, into which he enquireth, will poſſibly admit; and that the way of Demonſtration, *More Geometrico*, is of all others the moſt convincing and ſcientificall: yet, ſince many things not only in Metaphyſicks, but even in Phyſicks, are of ſo retired and abſtruſe a nature, as not to be brought under the ſtrict laws and rules of Geometry, of which notwithſtanding we may acquire a competent certitude, by well examining their Effects and conſtant Operations; as on one ſide, we ought not to require abſolute Demonſtrations, where the Condition of the ſubject doth exclude them; ſo on the other, we ought not to deny the force of all other teſtimonies,

nies, that right Reaſon offereth in evidence of its verity aſſerted, eſpecially when all that can be ſaid againſt it, ſhall be found vain and light, in compariſon of what is alleaged in defence of it. This conſidered, though *Athanaſius* hath not preciſely (according to the rigorous acceptation of the word) Demonſtrated the Immortality of Mans Soul; yet foraſmuch as He hath proved it by good and important Reaſons, aſwell Phyſical as Moral, ſuch as are not much inferiour to abſolute Demonſtrations, and ſuch as by vaſt exceſſes tranſcend the weight of all your oppoſite Allegations, *Lucretius:* truely, I think you ought to reſt ſatisfied, that He hath diſcharged himſelf of his Undertaking to the Full; eſpecially ſince it would be a very hard task for you to maintain, that all the beams of the Light of Nature do concentre only in Mathematical Demonſtrations, and that we can know nothing, which is not Demonſtrable. And now Gentlemen, if you pleaſe, let us be going towards my houſe, where I am ſure we were expected at leaſt an hour agoe, and where I ſhall have leaſure to thank you more ſolemnely for the infinite content I have received from your Converſation.

Athanaſius.

We are ready to attend you, Nobleſt *Iſodicaſtes*; and ſhall ever be as ready to acknowledg the ſingular Honour you have done us, in loſing this Evening upon perſons ſo unable to merit your attention, as we have now ſhewne ourſelves.

FINIS.